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A long and bloody conflict, United States military action in Vietnam 
tore the fabric of American political and social life during the 1960s and 
1970s. A wide coalition of activists opposed the war on political and 
religious grounds, arguing the American military campaign and the 
conscription of soldiers to be immoral.  The Reverend William Sloane 
Coffin Jr., an ordained Presbyterian minister and chaplain at Yale 
University, emerged as a leader of religious antiwar activists. 
 This project explores the evolution of Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric 
between the years 1962 and 1973. I argue that Coffin relied on three 





mode, which dominated Coffin’s discourse in 1966, Coffin relied on the 
tradition of Hebraic prophecy to warn that the United States was straying 
from its values and that undesirable consequences would occur as a 
result. After seeing little change to the direction of U.S. foreign policy, 
Coffin shifted to an existential mode of rhetoric in early 1967. The 
existential mode urged draft-age men to not cooperate with the Federal 
Selective Service System, and to accept any consequences that occurred 
as a result. Federal prosecutors indicted Coffin and four other antiwar 
activists in January 1968 for conspiracy aid and abet draft resister in 
violation of the Selective Service Act. Chastened by his prosecution and 
subsequent conviction, Coffin adopted a reconciling mode of discourse 
that sought to reintegrate antiwar protesters into American society by 
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WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN AS A RELIGIOUS DISSIDENT 
 
The 1960s were a time of social and political turmoil in the United 
States. The civil rights movement, urban race riots, and women’s 
liberation shook domestic politics. In foreign affairs, millions of draft-age 
men found themselves faced with the possibility of serving in a jungle 
war thousands of miles away.  As one commentator later argued, the 
sheer number of Americans affected by the Vietnam War was staggering: 
“30 million women and 30 million men reached draft age during the war; 
ten million of the men wore the uniform, three million of them went to 
Vietnam. About 300,000 were wounded and nearly 60,000 died” (Wheeler 
1985, 749).  But despite hundreds of antiwar protests between 1964 and 
1975—some of them violent—the Vietnam antiwar movement struggled 
to change the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In a September 1967 staff 
editorial, Commonweal, a Catholic newsmagazine critical of the war, 
lamented the growing policy stalemate: 
The war in Vietnam, the mounting fury in the ghettoes, and the 
whole intent and direction of the poverty program have shattered 
not only President Johnson’s “consensus,” a fragile thing to begin 
with, but more importantly, they have also brought the various 
forms of American political dissent to a dead end. The dissent was 





books, articles, petitions to the President, full-page advertisements 
in newspapers, even television jokes. Then the dissent became 
more active: sit-ins, marches, demonstrations, riots, and, on a 
smaller scale, refusal to pay taxes and a willingness to go to jail or 
Canada rather than be drafted. But none of these forms of dissent 
has managed to change the drift of American policy, at home or 
abroad. On the contrary, the war has escalated again and again, 
white resistance to Negro demands has hardened; Congress 
steadily hacks away at the poverty program (“Dissent at a Dead 
End” 1967, 597). 
Politically, the war had significant long-term consequences for United 
States public policy. Although a Democratic president escalated the war, 
Republicans accused antiwar Democrats of opposing a strong national 
defense (Buzzanco 1996, 3). Democrats lost the 1968 and 1972 
presidential elections and fared poorly in Congressional races at least 
partly because of the war (Levy 1991, 87). The antiwar movement shook 
American culture. As Levy asserts: “The debate over Vietnam was clearly 
a moment of critical and traumatic self-scrutiny for the American people” 
(1991, xiii).  
Vietnam antiwar protesters are commonly remembered as 
countercultural radicals who rejected American society even though they 
only represented a small portion of the movement: “This myth—antiwar 





standing order, stands alongside the myth of antiwar activists as agents 
or dupes of the international communist conspiracy. Both die hard in 
America” (Farber 1992, 21).  Scholarly accounts remain unsettled about 
the historical and cultural significance of the Vietnam antiwar 
movement, or what lessons can be learned as a result. As Melvin Small 
(1987) claims, “We still know little about how to attract the attention and 
sympathies of the president and his or her advisors on major foreign 
policy issues” (185). Within the field of communication, approximately a 
dozen previous studies have examined dimensions of the antiwar 
movement. These studies have typically employed an instrumental view 
of rhetoric, concerned with the effects produced by that discourse.1  
We know even less about the ways that religious protesters 
contributed to the antiwar movement. Rhetorical histories of the 1960s 
have not fully accounted for the role of religion in the American political 
left. For example, in their survey of American religious discourse in The 
SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies (2009), James Darsey and Joshua 
R. Ritter claim, “Too little attention has been paid to the moral grounding 
of much of the political activity on the left during the 1960s, perhaps 
because not all of it enjoyed the benison of the church” (567). Yet Darsey 
and Ritter’s narrative emphasizes the countercultural strains of religion 
in the 1960s: “Children of the sixties made the pilgrimage to Tibet; 
                                                 
     1 Bitzer’s influential definition of the rhetorical situation argues that 
the goal of rhetoric is to modify an exigence, or “imperfection marked by 
urgency” through the persuasion of an audience capable of modifying the 





explored Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism; sought themselves in sweat 
lodges and in the books of Carlos Casteneda; and flirted with paganism” 
(567-568). Although Darsey and Ritter are correct to assert that new 
religious movements arose in the 1960s, their account ignores a coalition 
of Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish activists who strongly 
protested the war and attempted to influence foreign policy. 
In what follows, I offer an account of the religious antiwar 
movement’s rhetoric, by focusing on explaining the characteristics and 
outcomes of the antiwar discourse of a single figure—namely, Rev. 
William Sloane Coffin Jr. An ordained Presbyterian minister and campus 
chaplain at Yale University, Coffin’s significance to the religious antiwar 
movement is unmistakable. The Encyclopedia of Christianity calls Coffin 
a leader and icon of the Vietnam antiwar movement (Burkholder 1997, 
114). Appelbaum (2009) claims that “mainline Protestants like William 
Sloane Coffin became strong public voices in the antiwar movement. 
Many individuals and congregations worked at the grassroots level” 
(203). 
Born to a wealthy family in New York City in 1924, Coffin studied 
at the elite Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts and finished high school 
at Phillips Andover Academy in 1942 (Goldstein 2004, 22, 28). Coffin 
served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1947, eventually earning the rank 
of second lieutenant (ibid., 37). After the war, he earned a bachelor’s 





one year of postgraduate study at Union Theological Seminary in New 
York (ibid., 73). He served as a CIA agent during the Korean War from 
1950 to 1953, where he used his Russian language skills to train Soviet 
expatriates as American spies (ibid., 76). After leaving the CIA, Coffin 
enrolled at Yale Divinity School, and eventually earned a masters’ of 
divinity degree in 1956 (ibid., 97). He then began a series of chaplaincies, 
serving at Philips Andover Academy for the 1956-57 academic year, at 
Williams College for the 1957-58 academic year, and eventually became 
chaplain at Yale University in 1958. He remained at Yale until 1975. 
During the 1960s, Coffin became an outspoken supporter of the 
civil rights movement in the American South and later, a leader of the 
religious branch of the Vietnam antiwar movement. In the following 
chapters, I shall argue that in spite of several historical accounts which 
examine Coffin’s antiwar activism, rhetorical scholars have mostly 
overlooked his Vietnam-era texts.  Through analysis of Coffin’s public 
discourse from 1962 through 1973, my dissertation aims to provide a 
more nuanced account of his participation in the antiwar movement. I 
shall argue that as the social and political circumstances evolved, Coffin 
employed distinct modes of rhetoric to express his opposition to the war.  
 This chapter begins with a survey of previous research, broadly 
grouped into historical and rhetorical categories. Within both categories, 





shift to more specific accounts of Coffin. I then offer a general description 
of my research method and outlines of subsequent chapters. 
Historical Research in Perspective 
 Historical accounts acknowledge that Coffin and other religious 
leaders played a distinct role in the Vietnam antiwar movement. A 
smaller body of literature deals with Coffin specifically, and seeks to 
contextualize his social activism in the 1960s and 70s. 
Vietnam Antiwar Movement Scholarship 
 There is voluminous historical scholarship about the Vietnam 
antiwar movement in the United States.2 My review of literature identifies 
five types of accounts: (1) synoptic accounts of the overall antiwar 
movement and the 1960s, (2) accounts about policymakers opposed to 
the war, (3) accounts about the religious antiwar movement, (4) 
specialized accounts about the antiwar movement in specific geographic 
and cultural communities, and (5) studies of public opinion toward the 
antiwar movement. Coffin is mentioned frequently in the first and third 
types of accounts; however, his rhetorical activities are generally not 
subjected to close analysis. 
                                                 
     2 In an essay about the historiography of the Vietnam-era antiwar 
movements  Charles Chatfield  (2004) classifies previous studies by date 
published. These categories include: wartime accounts from 1965-1975, 
histories and memoirs from 1978-1988, and historical syntheses and 





Synoptic Accounts. Numerous monograph-length studies have 
provided narratives of the antiwar movement from a synoptic perspective. 
The earliest of such accounts, by Thomas Powers (1973), focuses on 
antiwar events between 1964 and 1968. More recent studies, including 
Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan (1984), Charles DeBenedetti and 
Charles Chatfield (1990), Tom Wells (1994), Adam Garfinkle (1995), and 
Melvin Small (2002) trace the antiwar movement from its beginnings in 
the early 1960s through the evacuation of the last Americans from 
Saigon in 1975. Other synoptic accounts have focused on the 1960s 
more generally, by examining the Vietnam antiwar movement alongside 
other contemporaneous social movements.3  Most synoptic accounts of 
the antiwar movement begin by describing precursors to the movement 
in the 1950s and early 1960s. These events include the anti-nuclear 
movement of the 1950s (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990), Barry 
Goldwater’s unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1964 (Powers 1973), 
the civil rights movement (Small 2002), and self-immolations  committed 
by radical pacifists (Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984). 
Synoptic accounts offer conflicting judgments about the antiwar 
movement’s consequences. Powers asserts that the antiwar movement 
“created the necessary conditions for the shift in official policy from 
                                                 
     3 General historical treatments of the 1960s that include coverage of 
the Vietnam antiwar movement include O’Neill (1971), Shachtman 
(1983), Gitlin (1987), Farber and Foner (1994), Koerselman (1987), 
Steigerwald (1995), Isserman and Kazin (2000), McWilliams (2000), Heale 





escalation to disengagement” (1973, 318). Zaroulis and Sullivan avoid 
drawing specific conclusions, arguing that “[T]he effectiveness of [the 
antiwar movement’s] tactics is still a matter for debate; probably it 
always will be” (1984, xii). DeBenedetti and Chatfield similarly avoid 
drawing effects-based conclusions, but claim that in-fighting between 
liberals and radicals hindered the movement (1990, 391). Small (2002) 
argues that the antiwar movement achieved success at two points during 
the conflict: in early 1968, antiwar sentiment forced Lyndon Johnson to 
de-escalate the war, and prevented Richard Nixon from re-escalating in 
1969 (161).  
Only Garfinkle (1995) argues that the antiwar movement had no 
effect on policymakers. In particular, Garfinkle asserts that the Johnson 
administration de-escalated the war in early 1968 because of self-
restraint, and not growing public unrest (1995, 265, 266). He rejects 
claims that antiwar protests prevented Nixon from re-escalating the war, 
observing that Nixon did escalate by ordering the bombing of Cambodia 
(ibid., 185). In Garfinkle’s view, the antiwar movement succeed only at 
pushing the Democratic Party leftward (ibid., 266). 
Synoptic historical accounts largely overlook the rhetorical 
activities of individual movement participants. Coffin earns mention in 
several of the narratives, both for his leadership role in Clergy and Laity 
Concerned About Vietnam (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990, Small 2002) 





Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990). However, 
these studies provide only descriptive summaries of Coffin’s activities.  
Political Accounts. A second group of studies focus on policymakers 
who opposed the war in legislative settings. Although these studies are 
relatively small in number, they effectively summarize common 
arguments made against the war by policymakers. 
David W. Levy (1991) provides one of the broadest accounts of 
Vietnam-era policy. He frames American intervention in Vietnam as an 
outgrowth of Cold War-era anticommunist ideology. War opponents 
argued that Vietnam represented the failure of U.S. foreign policy toward 
communism, while war supporters argued that American defeat in 
Vietnam represented the failure of national will (1991, 171). Levy claims 
that three lessons can be learned from policy debates about Vietnam: 
first, the conflict illustrates “how wars are justified (or how they fail to be 
justified) among men and women,” second, the conflict illustrates the 
reluctance of Americans to become entangled in foreign wars, and third, 
the conflict illustrates a fundamental human debate about meanings of 
good and evil (ibid., 182, 183).  
Gary Stone examines opposition to the war amongst members of 
the United States Senate. He finds that senators opposed to the war 
made three types of arguments: escalating the war might provoke a 
broader conflict with China or the Soviet Union, the South Vietnamese 





between two independent states (2007, 187, 188). Senate opponents 
viewed the war as a threat to the Senate’s reputation with the American 
public (2007, 189). Although Stone draws few conclusions about the 
effects of Senate opposition to the war, he claims that senators “played a 
decisive role in ensuring that voices opposed to the war were audible and 
accessible to people throughout the United States” (2007, 191).    
Andrew Johns (2006) analyzes a small but vocal number of 
Republican policymakers opposed to American involvement in Vietnam. 
These Republicans included Rep. Eugene Siler of Kentucky, who opposed 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, and several members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations committee who voted for the Tonkin resolution 
but later supported de-escalation (2006, 589). One such Senator, George 
Aiken of Vermont, called for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in 
1967 (ibid., 597).   
These political narratives provide a clear chronology of antiwar 
arguments in institutional policymaking settings. However, they largely 
ignore the relationship between policymakers, social movement activists, 
and public opinion. As a result, important questions about the role of 
social-movement rhetoric in the formulation of Vietnam-era foreign policy 
remain unaddressed. 
Accounts of Religious Opposition.  Five previous studies examine 
Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish activists’ contributions to the 





Charles Meconis examines the Catholic antiwar left. He bases his 
account on personal involvement with the movement, primary sources, 
and personal interviews conducted with movement leaders. Meconis 
concludes that the Catholic Left had a three-fold impact. First, it moved 
the individual conscience of some Catholic leaders, particularly bishops 
(1979, 143). Second, the Catholic Left expanded the meaning of 
nonviolent civil disobedience (ibid., 144). Third, it attracted the attention 
of President Nixon (ibid., 148).4  
Penelope Moon provides a more nuanced account of the Catholic 
antiwar left, by analyzing the strategies of the Catholic Peace Fellowship 
(CFP). She argues that the CFP initially used apostolic witness to justify 
their opposition to the war, invoking Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem 
in Terris and Vatican II documents in support of their position (2003, 
1037). After apostolic witness failed to move a majority of Catholic laity 
and clergy to oppose the war, Moon claims the CFP shifted to more 
radical forms of resistance (ibid., 1040, 1041). Moon argues that this 
shift represented a move from apostolic witness to prophetic witness: 
“Unlike apostolic work, which relied on discussion, research, and writing, 
prophetic antiwar witness employed drama, theater, and action to jolt 
the public conscience and force American Catholics to assess the 
intersection of their religious and civic identities” (1043).  
                                                 
     4 Meconis’s claim about Nixon strains credibility, because it relies on 
a secondhand account of a conversation between a movement participant 





Mitchell K. Hall (1990 and 1992) focuses on religious opposition to 
the war organized by Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam 
(CALCAV), an ecumenical organization with Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish leadership. Hall (1990) charts the chronological progression of 
CALCAV, focusing largely on its day-to-day activities and its 
collaboration with other antiwar organizations. His second study (1992) 
links CALCAV to the post-WWII ecumenical movement and the civil 
rights movement in the American South (35, 36). He concludes that 
media coverage of radical antiwar protesters drowned out CALCAV’s 
initially moderate message, and that the group failed to connect with the 
public (ibid., 50-51). Nevertheless, Hall finds that CALCAV’s moderate 
image gave the organization more access to government officials for 
lobbying purposes than other antiwar groups (ibid., 52). Hall 
acknowledges that Coffin held an important leadership role within 
CALCAV and summarizes his leadership role in the organization, but 
gives only cursory treatment to Coffin’s speeches.  
Finally, Michael Friedland (1998) examines the relationship 
between the religious branches of the civil rights and antiwar movements 
in the 1960s. Unlike Meconis and Hall’s more narrowly-focused studies, 
Friedland examines a broad cross-section of the antiwar movement. 
Significantly, he argues that individual activists moved between causes 
and organizations as they saw fit, a finding which helps to explain some 





Together, these five accounts of antiwar religious groups describe 
the extent of religious antiwar movement that existed during the Vietnam 
era. Yet the narratives remain conflicted about the effectiveness of 
religious opposition. 
Specialized Accounts of the Antiwar Movement. A third type of study 
focuses on the antiwar movement as experienced in specific geographic 
and cultural communities. As Levy (1991) asserts, “The Vietnam debate 
was given some of its special flavor by the fact that it so often occurred 
between and within particular subcommunities” (77).   
Michael Foley (2003a) focuses on the draft resistance movement in 
Boston between 1966 and 1969. The book is significant because it 
provides an extensive contextual account of Coffin’s participation in draft 
resistance protests in October 1967. Jessica Mitford (1969) and Foley 
(2003b) provide detailed accounts of the subsequent Federal indictment 
and prosecution of Coffin and four other leaders from the October 1967 
protests.  
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (1999) focuses on the role of four groups in 
the antiwar movement: students, African Americans, women, and labor 
unions. Although each group initially supported Lyndon Johnson’s 
domestic political agenda, they eventually lost faith in the president 
because of his Vietnam policy. Jeffreys-Jones claims that the disunity 
among different factions of the antiwar movement and recurring protests 





that although policymakers disliked the antiwar movement, the protests 
cumulatively weakened the government’s desire to continue the war 
(1999, 223). 
Yet another strand of research examines the role of opposition to 
the war within the military itself, including Anderson (1992), Corthright 
(1992), Buzzanco (1996), and Hunt (1999). These studies claim that 
military resistance influenced public perceptions of the war. For example, 
Buzzanco argues that dissident officers “had no trouble reaching the 
public with their antiwar message and they arguably played an 
important part in the national debate over Vietnam” because of their 
firsthand experience with the war (1996, 344). Anderson argues that the 
GI antiwar movement achieved a major victory with the end of 
conscription in 1973 (1992, 115). 
These specialized accounts indicate that debate over Vietnam 
permeated diverse American communities. Foley and Mitford’s accounts 
are particularly useful for contextualizing Coffin’s rhetorical activities 
during and after the October 1967 resistance protests. 
Public Opinion Studies. Three empirical studies and one historical 
study measured the effect of the antiwar movement on general public 
opinion toward the Vietnam War. These studies suggest that the antiwar 
movement did not directly turn public opinion against Vietnam, but may 





The earliest public opinion study, Schuman (1972), concludes that 
although the antiwar movement did “not speak the same language as the 
general public,” antiwar activists influenced journalists and opinion 
leaders, who in turn influenced the general public (534, 535).Schreiber 
(1976) asserts that “the assumption that anti-Vietnam war 
demonstrations reduced, or helped to reduce, the American public's 
support for the Vietnam war . . . is not supported by the evidence" (232). 
Instead, Schreiber suggests that elite opinion leaders and unfavorable 
media coverage more likely contributed to the end of the war (ibid.). 
Similarly, Lunch and Sperlich (1979) argue that elite opinion leaders—
but not antiwar demonstrators—turned the American public against the 
war (31).  
Small (1988) analyzes public opinion’s influence on presidential 
policymaking. He asserts that the antiwar movement contributed to 
ending the war in two ways. First, it forced LBJ to de-escalate the war in 
spring 1968 and later prevented Nixon from re-escalating (21). Second, 
Small speculates that citizens who did not support the antiwar 
movement may have nevertheless wished for an end of war, because they 
disliked the social turmoil it created (ibid.).  
In sum, these studies suggest that the Vietnam antiwar movement 
influenced public opinion indirectly. Although antiwar demonstrators 





that protests influenced elite opinion leaders and prevented policymakers 
from escalating the war. 
Historical Studies of Coffin 
A separate, much smaller strand of literature examines Coffin’s life 
from a historical perspective. Warren Goldstein (2004) provides the most 
comprehensive account of Coffin’s life, from his childhood through 2003. 
Goldstein’s account is important to my project for two reasons. First, he 
situates Coffin theologically, arguing that his faith represented a mixture 
of social gospel and neo-orthodox theologies. Second, Goldstein traces 
the circumstances that gradually drew Coffin into the civil rights and 
antiwar movements during the 1960s. 
Joseph Heister (1973) also provides a historical account of Coffin’s 
theological beliefs and his participation in the civil rights and antiwar 
movements. Heister’s work contributes to my project by explaining the 
sources of Coffin’s beliefs. First, he asserts that the writings by French 
existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Andre Malraux 
influenced Coffin during his undergraduate years at Yale (17). Second, 
Heister claims that Reinhold Neibuhr, Paul Tillich, and the Book of 
Jeremiah influenced Coffin during divinity school (ibid., 201, 209). 
 Both Goldstein and Heister provide rich historical accounts of 
Coffin’s career and contextualize many of the ideas expressed in his 
public discourse. Goldstein quotes extensively from Coffin’s sermons and 





neither study purports to explain Coffin’s antiwar activities from a 
rhetorical persective. 
Rhetorical Research in Perspective 
Like historians, rhetorical scholars have studied the Vietnam 
antiwar movement and Coffin’s public discourse, but with different 
objectives in mind. As Zarefsky argues, rhetorical history seeks to 
explain 
[H]ow people defined the situation, what led them to seek to justify 
themselves or to persuade others, what storehouse of social 
knowledge they drew upon for their premises, what themes and 
styles they produced in their messages, how their processes of 
identification and confrontation succeeded or failed (1998, 31-32). 
Previous studies of antiwar movement rhetoric focus on the instrumental 
effectiveness of the movement’s messages, namely, whether they 
persuaded audiences to take action. Rhetorical scholars have examined 
Coffin’s public discourse, but as we shall see, these studies most 
frequently analyze Coffin’s post-Vietnam era rhetoric, especially his 
speeches from the 1980s. 
Rhetorical Studies of the Antiwar Movement 
Only a handful of published rhetorical studies deal directly with 
the Vietnam antiwar movement. Sutton’s “The Rhetoric of the Vietnam 





studies of antiwar movement discourse: Cox (1974), Bass (1979), and 
Jurma (1982).5   An additional study, Gustainis and Hahn (1988), also 
examines the movement in general terms. 
J. Robert Cox (1974) examines the antiwar movement from a 
Bitzerian perspective. He concludes that antiwar activists’ strident 
demands made it difficult to mobilize a broad audience to take action. 
Bass (1979) examines the generic features of antiwar discourse from the 
American Revolutionary War and Vietnam War. He claims that antiwar 
activists offered moral, legal, and economic arguments, and that such 
arguments intensify when a war progresses without clear signs of victory 
(191).  William Jurma (1982) argues that the Moratorium Day protests of 
1969 failed, because the protestors misunderstood the goals of their 
political adversaries and did not adjust their message to mass media 
(271). J. Justin Gustainis and Dan Hahn (1988) claim the Vietnam 
antiwar movement failed and actually prolonged the war with their 
divisive rhetoric (203).6 Yet with the exception of Jurma, who classifies 
the Moratorium Day organizers as ‘moderates,’ the authors of these 
                                                 
     5 The other twenty-seven sources listed deal with either presidential 
rhetoric justifying involvement in the war or popular culture texts 
responding to Vietnam. 
     6 In the authors’ judgment, six intrinsic rhetorical strategies proved to 
be unsound: “identification with the counter-culture, immoderate protest 
tactics, the use of violence, attacks on capitalism, the use of obscenity, 
and desecration of the American flag” (1988, 205). Gustainis and Hahn 
further argue that five extrinsic factors—anti-communist ideology, 
general opposition to protest, violence by protest opponents, media 
coverage, and polarization by political figures—further undermined the 





studies speak of the antiwar movement in general terms, as if it were a 
monolithic entity. 
A second strand of scholarship focuses on individual antiwar 
speakers.7 Gregory Olson (1995) analyzes U.S. Senate majority leader 
Mike Mansfield’s antiwar discourse during the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations. George Dionisopoulos, Victoria Gallagher, Steven 
Goldzwig, and David Zarefsky (1992) analyze the intersection of the civil 
rights and antiwar movements in Martin Luther King Jr.’s April 4, 1967 
speech “A Time to Break Silence.” James Jasinski and John Murphy 
(2009) also examine a “Time to Break Silence.”  
Scholars have also examined the rhetoric of individual Catholic 
peace activists. John Patton (1975) argues that the Jesuit priests Daniel 
and Philip Berrigansused rhetorical enactment to challenge the political 
order when they burned draft cards at a Catonsville, Maryland draft 
board office in 1968 (1975, 10). Similarly, Gustainis (1983) classifies the 
Berrigans as part of the Catholic ultra-resistance to Vietnam. More 
recently, Sara Ann Mehltretter (2009) argues that Catholic activist 
Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement embraced moderate 
                                                 
     7 I also wish to acknowledge three descriptive accounts of antiwar 
rhetoric. Benson and Johnson (1968) describe the experience of 
observing an antiwar protest firsthand. Rosenwasser (1969) provides a 
descriptive analysis of antiwar speeches made by Senators Frank 
Church, William Fulbright, Ernest Gruening, Eugene McCarthy, George 
McGovern, and Wayne Morse. Yoder (1969) offers a descriptive analysis 





protest tactics during the Vietnam era that allowed her to maintain ties 
with both Catholic radicals and the church’s institutional hierarchy (26).  
Rhetorical Studies of Coffin 
Previous rhetorical critics have analyzed specific subsets of Coffin’s 
public discourse; however, most of these studies have focused on his 
post-Vietnam rhetoric. Margaret Hambrick (1990; and as Margaret Cavin 
1994) analyzes six of Coffin’s speeches from the nuclear freeze movement 
of the 1980s. Marianne Rhebergen (2002) analyzes one hundred Coffin 
sermons delivered at Riverside Church between 1977 and 1987, and 
classifies twenty-two of those sermons as Jeremiads. Similarly, Steven 
Loy (2003) analyzes sixteen of Coffin’s Riverside Church sermons to 
compare prophecy in contemporary homiletics with ancient Israeli 
prophecy.  
 Only two previous studies examine Coffin’s Vietnam antiwar 
rhetoric. William Carl (1977) builds a theory prophetic rhetoric based on 
personal interviews with Coffin and a single sermon that was delivered 
on multiple occasions, “Vietnam: A Sermon.”8 John C. Lang (2008) 
examines the sources of Coffin’s sermons. Significantly, Lang argues that 
theologians Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Richard Niebuhr 
informed Coffin’s preaching (1).  
                                                 
     
8
 Coffin delivered “Vietnam: A Sermon” multiple times during his 
career. Carl relies on a version preached at the Washington National 
Cathedral’s evensong on April 30, 1967 that was subsequently 





In summary, previous rhetorical analyses of the Vietnam antiwar 
movement provide a useful but incomplete background for my study. Cox 
(1974) and Jurma (1982) provide useful background information about 
the rhetorical constraints faced by antiwar activists. Carl (1977) and 
Lang (2008) provide background information about some of the 
intellectual and theological trends that informed Coffin’s antiwar 
preaching. However, no previous studies explain how Coffin’s  antiwar 
rhetoric evolved over time, how he responded to changing political 
circumstances, or how his arguments incorporated religious perspectives 
other than prophetic discourse. My dissertation will contribute to this 
literature by analyzing the modes of rhetoric that Coffin used to oppose 
the war, and how these modes related to his political and social context. 
Research Procedure 
Object of Investigation 
Given the gaps in previous studies of religion in the Vietnam antiwar 
movement, my dissertation will examine Coffin’s activities between 1961 
and 1975. Through analysis of Coffin’s sermons delivered at Yale’s Battell 
Chapel, speeches given at antiwar events, transcripts of media 
appearances, personal correspondence, and courtroom testimony, I shall 
argue that it is possible to trace the gradual evolution of his antiwar 
discourse. It is important to note that Vietnam is mentioned in only a 





pastoral duties throughout the 1960s, including baptisms, weddings, 
funerals, and weekly services at Battell Chapel, where he preached 
sermons unrelated to Vietnam.9 
The main source of this primary discourse will be Coffin’s papers, 
available at the Yale University Manuscripts and Archives Division 
(MSSA), which I visited in August 2006, March 2008, and August 2009. I 
also draw on documents from the Clergy and Laity Concerned About 
Vietnam papers available at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection. 
The Coffin sermons, speeches, and public statements I analyze include: 
A. “The Church and Civil Rights,” lecture delivered in February 
1962; 
B. “The Spirit of Lamech.” Sermon delivered at Battell Chapel, Yale 
University, January 9, 1966. 
C. “Plea to the President.” Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, January 25, 
1966. 
D. “Why Are the Clergy So Concerned About Vietnam?” March 28, 
1966 
E. “On Civil Disobedience.” Lecture for the Washington Seminar, 
February 21, 1967. 
F. Reply to WHNC editorial. March 9, 1967, 
G. Speech in Boston on October 16, 1967.  
                                                 
     9 Some of these routine pastoral duties and sermons are available in 






H. Statement-Turning In of Draft Cards, Washington D.C., October 
18, 1967. 
I. “On Martin Luther.” Sermon delivered at Battell Chapel, Yale 
University, November 5, 1967. 
J. Meet the Press Interview, January 28, 1968. 
K. Untitled Sermon delivered at Battell Chapel, Yale University, 
February 4, 1968. 
L. Comments by the Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., at the third 
National Resistance Day Rally, Yale University, April 3, 1968.  
M. Speech to be Delivered by William Sloane Coffin at Bryant Park, 
October 15, 1969. 
N. Untitled Sermon delivered at Battell Chapel, Yale University 
April 16, 1972. 
O. Remarks by the Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., National 
Conference on Amnesty, May 5, 1973. 
Accordingly, my dissertation draws on the following letters: 
1. William Coffin to Members of CCAV, 2 February 1966.  
2. William Coffin to Peter Grothe, 8 March, 1966. 
3. William Coffin to Mike Land, 28 March, 1966. 
4. William Coffin to William Bundy, 30 June, 1966. 
5. William Coffin to Talmage Rogers, 19 December, 1966. 
6. William Coffin to Gordon W. Stearns, Jr., 10 January, 1967. 





8. William Coffin to the Yale Daily News, 4 October, 1967. 
9. William Coffin to Sidney Lovett, October 1967. 
Methods of Analysis 
My study approaches Coffin’s antiwar discourse from the 
perspective of public address. I situate Coffin as an individual orator 
within the larger Vietnam antiwar movement.  
In offering one possible meaning of rhetorical history, David 
Zarefsky (1998) asserts that “the historian views history as a series of 
rhetorical problems, situations that call for public persuasion to advance 
a cause or overcome an impasse. The focus of the study would be on 
how, and how well, people invented and deployed messages in response 
to the situation” (30). My study adheres to Zarefsky’s definition by 
considering how Coffin used the prophetic, existential, and reconciling 
modes of rhetoric to advance arguments against the Vietnam War. 
I adhere most closely to definitions of rhetorical movements offered 
by Leland Griffin (1952) and Zarefsky (1980). Griffin introduced the idea 
of movement studies to the communication discipline in his seminal 
1952 essay “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements.” For Griffin, the goal 
of studying movements is to discover the historical development of 
rhetorical trends:  
From the identification of a number of rhetorical patterns, we may 
discover the various configurations of public discussion, whether 





in the intervals of time and whether a constituent set of forms may 
be said to exist (188). 
Zarefsky (1980) extends Griffin’s argument about studying rhetorical 
movements in historical terms, claiming that, “The historical scholar of 
social movement rhetoric takes, as given, instances of collective behavior 
which the sociologist labels a ‘movement’ and then examines their 
rhetorical dimensions” (252). Zarefsky’s definition assumes that the 
study of social movement rhetoric contributes to a richer understanding 
of rhetorical history, rather than a systematic theory of social 
movements. 10 
Organization of the Project 
This project analyzes Coffin’s public discourse, beginning with his 
1962 lecture “The Church and Civil Rights” and ending with his 1973 
speech that advocated amnesty for draft resisters. I argue that as the war 
progressed, Coffin’s views about how to challenge the war evolved, along 
with his preferred mode of rhetorical expression. Each of these modes 
reflects Coffin’s changing views of the war. I assert that Coffin initially 
used a prophetic mode of rhetoric to oppose the war in 1966. In early 
                                                 
     10 Social movement scholarship published in communication journals 
during the 1970s focused on defining movements as theoretical 
constructs. For example, Herbert Simons (1970) claimed that movements 
were organizationally-centered, Michael McGee (1980) argued they were 
discursively-centered, Robert Cathcart (1978) claimed movements existed 
only when confrontation occurred between institutions and outside 
groups, and Suzanne Riches and Malcolm Sillars (1980) argued that 






1967, he shifted to an existential mode of rhetoric, and in the early 
1970s shifted yet again to a reconciling mode.11  
 Chapter Two focuses on Coffin’s use of the prophetic mode 
between 1962 and 1966. My analysis here draws on previous studies of 
prophetic rhetoric. Most notably, Darsey (1997) argues that American 
radical reform rhetoric shares with the Hebrew Bible “a sense of mission, 
a desire to bring the practice of the people into accord with a sacred 
principle, and an uncompromising, often excoriating stance toward a 
reluctant audience” (16). Jackson (2009) asserts that prophetic rhetoric 
champions the needs of socially and economically marginalized people, 
aims to disrupt the political status quo by reminding people “of the 
covenants they have made with God,” and, emphasizes the prophet’s role 
as God’s messenger (51). Similarly, Bobbitt and Mixon (1994) highlight 
prophetic rhetoric’s emphasis on judgment: “Prophecy announces 
impending judgment upon a recalcitrant people who are not living up to 
God’s expectations with the promise that if the people turn away from 
their wicked ways and live according to God’s laws, judgment will be 
                                                 
     11 My use of the term ‘mode’ refers to a recurring pattern of ideas with 
common substantive characteristics. Literary theorist Northrop Frye 
offers one possible definition, explaining that “[t]he conception of modes 
developed out of one of the first features of literature that attracted me as 
a critic. This was the strength and consistency of literary conventions, 
the way in which, for example, the same plot and character types in 
comedy persist with astoundingly little change from Aristophanes to our 
own day” (1990, 47). I do not regard the three modes in this study as 
synonymous with ‘genre,’ since genres are identified by common 
situational and stylistic characteristics in addition to substantive ones 





averted and peace and prosperity will reign” (27). In light of these 
studies, I analyze Coffin’s texts “The Church and Civil Rights ” (1962), 
“The Spirit of Lamech” (1966), “Plea to the President” (1966), and “Why 
Are the Clergy Concerned About Vietnam?” (1966) as representative 
examples of the prophetic mode. I also argue that Coffin’s antiwar 
rhetoric bears striking resemblance to his earlier civil rights rhetoric. 
Coffin’s letters to Mike Land (1966), Peter Grothe (1966c), William Bundy 
(1966), and Talmage Rogers (1966) provide context for my analysis. 
In Chapter Three, I argue that Coffin shifted from a prophetic mode 
of rhetoric to an existential mode in early 1967, after seeing that earlier 
antiwar efforts did not seem to be affecting U.S. policy in Vietnam. In the 
existential mode, Coffin argued that individuals should commit acts of 
protest as their consciences dictated and accept responsibility for those 
actions. Public discourse I analyze in this chapter include: Coffin’s 
lecture “On Civil Disobedience” (1967), his Reply to a WHNC editorial 
(1967), his speech at Boston’s Arlington Street Church (1967), his speech 
at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. (1967), and his sermon 
“On Martin Luther” (1967). 
 Chapter Four analyzes Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric between 1968 and 
1973. After a Federal grand jury indicted him for conspiracy to aid and 
abet draft resisters in January 1968, I argue that Coffin refused to follow 
the existential mode through to its logical end, badly damaging his 





mode of rhetoric to reintegrate war opponents into the mainstream of 
American society.  In a sense a veiled plea for mercy, Coffin’s discourse 
during this era conspicuously avoided blaming either pro-war or antiwar 
advocates. The public discourse I will analyze in this chapter includes 
the transcript of Coffin’s Meet the Press interview (1968), his February 4, 
1968 Sermon at Battell Chapel, his comments at a National Resistance 
Day Rally in New Haven (1968), the transcripts of his testimony in 
Federal district court (1968), his speech in New York City’s Bryant Park 
(1969), his Battell Chapel sermon of April 16, 1972, and his remarks at 
the National Conference on Amnesty (1973). 
 Finally, my afterword examines the implications of studying 
Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric. I shall argue that my study makes two 
significant contributions to studies of Vietnam-era public discourse. 
First, I expand the field’s understanding of Coffin as a speaker by 
analyzing texts overlooked in previous studies. Through analysis of these 
texts, I show that Coffin’s use of rhetorical modes changed over time, as 
his own views about how to best oppose the war changed. Second, I 
argue that Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric shares intertextual resemblance to 
other texts that circulated within his social milieu.  I conclude with a call 
for additional research about other antiwar activists that considers their 






  CHAPTER TWO 
COFFIN AND THE PROPHETIC MODE, 1962-1966 
 
American military advisors entered South Vietnam during the 
Eisenhower administration. U.S. military presence escalated dramatically 
during Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency in 1964. On August 2, 1964, 
North Vietnamese gunboats allegedly fired at the U.S.S. Maddox, while it 
patrolled off the Gulf of Tonkin near North Vietnam (Herring 2002, 142). 
North Vietnamese forces again fired at the Maddox and the U.S.S. C. 
Turner Joy two nights later.12 In response to the incident, President 
Johnson asked Congress for authorization to use military force against 
the North Vietnamese. Johnson declared in a televised address late on 
the evening of August 4, “I shall immediately request the Congress to 
pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its 
determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and 
in defense of peace in southeast Asia” (1964, 927). The resolution 
authorizing force passed the Senate 88-2. Senators Wayne Morse of 
Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska cast the only “nay” votes in the 
Senate. The resolution passed by unanimous consent in the House of 
Representatives.13 
                                                 
     12 The exact events surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin incident are highly 
controversial. Subsequent evidence suggests that the United States 
provoked the attack or misread North Vietnamese intentions entirely. 
     13 Representatives Eugene Siler of Kentucky and Adam Clayton Powell 





The American public initially supported Johnson’s Vietnam policy 
by a large percentage. In the immediate aftermath of the Tonkin incident, 
Johnson’s approval rating rose from 42 to 72 percent in one public 
opinion poll (Herring 2002, 145). Johnson won re-election in November 
1964 in a 46-state landslide, in part by portraying his Republican 
opponent, Barry Goldwater of Arizona, as a foreign policy extremist. 
Coffin later wrote that he supported Johnson’s re-election bid in 1964 
because he was “confident that, unlike Goldwater, a self-professed hawk, 
Johnson, if elected, would be remembered for the lives he saved in 
Vietnam, not for those he lost” (1977, 210).  
Americans opposed to the war initially struggled to challenge the 
Johnson administration. Early war opponents mostly came from social 
movement organizations already active in pacifist causes, including the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters’ League, the American 
Friends Service Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, and the 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 
1990, 100; Friedland 1998, 142). John C. Bennett of Union Theological 
Seminary organized one of the earliest religious protest groups in June 
1963 when he founded the Minister’s Vietnam Committee (Friedland 
1998, 142). The group remained dormant in 1963 and 1964, but moved 
to action in late 1965. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the House leadership used parliamentary procedures to circumvent a 





In October 1965, Bennett convened a group of religious leaders in 
New York to discuss possible responses to the war. Rabbi Abraham 
Joshua Heschel, a professor at Jewish Theological Seminary, Jesuit 
priest Daniel Berrigan, and Lutheran Pastor Richard Neuhaus helped 
organize the meeting (Goldstein 2004, 160). During an October 25 press 
conference about the event, Heschel announced that the group would 
continue to meet on an ongoing basis (ibid.). On November 28, the group 
hosted 400 clergy at New York’s Park Avenue Methodist Church for a 
“study conference” about Vietnam, which Coffin attended as an invited 
speaker (ibid., 161). Encouraged by the results of the conference, 
Bennett convened a meeting on January 11, 1966 to discuss turning the 
group into a national organization (ibid., 161). The organization initially 
took the name Clergy Concerned about the War.  
Coffin chaired the press conference announcing the formation of 
the organization and helped to secure office space from the National 
Council of Churches (Goldstein 2004, 163). He briefly served as the 
group’s executive secretary, but handed daily responsibilities over to 
Richard Fernandez, an unemployed Congregationalist pastor from 
Philadelphia (ibid., 169). Eventually, the organization added “Laymen” to 
its name, becoming Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam 
(CALCAV). Coffin remained involved with the organization for the 
duration of the war. Although Fernandez and Bennett assumed 





public face to the group by writing fundraising letters and position 
papers and speaking at antiwar demonstrations. 
Previous studies correctly argue that Coffin used prophetic rhetoric 
to oppose the war. Notably, Carl (1977) argues that Coffin’s rhetoric drew 
on prophetic commonplaces that circulated within the social milieu of 
the 1960s. However, Carl offers a factually incorrect chronology of 
Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric and fails to connect Coffin’s antiwar discourse 
with his civil rights activism. The result is a gap in the narrative of how 
Coffin’s rhetoric developed. In this chapter, I shall provide a brief 
synopsis of previous accounts of prophetic rhetoric. I next analyze 
Coffin’s use of the prophetic mode in speeches and letters between 1962 
and 1966. I argue that Coffin first employed the prophetic mode during 
his civil rights activism, as illustrated by his 1962 speech “The Church 
and Civil Rights.” Next, I claim that Coffin’s antiwar discourse, beginning 
with his1966 sermons “The Spirit of Lamech” and “Plea to the President,” 
as well as the March 1966 draft of his position paper “Why are the Clergy 
Concerned About Vietnam?” echo the prophetic arguments first 
introduced in “The Church and Civil Rights.” Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of the circumstances surrounding Coffin’s shift away from the 
prophetic mode in early 1967. 
Prophetic Rhetoric: A Review of the Literature 
Prophetic rhetoric has attracted the attention of rhetorical scholars 





asserting that “prophecy might best be characterized as a vision one has 
experienced that is rendered accessible to others through a linguistic 
translation . . . Prophetic visions reveal truths; they remove blindness 
and replace it with clarity” (460). The American tradition of prophetic 
rhetoric began in New England in the seventeenth century and continued 
into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Prophecy and the Judeo-Christian Tradition 
The Hebrew Bible provides the most common source of prophetic 
rhetoric within the American Judeo-Christian tradition (Zulick 2009, 
133). On the North American continent, seventeenth century Puritan 
ministers used a form of prophetic preaching known as the Jeremiad to 
remind listeners of their community’s relationship with God. Miller first 
described the formal characteristics of the Jeremiad in Errand into the 
Wilderness (1956). Although the Puritan theocracy’s influence waned in 
the late seventeenth century, Bercovitch (1978) asserts that the stylistic 
and substantive characteristics of the Jeremiad remained present in 
other types of public discourse.14 Zulick (2009) sees Bercovitch’s 
monograph as a watershed moment in the scholarship of religious 
rhetoric, claiming that “Bercovitch opened up the world of Puritan 
                                                 
     14 Bercovitch (1978) argues that Halfway Covenant of 1661 weakened 
the institutional church, but guaranteed that its cultural forms would be 
transmitted to future generations. The influence of Bercovitch on 
subsequent rhetorical studies is unmistakable. Ritter (1980) sees the 
Jeremiad present in presidential nominating speeches, Johanessen 
(1986) sees it present in economic reform rhetoric, and Murphy (1990) 





religion, a world in which America figured as the landscape of promise as 
prefigured by the prophets. But the concept now transcends the strict 
oratorical genre of the jeremiad to become a mode of discourse, a style of 
speech grounded in an entire worldview. This mode is better termed 
prophetic” (133). To Zulick, the prophetic mode “projects a deliberative 
future, one in which oral performance has been translated into written 
text. This future always takes the form of an indeterminate warning to 
persevere in faith, and it always serves the reflexive function of justifying 
God as well as authorizing divine speech” (ibid., 134) 
During the first half of the twentieth century religious orators 
expressed renewed interest in prophetic rhetoric. Three theological 
trends motivated this interest. One such trend, Christian liberalism, 
optimistically believed the kingdom of God could be created through 
material conditions on earth. For example, Social Gospel advocate Walter 
Rauschenbusch argued that Christians were compelled “to transform 
human society into the Kingdom of God by regenerating and 
reconstituting human relations according to the framing covenant 
between humanity and God” (Allen 2000, 97). But the horrors of two 
world wars shook faith in Christian liberalism.  
Two alternative perspectives to liberalism emerged within 





separateness from humankind.15  Mark Silk (1984) argues that neo-
orthodoxy’s power stemmed from its claim to offer prophetic judgment 
that stood outside of human time. As Silk claims,  
Neo-orthodoxy insisted on the limited and historically conditioned 
character of all earthly institutions.  The great sin, endemic to 
humanity, lay in absolutizing the contingent; this was idolatry. The 
great virtue, embodied in the prophetic tradition, was constantly to 
question society's false absolutes in the name of the only true 
absolute, the God who transcended history. (72-73) 
However, neo-orthodoxy rejected any connection between theology and 
worldly political affairs, leaving religious speakers with few ways to 
justify their social reform agenda. Some of these reformers found a 
middle ground between Christian liberalism and Neo-Orthodoxy in a 
perspective known as personalism.  
Personalism originated in the writings of nineteenth century 
philosopher Borden Parker Browne. As a philosophical perspective, 
personalism rejected materialist and idealist explanations of the human 
condition. Barbara Allen (2000) writes that “personalism taught that as a 
self-directed creature made in God’s image, the human being strives to 
attain a greater understanding of God and human purpose by reflecting 
on experience” (98). Consequently, personalists analyzed social 
                                                 
     15 Neo-orthodoxy found its earliest expression in the writings of 
German-Swiss theologian Karl Barth, who sought to dissociate theology 





institutions in terms of their effects on individuals. Warren Steinkraus 
(1973) argues that “there is no higher means of principle than the 
person. All other values are subordinate. Abstract laws, the state, 
property, and other institutions are all to be judged in the light of their 
effects on persons” (103). After Browne’s death, personalist philosophy 
resonated with Boston University theologians, including L. Harold 
DeWolf, Walter George Muelder, and Peter Anthony Bertocci (ibid., 103). 
Personalism played an especially significant role in the rhetorical career 
of DeWolf’s most famous doctoral advisee, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
King used personalist theology to craft a rationale for Christian 
social activism. Through personalist reasoning, King acknowledged 
humankind’s sinful nature, while simultaneously arguing that Christians 
had a duty to improve social conditions for oppressed individuals. John 
Rathbun (1968) asserts that “if God is love, and if men shares in the 
divine nature, then love is a part of the human condition even though all 
men do not respond in terms of love. Here King’s prophetic role plays its 
part, because he can view the atonement as historical assurance that a 
better social order is possible” (1968, 48). King challenged oppressive 
social structures by placing such structures into Biblical context, stating 
that  
As members of the [human] race, individuals find that they are not 
only involved in sporadic acts of sinful conduct, but that they 





public level, sin institutionalizes its power and thereby becomes 
collective in nature. Thus evil can corrupt social custom, and, by 
being locked into institutional behavior, descend unchallenged 
through the generations. The belief that institutional forms may 
themselves suffer from a collective guilt has led King to identify 
himself with the tradition of Hebraic prophecy and, like Ezekiel, to 
declare to that God judges societies as well as individuals. (ibid., 
41) 
Rathbun that as a result of this influence, King frequently drew on the 
prophetic books of the Hebrew Bible, especially Ezekiel and Amos  (ibid., 
42).  
Rhetorical scholars corroborate Rathbun’s claim that King used 
Hebraic prophecy to justify civil rights activism. For example, Gary Selby 
(2001) asserts that King’s use of the Exodus narrative during the 
Montgomery bus boycott of 1957 allowed King to connect secular events 
to a larger cultural tradition familiar to black churchgoing audiences. 
Along the same lines, David Bobbitt and Harold Mixon (1994) claim that 
King’s use of prophetic arguments in his speeches “Give Us the Ballot” 
and “I Have a Dream” emphasized “human action in the socio-political 
realm as the means to bring about a type of secular Kingdom of God in 
race relations” (27). As we shall see, similar themes emerged in Coffin’s 





Studies of Coffin and Prophetic Rhetoric 
Previous Coffin scholars have documented Coffin’s the prophetic 
mode during his rhetorical career. Rhebergen (1987) and Loy (2003) 
focus on Coffin’s prophetic rhetoric while serving as senior pastor at 
Riverside Church in New York City between 1977 and 1987, well after 
American entanglement with Vietnam had ended. Only Carl (1977) 
provides a detailed account of Coffin’s Vietnam-era rhetorical activities 
from a prophetic perspective. Carl’s study offers a theoretical account of 
prophecy’s rhetorical characteristics, traces the historical development of 
prophetic preaching in Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant 
traditions, and finally, analyzes a single instance of a Coffin sermon that 
contains prophetic qualities. Carl defines prophecy as a type of 
commonplace, or an instance of “ready-made slogans, and clichés that 
are accepted flatly” (1977, 77) Drawing on the work of French 
philosopher Jacques Ellul, Carl asserts that commonplaces represent a 
taken-for-granted worldview present in a particular social milieu: 
The argument here is that a sort of commonplace has emerged, a 
symbolic image to be more exact, that has gone unquestioned for 
the most part; that has in secular circles said "prophetic involves 
predicting" and in ecclesiastical circles, “prophetic involves ethical 
criticism of society.” In the Church this commonplace has for the 





least in the 1960's retained power and helped political critics in the 
Church to legitimize their activity. (ibid., 29) 
Yet Carl’s account of Coffin as a prophetic rhetor lacks sufficient 
historical scope. This leads Carl to offer a factually incomplete account of 
Coffin’s antiwar preaching. He identifies Coffin’s April 30, 1967 delivery 
of “Vietnam: A Sermon” at Sunday Evensong in the Washington National 
Cathedral as his “first formal, public statement in a sermon that took as 
its major theme the Vietnam War” (ibid., 208). A paragraph later, Carl 
qualifies this statement somewhat, asserting that “some sermons, 
preached at Yale’s Battell Chapel and other places, dealt with Vietnam 
but rarely in a major way” (ibid.; emphasis mine). However, I shall 
demonstrate that archival records plainly contradict both of Carl’s 
claims. Several primary sources show that Coffin expressed concern 
about Vietnam a full year before “Vietnam: A Sermon.”16 Consequently, 
Carl’s account of Coffin’s prophetic rhetoric overlooks important textual 
evidence.  
Furthermore, Carl completely ignores Coffin’s involvement with the 
civil rights movement and gives only minimal attention to the Vietnam 
antiwar movement after 1967. Even as Carl argues that the period from 
April 1967 to October 1967 represented “the transition from dissent to 
resistance in the peace movement” (ibid., 208), he operates on the 
                                                 
     16 Coffin references Vietnam in his sermon “The Spirit of Lamech,” 
preached at Yale’s Battell Chapel on January 6, 1966, in his speech “Plea 
to the President” given on January 26, 1966, and the March 1966 draft 





assumption that Coffin’s discourse remained prophetic in nature.17 As a 
result, we know relatively little about Coffin’s rhetoric during this period. 
Coffin, Prophetic Rhetoric, and the Civil Rights Movement 
Making sense of Coffin’s use of prophetic rhetoric in the antiwar 
movement requires a brief historical detour through his participation 
civil rights movement. As I shall argue, Coffin’s civil rights discourse 
utilized prophetic arguments that he would draw upon again during the 
antiwar movement later in the decade.  
Coffin became an outspoken supporter of civil rights during the 
1950s. During his year as chaplain at Williams, he endorsed ending the 
school’s fraternity system because he believed it discriminated against 
blacks and Jews (Goldstein 2004, 100). Shortly after he became Yale’s 
chaplain in 1958, Coffin hosted Martin Luther King, Jr. as a guest 
preacher at Battell Chapel (ibid., 131). When violence erupted in the 
American South in May 1961 over ill-fated attempts by civil rights 
activists to integrate interstate bus transportation, Coffin and six other 
activists staged their own Freedom Ride (New York Times 1961, 26). In 
addition to Coffin, the group included Yale Divinity School professor 
Gaylord Noyce, Wesleyan University professors John Maguire and David 
Swift, Johnson C. Smith University students Clyde Carter and Charles 
Jones, and Yale Law student George C. Smith (ibid.). In Atlanta, the 
                                                 
     17 In Chapter Three, I will argue that Coffin used an existential mode 





riders appeared at a press conference at Ebeneezer Baptist Church and 
then boarded a Greyhound bus (Goldstein 2004, 116). When the group 
arrived in Atlanta, Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy provided 
logistical support and lodging (ibid., 117). Although the riders planned to 
continue onward to Jackson, Mississippi, police arrested them in the 
cafeteria of the Montgomery bus depot on May 25 before they could 
complete the full journey (Parke 1962, 38). 
Initially, Coffin offered a secular explanation for participating in the 
Freedom Rides. Immediately after his release from jail, he wrote a short 
essay for Life magazine about his experience. The essay made only two 
oblique references to religion. Coffin wrote in the opening paragraph, 
Many people in the South have criticized the Freedom Riders as 
“outsiders” who went there to stir up trouble. But if you’re an 
American and a Christian you can’t be an outsider on racial 
discrimination, whether practiced in the North or in the South. 
Discrimination has always been immoral and now, as it 
undermines U.S. foreign policy, it is a matter of national concern, 
not local mores. Here was a group of fellow Americans striving for 
rights that were legally and morally theirs. As Christians, and 
Americans we couldn’t not go on the Freedom Rides. On this issue 
all Americans are insiders. (1961, 54) 
The remainder of the essay cited the United States Supreme Court 





about the issue among university educators and “the sea of silent 
moderates in the South” (ibid.). But Coffin would soon invoke a prophetic 
explanation as well. 
“The Church and Civil Rights”: A Rationale for Activism in the Prophetic 
Mode 
 Coffin’s delivered his lengthiest discourse about civil rights in 
February 1962. Delivered to a live audience at Yale’s Strathcona 
auditorium, “The Church and Civil Rights” also aired on the radio 
program Yale Reports. Coffin expressed four themes in the speech: the 
fundamental value of humans as individuals, the primacy of original sin, 
the mission of the church to save souls, and the significance of speaking 
in the prophetic voice rather than the priestly voice. These four themes 
combined to form a rationale for civil rights activism grounded in the 
prophetic mode, and reflected the unmistakable influence of neo-
orthodoxy and personalist theology on Coffin’ public discourse. 
 The first section the speech articulated a personalist rationale for 
believing in the equality of all humans, regardless of race. Coffin began 
by claiming that “[t]he dignity of man is conferred upon man by God, 
bestowed upon man by God. Man does not achieve it, he receives it as a 
gift. When the church talks about man being made in the image of God, 
the glory belongs to God and only reflectively to men” (1962, 2).  But, he 
acknowledged, fully grasping this premise represented “the hardest 





to prove ourselves, only express ourselves” (ibid., 2). Through a series of 
parallel clauses, Coffin next illustrated how the premise of equality 
played out: 
Man cannot be said, for instance, to have value because of his self-
awareness. This would put the mystic, in the eyes of God, ahead of 
the dullards. It cannot be said that man’s worth derives from his 
rational capacities as much as intellectuals would like to believe 
so, because this would put an intellectual, again in the eyes of 
God, ahead of a worker. One cannot say that even knowledge of 
good and evil constitutes the worth of man because this would put 
a pathological liar outside the ken of God’s love. All these equalities 
are essential for a complete person but in none of them, nor in all 
of them, does the value of man reside. (ibid., 2) 
Consequently, Coffin claimed that all individuals had worth, because “If 
Christ then died for all men indiscriminately, to discriminate against any 
man in terms of value is not only, in humanistic terms an offense to the 
human spirit, from a religious point of view it is blasphemy in the face of 
God” (ibid., 2). Yet in spite of this theological impetus, racial inequality 
still existed. 
In the second section of the speech, Coffin analyzed the origins of 
racial prejudice. Coffin’s argument in this section fused together two 
competing explanations for prejudice, one social and one individual. The 





perpetuated by social structures. Coffin asserted that this type of 
prejudice “is not a cause but a result which in turn becomes a cause, 
and thereby a self-perpetuating system is set up.” (ibid., 3). Drawing 
heavily on historical and journalistic accounts, he wrote, 
Carey McWilliams says, “Race relations are not based on prejudice. 
Prejudice is a byproduct of race relations as influenced by other 
factors.” By other factors he may mean economic factors. The 
invention our great New Haven inventor, Eli Whitney. Or he may 
mean historical factors, the War between the States in which, as 
Lillian Smith says, ‘the moral arguments of the North were oh so 
right and the motives of the North were oh-so-selfish.’ That could 
be called perhaps, a psychological reason. And there is a 
psychological explanation of this same point of view. Once you 
degrade somebody, the sense of guilt makes it imperative to justify 
the entire procedure. So the only defense left is to hate the object. 
(ibid., 3, 4) 
Yet Coffin saw another explanation for prejudice, one far more innate to 
the human condition. According to this second view, prejudice was the 
result of original sin latent in all humans.18 Through a garden metaphor, 
                                                 
     18 Coffin attributes this perspective to Toynbee’s An Historian’s View 
of Religion (1928), which, in Coffin’s words, argues that “every living 
creature is striving to make itself into the center of the universe, and in 






Coffin suggested that this sense of original sin combined with 
socialization to develop into full racial prejudice. He argued, 
Children are not born prejudiced in a racial sense, but they are 
born hostile with a sort of undifferentiated hostility which society 
then gives form and substance to. In other words, from a Christian 
point of view, society does provide the ground, the soil, in which 
the seed can germinate and grow. But the seed is already within 
the person. Therefore, Christians cannot charge the evil of 
prejudice to a corrupt society. Prejudice is most fundamental; an 
expression of man’s inherent, his constitutional self-centeredness. 
(ibid., 4)  
The argument here was significant, because it shifted responsibility for 
prejudice back to the individual, who in turn would be responsible for 
repenting from his or her own wicked ways. Like the scolding prophets of 
the Hebrew Bible, Coffin had reminded his audience of their broken 
covenant with God. 
 Coffin gave an implicit nod to neo-orthodox theology by asserting 
that “[t]he primary concern of the church is not with social structures 
nor with political parties, or any other type of social or economic or 
political organization, its primary concern is with the heart of every man” 
(ibid., 4). But because neo-orthodox theology believed the church should 
be completely separate from politics, Coffin had to offer an alternative 





explanation implicitly rooted in personalism.  Here, Coffin argued that 
civil rights activism was justified because it acknowledged the need to 
protect individual rights. He claimed that laws existed primarily to 
protect individuals from evil actions. “While it is true,” he stated, “that 
you cannot legislate morality, you can legislate conditions which are 
more conducive to reality. It is precisely because we are so prone to evil 
that we need the support of a good legal, political, and economic 
structure” (ibid., 5). Coffin argued protecting individuals from acts of evil 
was bound to produce opposition, claiming that “if you do try to prevent 
[men] from lynching Negroes, if you try to prevent men from segregating 
buses and parks and libraries and theaters and all other public utilities, 
you are, of course, going to disturb the peace.” (ibid., 6). 
Coffin next offered a lengthy exposition of the difference between 
the priestly and the prophetic roles of the church (ibid., 5). The priestly 
role, most commonly associated with clergy, “is to administer the 
sacraments, to baptize, to heal when possible, to counsel people in all 
types of situations” (ibid., 5). On the other hand, the prophetic role “is 
the role of the disturber of the peace; to bring the minister himself, to 
bring the congregation, to bring the entire Christian church, to bring the 
entire social order unto some type of judgment” (ibid., 5). Although he 
believed that the prophetic role “is a very necessary role for the church to 
perform,” Coffin acknowledged that it caused controversy when it came 





to be those who will hate him, not only disagree with him, but violently 
hate him, perhaps for good reasons and perhaps, also, for bad reasons” 
(ibid., 5). He next claimed, “I think that the church by and large in our 
country has been remiss in its prophetic role” (ibid., 5). The lack of 
prophetic voices in the public sphere directly paralleled the rise of racial 
segregation. Coffin argued, “It was precisely when the voice of the church 
was silent and withdrawn that Jim Crowism established itself in this 
country. Therefore, if we are to err today perhaps we should err on the 
compensatory side, on the side of the prophetic role” (ibid., 5). 
Anticipating common objections to the prophetic mode, Coffin drew 
from a series of Biblical and contemporary examples to remind the 
audience that Biblical prophets spoke disturbing messages even when 
they were socially inconvenient or unpopular. He first drew on the 
Hebrew Bible to illustrate this point, arguing that, 
In terms of the Old Testament, Moses didn’t wait around for 
Pharaoh’s hard heart to soften, he went down to Pharaoh and he 
said “Let my people go!” And Amos wasn’t shy about leaving Israel 
and going up into Judah and prophesying there. Jonah went all 
the way to Nineveh in order to say, “Thus, saith the Lord.” (ibid., 5) 
Coffin acknowledged that embracing the prophetic role carried 
risks. Drawing again on the example of Jesus Christ, he asserted that 
“[w]e cannot forget that it was His prophetic role that ended His priestly 





responsive. For we cannot forget whom our model is, and we cannot 
forget that the requirements of Christian love are fantastically difficult” 
(ibid., 7). In spite of these dangers, Coffin argued it was the responsibility 
of the Christian minister to work to bring about social change consistent 
with God’s word. “Our job is to try to make sure that the finger of God 
finally does reach the finger of outstretched man,” he stated, “and that 
man comes alive only through that particular touch” (ibid., 7). 
Coffin and the Early Antiwar Movement 
 In January 1966, Coffin participated in the formation of Clergy 
Concerned about Vietnam. During this period, his public discourse drew 
on prophetic themes analogous to the arguments he used in “The 
Church and Civil Rights.” The prophetic mode is particularly evident in 
three of Coffin’s early antiwar discourses: the January 1966 sermon “The 
Spirit of Lamech,” his first major public statement against the war; the 
speech “Plea to the President” delivered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
later that month; and an early draft of his position paper “Vietnam: The 
Clergyman’s Dilemma,” completed in March 1966.  
“The Spirit of Lamech” 
 Coffin delivered his earliest antiwar sermon, “The Spirit of Lamech” 
at Yale’s Battell Chapel on Sunday, January 9, 1966. The next day’s Yale 
Daily News provided a brief summary of the sermon with significant 





Court Disaster” (Gardner 1966, 5). As he had in “The Church and Civil 
Rights,” Coffin employed the prophetic mode to argue for a particular 
course of political action. 
The sermon’s main scriptural proof came from the Book of Genesis 
account of Lamech, a seventh-generation descendant of Cain, who knows 
no remorse for his evil actions. Quoting from Genesis 4: 23, Coffin 
stated,  
Lamech said to his wives: Adah and Zillah, hear my voice; you 
wives of Lamech, hearken to what I say: I have slain a man for 
wounding me, a young man for striking me. If Cain is avenged 
sevenfold, truly Lamech seventy-sevenfold. (1966g, 1) 
Coffin’s decision to quote the passage is significant, given Lamech’s role 
in early Genesis as symbolizing humankind’s wicked ways that would 
eventually culminate in the Great Flood.19 One Biblical scholar’s account 
suggests that the Hebrew etymology of the name Lamech may be 
                                                 
     19 Fretheim argues, “Whereas God avenged the death of Abel, Lamech 
takes vengeance into his own hands; he exacts death for only an injury; 
he appropriates God’s own measures and intensifies the level of 
retribution so much that only a blood feud could ensue . . . the song 
shows how Cain’s violence has been intensified through the generations. 
Progress in sin and its effects matches the progress in civilization” (1994, 
375). Another commentator sees the Song of Lamech as structurally 
significant, arguing that “Over and against these descendants of Cain is 
set Lamech, who boast of his vengeful reign of terror. This dark story of 
violence ends with a genealogy that moves from murderer to murder; the 
framing of a genealogy by two acts that bring death stands in 
contradiction to the genealogical record of the continued life of a family” 





metaphorical for a transition point (Hess 1991, 24, 25).20 Clearly aware 
of this deep symbolism, Coffin argued that the United States had become 
Lamech. He argued that 
The story of Lamech in the Book of Genesis warns that the greatest 
evil can take place there where people say “I don’t see anything so 
bad about that.” Significantly, man’s progress from primitivism to 
civilization is attributed to the descendants not of Seth, but of the 
murderer Cain. And the progress is no moral escalator, ever 
upwards and onwards . . . Today, the spirit of Lamech is moving 
over the face of our land. The crusades for freedom are really for 
chauvinism bolstered by the naïve assumption that God is 
automatically on the anti-communist side. But this nation is 
separating itself from God, and in separating itself from God[,] 
isolating itself from others, so that our national life threatens 
increasingly to become one of cruel self-sufficiency—what’s good 
for America is good for the rest of the world. Morally speaking, the 
                                                 
     20 While acknowledging that the origins of the name Lamech are 
unclear, Hess speculates that “Lamech encompasses the three middle 
consonants of the Hebrew alphabet. Could it be that, as these letters join 
the first half of the Hebrew alphabet with the second half, so Lamech 
joins two halves of the genealogies in the line of Cain just as he also joins 
the lines of Seth and those genealogies which follow in Chapters 10 and 
11?” (1991, 24). Hess believes that such an argument is plausible, 
because ancient Hebrew and Ugaritic abecedaries tended to divide the 
alphabet in halves for pedagogical reasons (ibid., 24). Thus, it would 
follow that “a reader who had learned the alphabet using similar 
abecedaries would naturally associate the name Lamech with a 
transitional movement from the first to the second half of the text, 





U.S. Ship of State is today comparable to the Titanic just before it 
hit the iceberg. If we decide to escalate the war in Viet Nam we are 
sunk. (1966g, 1) 
As a result, the rest of the sermon can be read as a prophetic warning 
about the ways in which the United States has violated its covenant with 
God. 
The speech conclusion returned to the Biblical passage. American 
actions in Vietnam were indefensible in spite of the administration’s 
claim to the contrary. Coffin pessimistically warned, 
America, thy pride swollen face hath closed up thine eyes. Thou 
has become as Lamech. I have slain a man for wounding me, a 
young man for striking me. If Cain is avenged sevenfold, truly 
Lamech seventy-seven fold. O America, my country, my country. 
(ibid., 5) 
On a pragmatic level, it seems obvious that Coffin meant the war in 
Vietnam was unjust and represented the moral decline of the United 
States. Just as Lamech represented the decline of humanity in the early 
Book of Genesis, Coffin postulated that Vietnam would represent the 
decline of the Untied States. 
“Plea to the President”  
Coffin delivered a second speech about the war, “Plea to the 
President,” at an antiwar rally in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on January 





arguments used in “Spirit of Lamech,” the speech made a clearer 
argument about the horrors of the war and contained no overt religious 
references. These substantive differences suggest that Coffin was 
distinctly aware of his audience and sought to broaden the appeal of his 
arguments. 
 The text of “Plea to the President” shares two intertextual 
similarities with “The Spirit of Lamech.” Again, Coffin invoked the Titanic 
metaphor nearly word-for-word, this time near the beginning of the 
speech text. He stated, “I am persuaded that at this very hour the 
American ship of state is comparable to the Titanic just before it hit the 
iceberg. If we escalate, if we enlarge the war in Vietnam, then morally 
and perhaps politically and economically we are sunk” (Coffin 1966f, 1). 
As he had in “Lamech,” Coffin again criticized the U.S. for backing a 
morally bankrupt dictatorship in South Vietnam, arguing that 
The unpleasant truth that we the American people simply must 
face now is that the origins of this war lie far more in Diem’s 
repression than in whole subversion, and that even today despite 
billions of dollars of aid, the heroic labor of many American 
civilians and the blood of many soldiers, both the Vietcong and 
Hanoi can talk of national independence, land reform, and social 





Saigon.21 The unpleasant truth is that we are now backing a losing 
horse ridden by a mediocre jockey. (ibid., 2) 
Yet despite these intertextual similarities to “Lamech,” Coffin’s “Plea” 
contained significant stylistic and substantive differences. First, Coffin 
employed the stylistic device of apostrophe, addressing President Lyndon 
B. Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara as though they were present in the audience.22 For 
instance, in paragraph two, he stated, “Secretary Rusk, you bear a major 
responsibility for putting us on this collision course with disaster” (ibid., 
1). This “you” structure recurred three additional times within the same 
paragraph. He stated, “Only a few years ago, you were assuring us that 
Premier Diem was a statesman and that we were winning the war, when 
as it turned out, Diem was a catastrophe and we were losing the war. 
Now you tell us that you have done everything possible to end the war, 
when in fact you have refused to do the one thing necessary—grant the 
                                                 
     21 Coffin’s handwritten notes on the speech text indicate that this 
sentence may have been delivered as “The unpleasant truth is that we 
the American people must be told is that the origins of this war lie for 
[far?] more in Diem’s repression than in Ho’s subversion, and that even 
today, despite the billions of dollars in aid, the heroic labor of American 
civilians and the blood of soldiers, both the Vietcong and Hanoi can talk 
of national independence, land reform and social justice, far more 
convincingly, than can the government of Saigon” (ibid., 2; italics 
indicate handwritten changes to the text).  
 
     22 Jasinski defines apostrophe as “a device by which a speaker begins 
to address an audience other than the one to which he or she is 





Vietcong their own seat at the negotiating table” (ibid., 1).23 The “you” 
structure enabled Coffin to cast the American administration as 
responsible for the failure of the Diem administration, and therefore as 
responsible for the war.  
Second, “Plea to the President” contained no overt references to the 
Hebrew Bible. Coffin warned that the United States faced potentially 
horrific losses in the war. Again addressing the absent LBJ officials, he 
asserted, “Secretary McNamara, surely you don’t want a war on the 
Asian mainland that will cost tens of thousands of American lives and 
hundreds and thousands of Vietnamese, most of them innocent civilians” 
(ibid., 2). He warned that the conflict risked further inflaming tensions 
with the North Vietnamese, claiming that “A resumption of bombing and 
an escalation of the war can only push both Vietcong and Hanoi to the 
waiting arms of Russia or China with all the risks of a major 
conflagration such as confrontation with Russia or China entails” (ibid., 
2, 3). The speech’s only reference to religion was an oblique reference to 
McNamara.  Coffin portrayed the Secretary of Defense as a false prophet, 
claiming, “The Pentagon too has mislead us. Secretary McNamara has 
consistently proved a brilliant administrator but just as consistently a 
                                                 
     23 Handwritten notes on the manuscript suggest that the “you” 
phrasing was added to the speech after initial drafting. The typewritten 
manuscript reads, “In all brutal frankness it must be said that the state 
department bears the major responsibility for putting us on this collision 
course with disaster. Only a few years ago the department was assuring 
us that Premier Diem was a statesman and that we were winning the 
war. In fact it has refused to do the one thing necessary—grant the 





mistaken prophet. Again and again he has said ‘This time it’s going to 
work’ and it hasn’t” (ibid., 2).   
Finally, Coffin made a specific policy appeal absent from his 
argument in “Lamech.” He begged the president not to resume bombing, 
which had been discontinued in January 1966. Again, Coffin appealed to 
the president directly, stating, “We plead with you therefore not to 
resume bombing. Hold fast in the South. Cease seeking military 
solutions for problems which can only be solved at the conference table” 
(ibid., 3). 
After the Cease Fire 
 The United States resumed bombing of North Vietnam on February 
1, 1966. CCAV issued a press release on February 1 denouncing the end 
to the ceasefire. In a February 2 letter to CCAV members, Coffin called 
the resumption of bombing “a severe set-back” (1966a, 1). He asserted, 
“we must not stand in the background like members of a Greek chorus 
bewailing the tragedies taking place before our eyes” (ibid.). Religious 
leaders should put pressure on the public to pressure Congress to take 
corrective action, he claimed,  
The president needs to be telegraphed our displeasure, 
Ambassador Goldberg our encouragement. Senators and 
congressmen obviously hold up wet fingers to political breezes, and 
these must become a gale force for peace. Nothing is going to 





ourselves must become informed interpreters of those aspects of 
the war which are properly the concern of every Jew and Christian 
. . . we must arouse, educate, and stir to political action not only 
our people but key members of our communities. (ibid., 1) 
This passage indicates that Coffin saw the goal of CCAV as to produce 
policy change through a pressure point system. In a rhetorical move that 
illustrated the committee’s political moderation during this time, Coffin 
stopped short of endorsing civil disobedience without completely 
disavowing it. He explained, “As a committee we cannot now call for 
withholding of income tax or other acts of civil disobedience but should 
such acts take place, our job should be not to [c]ondemn such acts but 
rather to point again to the situation that produced them” (ibid., 1)  
Coffin’s activities during this time also garnered attention from the 
Yale Daily News. The January 27 edition included front-page coverage of 
Coffin’s trip to France in late January to meet with dissident Vietnamese 
exiles (Yergin 1966, 1). On February 3, the News quoted Coffin stating, 
“Secretary Rusk is guilty of having misled the American people on 
numerous occasions” (Yale Daily News 1966, 4). On Friday, February 7, 
the News reported Coffin delivered a speech at the Yale Law School 
auditorium declaring that the United States had made a “well-nigh 
impossible demand” by excluding the Viet Cong from peace negotiations 





“Why Are the Clergy Concerned About Vietnam?” 
 Despite resumption of the bombing, Coffin continued to believe 
that a negotiated settlement to the war represented the best possible 
outcome. In a March 8, 1966 letter to Peter Grothe, Coffin asserted, “I am 
not for walking out of Viet Nam, but I am certainly against any 
escalation. We never should have gotten into this war, and we must do 
everything decently possible to get out. But don’t worry. I realize how 
messy it could be” (1966c, 1). By mid-March, Coffin had completed a 
draft of his most detailed statement yet about reasons for opposing the 
war, a written manuscript entitled “Why Are the Clergy Concerned about 
Vietnam?” In a March 28 letter to LOOK Magazine editor Mike Land 
asking for feedback about the document, Coffin explained, “While it is 
very well known that many clergy are opposed to the war in Viet Nam, 
what is less clear, to us as well as to others, are the grounds on which 
we can properly speak out” (1966b, 1). Coffin added, “You probably know 
that the world Council of Churches, The National Council of Churches, 
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Central Conference of 
American Rabbis, and other religious groups have stated their opposition 
to the war” (ibid., 1). Although LOOK did not publish the manuscript, a 
printed version of the essay was subsequently circulated to CALCAV 
contacts across the U.S.24 
                                                 
     24 Copies of “Why are the Clergy Concerned about Vietnam?” exist at 





  The eleven-page document of twenty-seven paragraphs followed 
four lines of argument. In the first seven paragraphs, Coffin defended the 
right of religious leaders to speak against the War. In paragraphs eight 
through nineteen, Coffin enumerated reasons why U.S. policy in Vietnam 
had failed. In paragraphs twenty through twenty-two, Coffin argued that 
a negotiated settlement with the North Vietnamese represented the most 
pragmatically attainable and philosophically defensible solution available 
to the conflict. Finally, in paragraphs twenty-four through twenty-seven, 
Coffin criticized the conduct of U.S. foreign policy more generally. 
In the first seven paragraphs, Coffin asserted that clergy had the 
right to speak against the war. For example, he asked in the third 
paragraph, “[W]hat can we say? What competence have we to speak out? 
While this article speaks only for its author, its sentiments are widely 
shared by rabbis, priests, and fellow pastors. Let us concede immediately 
we may be wrong, but let us hope that those who disagree with us will 
think it right that we should state our views as forthrightly as possible” 
(1966h, 1). In the sixth paragraph of the document, Coffin asserted that 
false patriotism stifled dissent, lamenting that  
It is a terrible thing when agreement takes the place of mutual 
concern as the basis of human unity. For then “Play it safe,” “Don’t 
rock the boat”; these slogans become as it were the eleventh 
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commandment, the commandments on which are “hanged” all the 
law and the prophets. (ibid., 2)  
Just as the guise of goodness had cloaked Lamech’s evil deed in “The 
Spirit of Lamech,” the unspoken eleventh commandment cloaked the 
sins of the United States during times of war. Coffin claimed, 
For it is the commandment that drops the mask of dissimulation 
over the face of the truth, the commandment that makes us turn 
the other cheek—in order not to see the evil, that makes us hide 
behind our specialties, claiming insufficient knowledge. Wartime 
avoidance of controversial issues is often but a sophisticated 
version of unsophisticated Cain clubbing his brother to death. 
(ibid., 2) 
In the seventh paragraph, Coffin insisted that he did not question the 
sincerity of American leaders, opining that “Our leaders too we must 
question, but not their sincerity. On the contrary, it is their passionate 
conviction of the rightness of this war that concerns us” (ibid, 2). 
In paragraphs eight through nineteen, Coffin enumerated specific 
reasons why he objected to U.S. foreign policy. He claimed in this section 
that the United States had failed to acknowledge the material conditions 
that produced the conflict between North and South Vietnam in the first 
place. Coffin asserted in paragraph eight that the United States was a 
conservative nation “for the simple reason that it has much to conserve” 





suffering of much of the world. Revolutionaries in Vietnam and elsewhere 
existed because “no one is anxious to conserve poverty, illiteracy, and 
disease . . . For a conservative nation to give relevant leadership to a 
revolutionary world is phenomenally difficult” (ibid., 3). As a result, a 
variety of ideological interests sought to influence the foreign policy 
process. Coffin stated, “[I]n international affairs many kinds of experts 
are needed to develop foreign policies that reflect broad political wisdom 
informed by moral sensitivity” (ibid., 3).25 
In paragraph twelve, Coffin claimed the war possessed an “utterly 
self-defeating character” (ibid., 4). Human misery had long aided the Viet 
Cong. Coffin claimed, “this misery is not alleviated by our bombing and 
burning of villages, by our destruction of crops, and our killing of at least 
as many civilians as Viet Cong fighters” (ibid., 4). Instead, the U.S. 
bombing had increased human suffering, he insisted. “This misery is 
growing as peasants now flee from our bombs as much as from Viet Cong 
terror, crowd into totally inadequate refugee camps, and increasingly 
send their daughters into Saigon to become mistresses for our soldiers, 
and cast their children into the streets to fend for themselves” (ibid., 4). 
Further, the United States bombing campaign failed to honor the Geneva 
                                                 
     25 In an interesting digression, Coffin argues that elite policymakers 
lack the perspective necessary to understand the plight of the materially 
disadvantaged. He asserted that “often a civil-rights worker in 
Mississippi or a slum priest in Chicago will prove more sensitive to an 
explosion of human frustration in Latin America than a Rusk or a 
McNamara; and more sensitive also to the wrongness of a government 
like that of Diem that conferred so little justice or self-respect upon the 





Accords because U.S. leaders feared communist victory (ibid., 4). As a 
result, the United States had prolonged a conflict that should have been 
an open-and-shut domestic matter. In Coffin’s view, the results were 
devastating to the moral standing of the United States. “By repudiating 
the heart of the Geneva agreements,” he observed, “the United States 
must bear a major responsibility for the war. For when a civil war ends 
on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the 
political level, then the side which repudiates the agreed conditions can 
expect the military struggle to resume” (ibid., 4).  
In paragraph seventeen, Coffin asserted the actions of the United 
States failed to give the South Vietnamese government any sense of 
legitimacy, noting that 
it seems accurate to say that were it not for our intervention, 
Saigon would long ago have lost this war, and for the basic reason 
that from Diem to Ky its leaders have been able to talk of social 
justice, land reform, and genuine nationalism far less convincingly 
than have both Viet Cong and Hanoi. (ibid., 7) 
In Coffin’s view, these actions created an irresolvable paradox. The U.S. 
military campaign produced results opposite of what policymakers 
intended. He explained, “In such a situation our anti-Communism in the 
long run can only amount to pro-Communism, and this is why to so 





Beginning in paragraph twenty, Coffin advocated for a negotiated 
settlement. Such a solution, he argued, had the most pragmatic and 
philosophical advantages. He asserted, “Of the three basic alternatives 
now facing the United States—withdrawal, negotiation, escalation—we 
feel the last to be the worst. To seek military victory is almost certainly to 
assure political and moral defeat” (ibid., 7). However, Coffin conceded 
that immediate withdrawal was not a viable option because of the 
undesirable consequences it could produce. Such a withdrawal would 
endanger those Vietnamese citizens aiding the United States. Coffin 
argued that 
We are impressed by the fact that the United States in Vietnam is 
now working with many “collaborationists,”26 with those who 
collaborated previously with the French and are now collaborating 
with us. Should we precipitously withdraw not only could the Viet 
Cong be counted on to initiate a blood bath, but collaborationists 
would be expected to kill other collaborationists in order to prove 
they had always, if secretly, been with Ho Chi Minh. (ibid., 8) 
Consequently, Coffin claimed that negotiation provided the most viable 
means for the United States to exit the conflict. He proposed that 
negotiation proceed immediately through the United Nations and should 
involve the Viet Cong, “for the simple reason that in war political 
                                                 
     26 I have emended the punctuation around the word 






settlements must reflect military realities . . . to refuse to grant the Viet 
Cong their place at the conference table, to refuse to allow them any part 
in the political settlement of the South is to ask them to accept a defeat 
they have not suffered” (ibid., 8). Coffin chastised the Johnson 
administration for failing to make any concessions on this point. “It is 
important, he says, “that the American people realize that it is because of 
the Administration’s position, as opposed to that of Senators Fulbright, 
Mansfield, Kennedy, not to mention U Thant—it is because of the 
Administration’s position that the doors to negotiation are now virtually 
shut, if at any time they were ever seriously opened” (ibid., 8, 9). 
 Coffin further argued that negotiated settlement represented the 
most moral course of action. The United States, he warned, had strayed 
from its moral principles by ignoring the international community it 
supported after WWII. As a result, he notes, “Our rather disdainful 
disregard also of the United Nations gives credence to the charge that 
America has gone from isolationism to interventionism without passing 
through internationalism” (ibid., 10). Coffin criticized the United States 
for refusing to recognize the U.N.’s possible role in resolving the conflict, 
arguing that “Never has our government stated clearly or even suggested 
that it would accept the results of the arbitration of any international 
agency” (ibid., 10). 
 In the document’s conclusion, Coffin returned to addressing the 





churches and synagogues of America are going to help people to their 
dream of world peace is debatable; that they could make a difference is 
not.”  The question then becomes, “So what we ask is whether we shall 
continue to pick over old stones in comfortably self-limited fields, or 
whether, possessed by a high excitement, we shall plunge into the task of 
fulfilling our own vision of a world in which ‘each shall live under his own 
vine, and his own fig tree, and none shall make them afraid.”27 
 Coffin’s activities during the spring and summer of 1966 are not 
well documented. Fragmentary evidence suggests that he continued to 
speak out against the war and to lobby Johnson administration officials 
to alter their position. In a June 30, 1966 letter to William P. Bundy at 
the U.S. Department of State, Coffin again lamented U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam: 
I am sitting here with a heavy heart, retching at the sickening 
syrup of the President’s piety. There he is out in Omaha, filling the 
air with fighting creeds no longer in touch with the realities of the 
situation. He reminds me dreadfully of Billy Graham, delivering his 
simple message to simple people in simple times, when in fact 
neither the message nor the people nor certainly the times are that 
simple. History is going to judge us harshly, Bill. (1966d, 1) 
                                                 
     27 The line is an allusion to Micah 4: 4, which reads, “but they shall 
all sit under their own vines and under their own fig trees, and no one 







 Coffin’s use of the prophetic mode can ultimately be seen as 
paralleling external developments within his social milieu. The prophetic 
mode’s connection to Neo-Orthodox and Personalist theologies allowed 
Coffin to depict his participation in civil rights protests and the antiwar 
movement as connected to his Christian faith. But as war escalated in 
early 1967, it became increasingly clear to him that a change in 
strategies would be necessary. Between December 1966 and April 1967, 
Coffin’s rhetoric moved from a prophetic framework to an existential 
one.28 This existential mode would again throw Coffin into the public 
spotlight. 
  
                                                 
     28 Although I argue in Chapter Three that the existential mode 
dominated Coffin’s public discourse in 1967, I acknowledge that the 
prophetic and existential modes chronologically overlapped to some 
extent in early 1967. For instance, Carl (1977) identifies Coffin’s April 30, 
1967 delivery of “Vietnam: A Sermon” as prophetic in nature. 
Specifically, Carl asserts that Coffin used the Biblical story of Jesus 
healing of a paralytic as a metaphor for the United States in Vietnam 
(259). Although Carl’s interpretation is well-grounded in textual evidence, 
I would add that “Vietnam: A Sermon” also contains existential elements, 







THE EXISTENTIAL MODE, 1966-1967 
 
By December 1966, the media increasingly scrutinized U.S. 
military operations in Vietnam. When U.S. forces bombed targets near 
Hanoi on December 13-14, 1966, the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
claimed high civilian casualties. Two western observers in Hanoi 
confirmed heavy damage to the city, giving credence to NLF claims (Apple 
1966, 5). U.S. officials struggled to manage their public response to NLF 
allegations.  On December 15, the Pentagon admitted to bombing Hanoi, 
but claimed that only military installations had been targeted (Smith 
1966, 1). A day later, U.S. General William Westmoreland denied that 
any American bombs had fallen on the city of Hanoi itself and offered 
aerial photographs to support his claims (New York Times 1966d, 1). The 
military again reversed its position on December 28, when an 
anonymous American source admitted to the Associated Press that the 
December 13-14 bombing raid had indeed killed North Vietnamese 
civilians (New York Times 1966a, 3). The source pessimistically stated, 
“The worst part of the whole thing is that we know it’ll happen again” 
(ibid.). 
 Meanwhile, no military or diplomatic solution to the war appeared 





that U.S. policy would result in “a long, drawn-out and bloody war of 
attrition which will entail increased casualties and continued war costs 
of $25 billion per year or more” and that “this war may go on for several, 
if not many, years” (quoted in Baldwin 1966, 4). Stennis further called 
for widening the bombing of North Vietnam immediately (ibid.). A month 
later, Stennis again reiterated his call for widening the war. 
The U.S. military launched Operation Cedar Falls on January 8, 
which aimed to gain control of the NLF stronghold 30 miles north of 
Saigon known as the “Iron Triangle.”   The rising conflict took a toll on 
U.S. forces. The number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Vietnam 
increased from 368,000 in December 1966 to 400,000 in January 1967 
(New York Times 1967g, 3). By mid-February, the Pentagon projected 
that 470,000 Americans would be stationed in Vietnam by July 1 of that 
year (Baldwin 1967, 4). Casualties were high. In January 1967, the 
number of troops killed increased weekly. During the third week of 
January alone, 123 Americans were killed in action and another 716 
wounded (New York Times 1967g, 3).  
Amidst the bloodshed, war opponents criticized the Johnson 
administration in increasingly moralistic terms. On December 23, the 
Catholic newsmagazine Commonweal, endorsed an American withdrawal 
from Vietnam. The editorial invoked an ends-means justification for its 
position, arguing that “the Christian cannot consider the Vietnam war 





tolerated. Meanwhile, the evil outweighs the good. This is an unjust war. 
The United States should get out” (Commonweal 1966, 336). On 
Christmas Day, twelve ministers associated with the Methodist Church 
released a public letter criticizing the administration for killing civilians, 
and warned that “any moral superiority of purpose the United States 
may possibly have had a few years ago has been obliterated by the cruel 
use of indiscriminate weapons and overwhelming firepower” (Perlmutter 
1966, 6). Three days later, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse warned in a 
television interview that widening the war would tarnish President 
Johnson’s legacy. Morse argued, “any president that leads mankind into 
World War III will go down—with whatever history left—as a discredited 
president” (New York Times 1966b, 25).  
Despite the gloom, antiwar groups were increasingly divided along 
radical and moderate lines about how to best respond (DeBenedetti and 
Chatfield 1990, 174).  CALCAV opted to not participate in the April 15, 
1967 Spring Mobilization against the war. Richard Fernandez advised 
CALCAV contacts in a February 24 memo that the Mobilization was 
unlikely to attract moderate protesters. He wrote, “we do not believe that 
the Spring Mobilization is going to broaden the base (toward the middle) 
of the peace movement” (1967b, 1).  He further advised that radical 
protesters could prove counter-productive to movement goals, noting 
that “while we draw no lines in our own committee with regard to pacifist 





in the Mobilization represent a very radical pacifism as well as a 
considerable amount of ‘total non-interventionist thinking.’ We are not 
convinced that kind of perspective will be helpful in changing present 
military policy in Vietnam” (ibid., 1).  
Like other CALCAV leaders, Coffin initially rejected the possibility 
of committing civil disobedience against the war. Goldstein speculates 
that Coffin knew civil disobedience would put him in a more precarious 
legal position than had his participation in civil rights activities (2004, 
184). Yet by October 1967, Coffin would openly urge draft-age men to 
refuse to cooperate with the Federal Selective Service System. Goldstein 
further speculates that Coffin “had begun to think that the draft 
represented an easier target than administration Vietnam policy . . . 
Hundreds of thousands of young men and their families would be facing 
the draft, which would bring the reality of the war home far more than 
any flyer, article, or sermon” (ibid., 185). 
Previous antiwar scholarship has rightly observed a dramatic shift 
in the antiwar movement’s tactics between 1965 and 1967 (Moon 2003, 
1040; and Carl 1977, 181). Moon claims that Catholic antiwar groups 
moved toward active resistance after American bishops began punishing 
priests for making antiwar statements (2003, 1040). As a result, she 
argues that lay leaders in Catholic antiwar groups escalated their protest 
tactics in an effort to make the church’s leadership look out-of-step with 





activists moved from traditional policy advocacy to civil disobedience 
because they saw few, if any, signs that policy advocacy was working 
(1977, 181). In this chapter, I argue that Coffin embraced an existential 
mode of rhetoric as part of this shift in tactics. The existential mode 
enabled Coffin to argue that individuals had a duty to resist authority 
that violated their conscience, and to accept responsibility for the 
consequences of such actions. To illustrate how Coffin used the 
existential mode, I begin with a brief overview of existential philosophy 
and the role it played in 1960s movements. I next analyze Coffin’s use of 
the existential mode between December 1966 and November 1967, and 
the responses it evoked. 
Existentialism: A Brief Survey 
Two distinct strands of existentialism—French humanism and 
German-American Christian Existentialism—circulated in the mid-
twentieth century United States. The discourse of existentialism 
emphasized individual responsibility, a contingent view of truth, 
authenticity, and angst. 
Defining Existentialism 
Vast in scope, existentialism represents a loose collection of 
philosophical and literary movements that resist easy definition. Traces 
of existential thought may be seen as early as Plato and Pascal, although 





(MacIntyre 1967, 147). Alasdair MacIntyre argues that existential 
thought is best conceptualized as a historical movement reflecting six 
themes: the relationship of individuals to larger social systems, being 
and absurdity, intentionality, the nature and significance of choice, the 
role of extreme experiences, and the nature of communication (1967, 
147). To MacIntyre, the most important of these six themes is the 
primacy of individual choice. “If any single thesis could be said to 
constitute the doctrine of existentialism,” he claims, “it would be that the 
possibility of choice is the central fact of human nature” (ibid., 147).  
Similarly, David E. Cooper argues that existential philosophy shares a 
common concern with freedom and authentic experience, asserting that 
“inspired by the issue of estrangement, existentialist thought moves in a 
coherent direction, from conceptions of the world and human existence 
to a doctrine of radical human freedom that leads into an ethics of 
authenticity and reciprocal freedom” (2012, 49). 
Existentialism’s intellectual forerunners include Blaise Pascal, 
Soren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky and Friedrich Nietzsche (Dreyfus 
and Wrathall 2009, 4).  Nietzsche inspired secular existentialists in post-
Word War II France, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simon de Beauvoir, and 
Albert Camus (ibid.). In contrast, the writings of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and 
Dostoevsky were less hostile to religion and inspired a range of 





twentieth century, including Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, 
and Martin Buber (ibid.).   
Coffin read Albert Camus, Andre Malraux, and Jean-Paul Sartre 
while an undergraduate at Yale University (Heister 1973, 17). Although 
the French existentialists’ worldview resonated with Coffin’s experiences 
during World War II, he later described his intellectual flirtation with 
French existentialism as uneasy. 
[C]onvinced as I was that Sartre and Camus were asking all the 
right questions, still I couldn’t help thinking that their answers 
lacked weight. Their despair was real but the stoicism with which 
they met it struck me as romantic, lacking strength. The 
theologians seemed to be in touch with a deeper reality. They too 
knew what hell was all about but in the depths of it they found a 
heaven which made more sense out of everything, much as light 
gives meaning to darkness. (1977, 82) 
Because of his disappointment with French existentialism, Coffin instead 
turned toward Christianity. But existential philosophy would leave its 
imprint on Coffin through the writings of theologian Paul Tillich. 
Tillich, a German expatriate who taught at Union Theological 
Seminary, proposed a complex theological system that combined 
Protestant theology with existential philosophy.  His theology assumed 
that humans were fundamentally concerned about questions of 





meaning . . .  Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he 
belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing” (1951, 
14). In some texts, Tillich used the term boundary-situation to describe 
these ultimate concerns. He explained, “[T]he human boundary situation 
is encountered when human possibility reaches its limit, when human 
existence is confronted by an ultimate threat” (1948, 197). Tillich offered 
an existential answer to these ultimate concerns, but differentiated 
between three meanings of the term existentialism. It could represent a 
point of view motivating philosophical or religious inquiry, a form of 
protest against Cartesian rationality, or a form of cultural expression 
(1952/2000, 126).  It is significant to note that Tillich believed 
existentialism as a point of view predated the rise of existential protest in 
the nineteenth century by several hundred years. He argued that Martin 
Luther foreshadowed the rise of existential theology. Tillich claimed, 
“Luther had experiences which he describes as attacks of utter despair 
(Anfechtung), as the frightful threat of complete meaninglessness. He felt 
these moments as satanic attacks in which everything was menaced: his 
Christian faith, the confidence in his work, the Reformation, the 
forgiveness of sins. Everything broke down in the extreme moments of 
this despair, nothing was left of the courage to be. Luther in these 
moments, and in the description he gives of them, anticipated the 





In Tillich’s view, a similar condition characterized humanity in the 
twentieth century. The rationality of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that culminated in two world wars meant that human beings 
were alienated from their spiritual centers. He believed that humans 
could recover ultimate meaning only by acknowledging the existential 
despair of their situation. In Tillich’s view, humanity in the twentieth 
century 
has lost a meaningful world and a self which lives in meanings out 
of a spiritual center. The man created world of objects has drawn 
into itself him who created it and who now loses his subjectivity in 
it. He has sacrificed himself to his own productions. But man is 
still aware of what he has lost or is continuously losing. He is still 
man enough to experience his dehumanization as despair. He does 
not know a way out but he tries to save his humanity by 
expressing the situation as without an ‘exit.’ He reacts with the 
courage of despair, the courage to take his despair upon himself 
and to resist the radical threat of nonbeing by the courage to be as 
oneself. (1952/2000, 140)  
Tillich further asserted that the existential “courage to be” threatened the 
dominant values of conformist political systems, including Nazi Germany 
and the McCarthy-era United States (ibid., 141). For Tillich, the role of 
religion during such times was clear. “There should be no question of 





should decide for truth against safety, even if the safety is consecrated 
and supported by the churches” (ibid., 141). 
Existentialism in the 1960s United States 
Secular and religious strands of existentialism circulated within 
liberal social movements in the 1960s United States. Liberal social 
movements influenced by existentialism included the student New Left 
(Lynd 1969), the religious anti-nuclear group The Peacemakers 
(Danielson 2008), the October 1967 Resistance protests (Foley 2003), 
and Protestant campus ministries (Rossinow 1994 and 1998). 
Existentialism allowed these groups to argue that the contingent nature 
of truth called for individual action that would inspire social change. 
Existential social movements first emphasized the need for action 
even in the face of uncertainty. For example, Lynd believed that the 
contingent nature of truth was especially significant for the New Left, and 
asserted that “the existential commitment to action, in the knowledge 
that the consequences can never be fully predicted, is the single most 
characteristic element in the thought-world of the New Left” (1969, 69). 29 
Similarly, Boston Resistance protestor Michael Ferber—later one of 
Coffin’s four co-defendants in the 1968 Boston Five trial—acknowledged 
in an interview with historian Michael Foley that existentialism had 
inspired him to see “the unexpectedness and absurdity of life, the 
                                                 
     29 In Once to Every Man, Coffin credits Lynd by name with shaping his 





contingency of life, and the importance of living life with passion . . . It 
sort of discouraged waiting until you got a whole correct theory” (quoted 
in Foley 2003, 83).  
Existential activists believed they could achieve political change by 
leading through personal example. Rossinow asserts that existential 
Christians active in campus ministry during the 1960s aimed to achieve 
“personal breakthrough . . . rooted in both Protestant theology and 
modern psychological theory. It meant a breakthrough to a new life . . . a 
personal breakthrough, which, if duplicated enough times, could 
produce a social breakthrough” (Rossinow 1998, 321). Likewise, 
Danielson contends that The Peacemakers attempted to persuade others 
to accept their nonviolent worldview “[by] acknowledging their own 
complicity in evil, pacifists believed that they would create and reaffirm 
the existence of a moral universe and inspire others to do the same” 
(2008, 224).  
Despite existentialism’s unmistakable circulation in the discourse 
of the mid-twentieth century United States, remarkably few studies have 
examined its rhetorical features during this period.30 Leliah Danielson 
(2008) very briefly discusses characteristics of discourse in The 
Peacemakers. She asserts the group’s discourse resists easy 
classification, because “pacifist use of the language of ‘personal 
                                                 
     30 Weiman (1961), Galati (1969), Craig Smith (1972), and J. Michael 
Hyde (1990) describe existentialism as a possible basis for persuasion. 






responsibility,’ which is typically associated with conservative thought, 
reflected the influence of Christian existentialism—and it is significant 
that excerpts from the writings of Paul Tillich and Soren Kierkegaard 
circulated at the conferences” (ibid., 224). Danielson claims that 
existentialism continued to circulate within Peacemaker discourse in the 
mid-1960s, but amid internal strife. She writes that, “the personalist 
concerns and existential framework of radical pacifists persisted through 
the 1950s and 1960s even as the consensus that brought them together 
frayed” along the lines of those who emphasized individual action and 
those who emphasized communal responsibility for achieving 
disarmament (ibid., 234). 
 In summary, it is evident that existential discourse circulated 
within the mid-twentieth century United States. It influenced religious 
activists, but also non-religious social movements, such as the student 
New Left. In what follows, I will demonstrate that these existential 
features can be seen in Coffin’s discourses beginning in late 1966. 
Laying the Groundwork for Draft Resistance 
 By late 1966, Coffin had grown frustrated with the antiwar 
movement’s inability to achieve policy change. Although he continued to 
believe that a diplomatic solution to the war was possible, external 
events pushed Coffin toward an existential mode of argument that 
emphasized individual responsibility to follow one’s conscience, even if 





from December 1966 and January 1967 suggest that he felt increasingly 
dissatisfied with the prophetic mode. By February 1967, the existential 
mode had become the central feature of his public discourse.  
Personal Correspondence 
In his December 1966 and January 1967 personal 
correspondence, Coffin expressed growing doubts about the war. In a 
December 19, 1966 letter to Talmage Rogers, Coffin acknowledged that 
Senator Stennis’s argument for escalation was logically coherent, even 
though Coffin found the proposal to be ill-advised. “Stennis is right,” 
Coffin wrote. “[W]e do not have at present a formula for victory. Victory 
could only be attained by major escalation, which of course risks 
bringing in the Russians in considerable numbers” (1966e, 1). In light of 
those potential consequences, combined with the dubious nature of the 
U.S. mission in Vietnam, Coffin believed that ending the war needed to 
be an absolute priority. He claimed, “Given the fact that we shouldn’t 
have been there in the first place, and that escalation is no solution, I 
think we have got to start thinking in terms of ending the war” (ibid., 1). 
He believed that draft resistance represented a legitimate avenue for 
protest, although he demurred about how to publicly express that 
resistance. Responding to Rogers’ inquiry about whether he supported 
draft-card burning, Coffin stated, “I did not advocate burning, but I 
would certainly advocate civil disobedience” (ibid., 2). He then argued, 





phrase would become increasingly central to his discourse throughout 
1967. In a letter to Rev. Gordon W. Stearns on January 10, 1967, Coffin 
advocated that draft protests should be initiated by students.  “[I]t would 
be a wonderful thing,” he wrote, “if five, six, seven hundred students on a 
given day were with dignity to assemble, let’s say, in ten different centers 
throughout the United States, and issue a moving statement, and return 
their draft cards to some selected Federal buildings” (1967b, 1). Coffin 
hoped that such protests would result in increased public recognition of 
the war’s moral dilemmas. He explained, “the idea would be, as you 
suspected, to try to arouse an American public not to hostility but to 
greater concern” (ibid., 1).  
Even as he endorsed civil disobedience, Coffin believed a policy 
solution to the war remained possible. In his letter to Stearns, he 
expressed hope that a policy solution could be found, claiming that, 
“Right now, however, I am really more interested in trying to get the 
middle of the roaders out to bolster the forces of moderation. I think we 
have a real chance in the next month or two. The chance is not big but 
worth obviously every effort” (ibid., 1). It is unclear what sort of 
settlement Coffin believed moderates could achieve. What is clear is that 






“On Civil Disobedience” 
On February 21, 1967, Coffin debated retired U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Charles Whittaker at the Washington Club. Entitled “On Civil 
Disobedience,” the debate took place in front of a live audience that 
included over forty journalists and television cameras (Goldstein 2004, 
186). In his address, Coffin articulated an existential rationale for social 
activism in which race relations served as a representative example of 
existentially-driven social change (1967e). After Coffin explicated this 
rationale, he sketched a preliminary framework for draft resistance. 
Although the speech never used the term ‘existentialism’ 
specifically, it is clear that an existential rationale informed Coffin’s 
argument. For instance, Coffin began the address by claiming that an 
individual’s social conscience was the central feature of human 
existence. In Coffin’s view, this sense of conscience contrasted with the 
purely individualistic sense of the self. He insisted, “[T]he most profound 
experience of the self is still the experience of the conscience, and not as 
frequently suggested today the experience of private sensations and 
interior vision” (1967e, 1). Furthermore, Coffin asserted that individuals 
who recognized this conscience would achieve a sense of agency over 
their own future, because “men are not trapped in their destinies, 
powerless against them” (ibid., 1). By following their conscience, Coffin 
believed that individuals could choose to resist laws they believed to be 





there solutions. I do not think that any man ever has the right to break 
the law, but I do think that upon occasion every man has the duty to do 
so” (ibid., 2).  
Unlike the existentialists of 1940s France, Coffin held that an 
existential framework could exist alongside of theistic beliefs. For Coffin, 
belief in a theistic entity could provide individuals with the courage 
needed to make a leap of faith, “[b]ecause there is a higher and hopefully 
future order of things, men at times will feel constrained to disobey the 
law out of a sense of obedience to a higher allegiance” (ibid., 1). For 
Coffin, this disobedience was a reflection of the Christian tradition rather 
than an opposition to it. He claimed that “[t]he New Testament concludes 
that man must respect but never worship the law; respect what is legal, 
but be more concerned with what is just” (ibid., 2). 
To Coffin, contemporary race relations served as a representative 
example for how existentially-driven social change worked. His argument 
here drew support from Nat Hentoff’s 1966 account of public school 119 
in Harlem, Our Children Are Dying. Hentoff’s book described squalid 
material conditions in Harlem schools, including leaky roofs and rat-
infested buildings, which in turn produced alienated children unable to 
learn. Extending Hentoff’s analysis, Coffin argued that American 
consumer culture reinforced Harlem children’s sense of alienation. He 
claimed, “Their brain cells have never really been brought to life because 





much. Then their hearts so quickly fill with bitterness if only because 
their chief babysitter, the T.V. set, keeps shoving the good life down their 
throats” (ibid., 3). However, traditional policy argument rarely worked for 
communities faced with such conditions. Coffin contended, “very quickly, 
they [African-Americans] are forced to the realization that rational 
persuasion is rarely the best way to persuade people to be rational. Go 
through normal channels and you get few results months later” (ibid.). 
Some other form of persuasion was needed to achieve meaningful 
change. 
As an alternative to rational argument, Coffin proposed that 
oppressed persons could achieve social change by forcing direct 
confrontation with their oppressors.31 He asserted, “if you boycott a 
school, or physically occupy the seats of the Board of Education, then 
you do make contact with the public outside” (ibid., 4). The process 
worked by forcing oppressors to recognize the consequences of their own 
actions. Coffin explained, “You confront people with their beliefs, for the 
fact of the matter is that few people realize they have strong beliefs until 
things are stirred up . . . only when men realize that others are not going 
to pay the price, only when Watts, Hough, Harlem blow up, do men 
become willing to make necessary concessions” (ibid., 4). When 
successful, the result of these protests would be a recovery of 
                                                 
     31 Coffin’s advocacy of confrontation bears some resemblance to 






humanness of the people oppressed by unjust authority. He argued, 
“given these circumstances, a carefully planned non-violent act of civil 
disobedience such as a school boycott or a rent strike can be an act of 
intelligence and concern. It can reflect an effort to reach the public by 
refusing to be more loyal to a system than to the people the system was 
designed to serve” (ibid., 5).  
According to Coffin’s logic, the same existential rationale used to 
justify civil disobedience in African-American communities also justified 
civil disobedience against the war. To make this point, however, Coffin 
needed to overcome arguments against dissent during wartime. He 
acknowledged that political conservatism frowned upon such dissent, 
stating that “unfortunately passion has now so frequently distorted 
judgment that many loyal citizens have found their patriotic motives 
impugned at the very moment they were demonstrating their allegiance 
to the ethics and tactics of a democracy” (ibid., 7). Coffin refuted these 
views by asking his audience to 
recall that our Puritan Fathers came to this country precisely 
because they refused to surrender their conscience to the State; 
and that many Americans whom we now hail as heroes were in 
their generation notorious lawbreakers. The Quakers in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony were not only imprisoned but executed. 
In Pennsylvania John Woolman broke with Benjamin Franklin and 





against the Indians. Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, were of 
course traitors all until success crowned their efforts and they 
became patriots. (ibid., 7)32 
Coffin hoped that these examples would bring respect for existential 
protest. He added, “Americans would better be able to applaud the spirit 
of those who refuse today to surrender their conscience to State even 
when they do not share their views” (ibid., 8). 
Still, Coffin acknowledged that committing civil disobedience would 
be difficult, for three reasons. Civil disobedience might be unpopular, 
because “as men frequently vote their ignorance, fears, and prejudices, 
there is never a guarantee that majority rule represents the rule of 
conscience” (ibid., 8). It might produce no immediate effects. He warned, 
“we need to recognize that while one man’s witness may do wonders for 
that man’s conscience, it will do little, at least immediately, to alter the 
course of events” (ibid., 8). Most significantly, Coffin acknowledged that 
civil disobedience required protesters to take a leap of faith in the face of 
uncertain outcomes: 
I said, you remember, at the outset to the question of civil 
disobedience I thought there were no easy or written answers, only 
solutions in concrete life situations. I think in this instance those 
opposed to the war must ask, “How great is the evil we protest? 
Have all legal remedies been exhausted? Or is the evil so 
                                                 






monstrous that there is no time for these? How many innocent will 
suffer, one way or another, now and in twenty years’ time? And 
have we really done our homework?” Then, as these questions can 
never be more than partly answered, we have to proceed even as 
the government is now proceeding—to act whole-heartedly, without 
absolute certainty. (ibid., 9) 
Despite the existential angst that would accompany such activities, 
Coffin believed that the time had arrived for civil disobedience against the 
war. 
The speech briefly outlined how antiwar civil disobedience should 
proceed. Coffin suggested that clergy should play an active role in 
resistance. He explained, “I propose that seminarians opposed to the war 
should surrender their draft exemption in order to make it count on 
moral grounds, that they should declare themselves Conscientious 
Objectors to this war. I further propose that older clergy should publicly 
advocate their doing so in order that all be subject to the penalties of the 
Selective Service Act” (ibid., 9). He next suggested that draft-age students 
follow a similar course of action, asserting that “I think it would be a 
good thing if the students organized themselves. I would love to see one, 
two, or five thousand students and others of draftable age opposed to the 
war gather on some specified date this spring in some ten or twenty 





statement to surrender their draft cards at previously designated federal 
buildings” (ibid., 9). 
Reactions to “On Civil Disobedience” 
On Civil Disobedience” evoked a flurry of negative responses from 
both individuals and media outlets. Public opinion mail consisted of two 
types of letters: interlocutors who advanced ad hominem arguments that 
questioned Coffin’s competence as a chaplain, and interlocutors who 
engaged Coffin in substantive argument by questioning the existential 
logic that informed his anti-draft advocacy. 
The first category of letters addressed to Coffin in the aftermath of 
“On Civil Disobedience” consisted of ad hominem attacks. Elizabeth 
Knippenberg of Woodhaven, New York wrote on February 22, 1967, “I 
was horrified (not for the first time) to see and hear a man who pretends 
to be a chaplain utter some loathsome remarks—I hope there are 
everywhere decent students left to protest you and may I suggest your 
last name is very apt” (1967, 1).  William Boyd of Pennsylvania went even 
further, claiming that Coffin represented a social disease requiring 
eradication. He wrote, “All across our land we have laboratories where we 
are continually striving to eliminate disease, but we are afflicted with a 
powerful disease caused by vermin in our society. Some of the most 
obnoxious of these vermin are the false prophets who profess to be a part 
of the host of honest men of the clergy” (Boyd 1967, 1). In a March 13, 





asserted, “I am not anti-clergy but I am decidedly against any person 
who engages in any activity to aid and abet unpatriotic activities” (Powell 
1967, 1). Authors of ad hominem letters further questioned Coffin’s 
masculinity. Knippenberg wrote, “To think that people like you are free to 
say such things because real men like my husband and son and 
thousands more are willing to fight and die gives you this freedom” 
(1967, 1). Similarly, Boyd asserted that “All across our great United 
States we have these insidious characters, not men but ‘panty-waists,’ 
who preach blaspheme” (1967, 1).  
Another group of interlocutors appeared to grasp the existential 
logic of Coffin’s argument, but rejected the claim that it necessarily 
warranted draft resistance. James F. Carney, a Yale alumnus with a self-
described “sincere religious conviction and a background as a former 
pacifist” most clearly represented this view. In a March 1, 1967 letter to 
Coffin, Carney wrote, “I have consistently defended your past actions, 
particularly in the field of civil rights. I have been proud that Yale’s 
chaplain had clear perception and the courage to stand for his beliefs as 
a Christian” (1967, 1). Yet Carney believed that draft resistance 
represented a line that Coffin should not cross. He claimed, “I am deeply 
hurt by your recent action in encouraging ‘thousands of students to turn 
in your draft cards.’ I feel that you have crossed a most important line 
between witness to your personal beliefs and an action which uses your 





chosen to lead, should take one particular illegal action to support your 
personal belief” (ibid.). Even so, Carney clearly recognized the existential 
leap that Coffin was attempting. He stated,  
I have no question as to your sincerity and conviction. I hope that 
this same sincerity and conviction whether you have the right to 
use your position as Yale’s chaplain to advance this type of 
conviction . . . Mr. Coffin, you could continue to express your 
conviction about the war in many personal ways, and you could 
urge students to protest in other ways. (ibid.) 
Similarly, one of Coffin’s Andover classmates, Nelson “Nick” Taintor Jr., 
wrote, “Everyone has the right to his personal opinions, and obviously, in 
the matter of this country’s foreign policies, there will never be 100% 
agreement-regardless of the policy in question. However, to encourage 
and incite men of draft age to disregard the law of the land, in my 
opinion is distasteful and even more distasteful when it comes from a 
chaplain of a highly regarded institution of learning” (Taintor 1967, 1).  
An unsigned editorial aired by New Haven radio and television 
station WNHC the week after the speech criticized Coffin’s remarks as 
irresponsible. The editorial argued, “We respect freedom of belief. But 
when someone speaks from such a position as Chaplain of a great 
university, he should give far more thought to what gets said” (WHNC 
Editorial 1967, 1). It added, “Civil disobedience we see as a personal, 





important office as a means to openly advocate that thousands follow 
such a ridiculous scheme is another matter” (ibid., 1).  
Coffin’s response to the criticism sought to clarify his views about 
the role of clergy in draft resistance. In a letter to the Yale Daily News 
published on February 23, Coffin insisted he did not want clergy to 
organize students as conscientious objectors, stating that “obviously 
that’s a job for the students if they’re inclined to do it” (1967c, 1). He 
ended the letter by offering to discuss the matter further with students 
(ibid.). In other responses, Coffin emphasized that civil disobedience 
represented a means of last resort necessary only to preserve one’s sense 
of conscience. In an invited reply to the WNHC editorial that aired on 
March 7, he asserted, 
Obviously too, you do not engage in civil disobedience—not as a 
first resort. You speak out, write letters, sign petitions, all in the 
best American democratic tradition. But having done all this—
many times, and for years—do you then decide to put your 
conscience to bed with the comforting thought that well, you have 
done your best, the Government remains unimpressed, and the 
law of the land is clear; or do you decide that having chosen the 
road of protest you have to choose to pursue it to the end, even if 
this means going to jail? How you answer that question clearly 
depends on how wrong you think the war and how deeply you 





Coffin further claimed that he did not advocate acts that have been 
associated with radical protesters. “Now let’s be very clear,” he said. 
“[T]his is not to advocate violence. I am against violence, as I am against 
draft card burning, which I consider an unnecessarily hostile act” (ibid., 
1). In a March 1 interview with The Phillipian, student newspaper of 
Phillips Academy, Coffin again clarified his view that civil disobedience 
required participants to make an uncertain leap of faith, because “a man 
has to act without absolute certainty, but has to act wholeheartedly, 
which is the way, of course, the Federal Government has to act, too” 
(Phillipian 1967, n.p.). In time, the existential currents in the larger 
antiwar movement would continue push Coffin toward committing civil 
disobedience. 
Implementing Draft Resistance 
Several months passed before Coffin actively participated in draft 
resistance. Throughout the first half of 1967, Coffin worked to build 
support for the antiwar movement. He participated in CALCAV’s Vietnam 
Summer. In August 1967, CALCAV endorsed civil disobedience as a 
protest strategy. In an August 24, 1967 memorandum to other CALCAV 
leaders, Richard Fernandez called for the organization to move beyond 
policy statements to active resistance, arguing that “we believe that it is 
time for the religious community to stand in solidarity with the young 
men who, because of conscience, cannot go to Viet Nam and, as soldiers, 





1967c, 1).  The Fernandez memo included a draft version of the 
document “Conscience and Conscription,” which articulated CALCAV’s 
philosophy of draft resistance. As Fernandez explained, the document 
did not reference Vietnam specifically, “primarily because, in our 
judgment the statement is both accurate and something to be acted 
upon even if there were no war” (ibid., 1). Instead, the act of supporting 
conscientious objection itself was more significant than the reasons for 
that conscientious objector’s stance. 
We have suggested in the statement that as members of the 
religious community we place paramount importance on the role of 
conscience in the process of ethical formulation. In so doing we 
have tried to make clear that the specific reasons why a particular 
young man may, in conscience, decide that he cannot fight for his 
country is of secondary importance in contrast to the importance 
of members of the religious community standing in solidarity with 
him in his objection. (ibid., 1) 
But the memo remained short on details about how draft resistance 
would be implemented.  
Fernandez acknowledged that CALCAV members would need to 
provide input about how to best proceed with active resistance. In the 
August 14 memo, he wrote, “any implementation of specific program 
ideas relative to this statement will necessarily mean that you and other 





think through the specifics of what such an implementation might mean” 
(ibid., 2). Fernandez called for a two-day meeting in Washington D.C. to 
discuss these implementation details. Although that meeting never took 
place, Coffin proposed in mid-September that the organization hold a 
draft-card turn-in at the Department of Justice headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. (Goldstein 2004, 195).33 Richard Neuhas, a CALCAV 
executive board member, took responsibility for organizing the event 
(ibid.). 
 On October 2, Coffin chaired a press conference that revealed a 
document entitled “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” to the public. 
The document’s author, Mitchell Goodman, presented the document’s 
substantive arguments. He argued, “when young men refuse to allow 
their consciences to be violated by an unjust law and a criminal war, 
then it is necessary for their elders—their teachers, ministers, friends—to 
make clear their commitment, in conscience, to aid, abet, and counsel 
them against conscription” (Goodman 1967, 1). It is significant to note 
that Goodman’s language bore striking resemblance to Coffin’s 
arguments in “On Civil Disobedience” eight months prior. Goodman 
further drew a distinction between private belief and public action, 
claiming that “most of us have already done this privately. Now, publicly, 
                                                 
     33 The proposed Washington D.C. meeting was subsequently called off 
in a September 14 follow-up memo from Fernandez, citing the costs 
associated with transportation (Fernandez 1967b, 1). The memo also 
apparently deleted the word “refuge” from a “Conscience and 
Conscription” draft, because of concerns that would place an undue 





we will demonstrate, side by side with the draft resisters, our 
determination to continue to do so” (ibid., 1). 
 In an October 4 letter to the Yale Daily News, Coffin qualified his 
participation in the resistance slightly, asserting that the movement did 
not desire to force students into jail. Rather, the goal was to assist 
individuals who felt compelled to resist the war on their own. He 
explained, “we do, however, have every intention of trying to assert 
solidarity in all ways we can--which are precious few--with those who in 
conscience cannot serve in the armed forces as long as our country 
continues the war in Vietnam” (Coffin 1967e, n.p.). 
The Boston Resistance Protests 
Shortly after the appearance of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate 
Authority,” Coffin received an invitation from Richard Mumma, 
Presbyterian campus minister at Harvard, to preach at a draft card turn-
in in Boston’s Arlington Street Unitarian Church on October 16 (Coffin 
1977, 241). The event would be part of nationwide Resistance Day 
activities being coordinated by other antiwar groups. Foley (2003) asserts 
that elements of French existentialism circulated in the Resistance Day 
protests. But the Resistance Day protesters drew inspiration from a 
variety of intellectual sources. Foley acknowledged, “Although the 
Resistance owed much to the ideas of the New Left, the draft resistance 
movement in Boston, in particular, derived its theoretical underpinnings 





religion” (2003b, 83). This existentialist impulse was most evident in the 
West Coast resistance protests, where participants “wore their hair long, 
rode motorcycles and read Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Nietzsche” (ibid., 83). 
Although the Boston protesters tended to be less flamboyant in 
appearance, they nevertheless remained influenced by existentialism and 
frequently quoted Camus (ibid., 83). 
5,000 protesters attended a protest on Boston Common on the 
morning of October 16 (Goldstein 2004, 197). People then packed into 
the Arlington Street Unitarian Church in Back Bay, the home pulpit of 
nineteenth century abolitionist William Ellery Channing. Draft resisters 
sat in the first ten rows, while observers—including their parents and the 
news media—sat in the back (Coffin 1977, 242). Preachers who spoke at 
the service included Coffin and Harvard Divinity School professor George 
Williams (Goldstein 2004, 197). 
Coffin’s Arlington Street Church Speech 
Coffin spent the day before the Arlington Street Church service at 
Phillips Academy, preparing a speech text, ostensibly for distribution to 
the press. As Coffin wrote in his memoirs, “It was always a chore for me 
to write out every word of my speech. On the other hand, it was 
important not to be misquoted” (1977, 241). Although the Boston speech 
shared several intertextual similarities to “On Civil Disobedience,” Coffin 
broke new ground by offering a detailed plan for draft resistance that 





As he had in “On Civil Disobedience” eight months earlier, Coffin 
began the Arlington Street speech by appealing to a long tradition of 
protest. He quoted from “On Civil Disobedience” nearly word-for-word by 
stating, 
Most words are dispensable. They can perish as though they had 
never been written or spoken. Some few, however, must forever 
remain alive if human beings are to remain human. “I love my city, 
but I shall not stop preaching that which I believe is true: you may 
kill me, but I shall follow God rather than you.” and: “We must 
obey God rather than men.” (Acts 5:29). Why are these words of 
Socrates and St. Peter so indispensable? Because in the first place 
they tell us that the most profound experience of the self is the 
experience of the conscience, and not as frequently suggested 
today the experience of private sensations and interior visions. 
(1967j, 1)34 
As he had in “On Civil Disobedience,” Coffin also appealed to the 
tradition of American patriotism. He argued, 
                                                 
     34 In on “On Civil Disobedience,” Coffin stated, “Most words are 
dispensable. They can perish as though they had never been written or 
spoken. A few, however, must forever remain alive if human beings are to 
remain human. For instance: ‘I love my city, but I shall not stop 
preaching that which I believe is true; you may kill me, but I shall follow 
God rather than you.’ ‘We must obey God rather than men.’ And perhaps 
even ‘Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.’—the somewhat 
sloganistic motto on the seal of Thomas Jefferson. Why are these words 
so indispensable? Because in the first place they tell us that the most 
profound experience of the self is still the experience of the conscience, 
and not as frequently suggested today the experience of private 





And how can Americans so quickly forget their own heritage? Our 
Puritan forefathers came to these shores precisely because they 
would not surrender their consciences to the state! The Quakers in 
the Massachusetts Bay Colony were not only imprisoned but 
executed because they refused to obey the law. In Pennsylvania in 
1750 John Wollman refused to pay taxes when Pennsylvania 
decided to arm against the Indians. And Washington, Hamilton, 
Jefferson, and Adams were not only civilly disobedient but traitors 
all, until success crowned their efforts and they became great 
patriots. (ibid., 1) 
 However, Coffin went a step further than he had in “Civil 
Disobedience,” by claiming that the existential dilemma created by the 
war called for action. “The issue is one of conscience,” he stated. “Let us 
be blunt. To us the war in Vietnam is a crime. And if we are correct, if 
the war is a crime, then is it criminal to refuse to have anything to do 
with it? Is it we who are demoralizing our boys in Vietnam, or the 
Administration which is asking them to do immoral things?” (ibid.). It 
then followed that young men should defy draft laws they believed to be 
unjust. Coffin insisted, 
To us then the war is an issue of conscience. So too is the draft. 
For not only does the National Selective Service Act inexcusably 
defer the rich and better educated; it also insists that a man’s 





Could anything be more ethically absurd? Have humanists no 
conscience? Why, many men become atheists because they think 
Christians are so inhuman that the only way to be a good 
humanist is to be an atheist. (Of course, they are mistaken. 
Christians have always been the best argument against 
Christianity. But Christ is the best argument for it, and that’s the 
argument that has to be met!) But it is absurd once again to say a 
man must be a believer in order to be conscientious. (ibid., 2) 
After Coffin had finished speaking, Harvard Divinity School 
professor George Williams delivered his message. The plan initially was 
that draft resisters would come forward to the altar to hand their cards 
over to clergy in a dignified and solemn ceremony. But Williams deviated 
from that plan. Coffin later recalled, 
Suddenly, I heard his voice rise. I saw an excited finger shaking in 
the direction of the single candle on the table below. “There,” he 
shouted in words I recall as follows, “there is Channing’s own 
candlestick, the one he used night after night to illumine the 
progress of his writing. I am certain that were he here for this 
occasion, its flame, illuminating as it does the faces of you 
resisters, would seem to him almost Pentecostal. For you, 
gentlemen, are the very pillar of fire this nation needs to lead it out 





Coffin then realized that protesters intended to burn their draft cards, a 
sensational image that would dominate subsequent news coverage of the 
day’s events (ibid., 243). 67 resisters chose to burn their draft cards with 
Channing’s candlestick, while the remaining 214 simply handed over 
their draft cards to the clergy as planned (Goldstein 2004, 197).  In his 
memoirs, Coffin wrote that “all the Yale students in the church, as was 
natural, gave their cards to me. That was the first of several times I was 
to receive draft cards. While always moved, I was never more so than this 
time” (1977, 243). After the burning of draft cards had concluded, the 
church sang “Once to Every Man” as its final hymn. 
The Justice Department Speech 
Resistance protesters converged on Washington, D.C. on October 
20. Unlike the Boston Resistance events four days earlier, the DC 
protests were marred by confusion. Because of ambiguous written 
directions, protesters assembled at two different churches (Coffin 1977, 
245). After organizers gathered the group in one place, protesters lined 
up two by two and marched under police escort (ibid., 245). In addition 
to draft resisters, the crowd included artists, writers, professors, and 
clergy (Goldstein 2001, 198). As the group rallied outside of the Justice 
Department, 25 representatives of resistance groups presented the draft 
cards to pediatrician Benjamin Spock, a noted war opponent.35 Spock 
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then placed the cards in a briefcase, and handed the briefcase over to 
Coffin to carry into the Department of Justice. 
 Perched in front of television cameras, Coffin delivered a brief 
statement to the press. But unlike his sermon at the Arlington Street 
Church four days earlier, Coffin seemed to backtrack on the sanctuary 
claims. He argued, “we cannot shield them. We can only expose ourselves 
as they have done. The law of the land is clear. Section 12 of the National 
Selective Service Act declares that anyone ‘who knowingly counsels, aids, 
or abets another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed 
forces . . . shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years or 
a fine of ten thousand dollars or both’” (1967h, 1). In spite of the high 
stakes, Coffin urged the draft resisters to follow through with the effort, 
stating that “we hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in 
their refusal to serve in the armed forces as long as the war in Vietnam 
continues, and we pledge ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways 
we can. This means that if they are now arrested for failing to comply 
with a law that violates their consciences, we too must be arrested, for in 
the sight of that law we are now as guilty as they” (ibid., 2). In 
unmistakable terms, Coffin grasped the gravity of his actions. 
 After the speech, eleven men entered the Justice Department: 
Coffin, Mitchell Goodman, Benjamin Spock, Marcus Raskin, Arthur 
Waskow, R.W.B. Lewis, Seymour Melman, and four draft resisters. 





believed looked too hung over (Coffin 1977, 246). Coffin later regretted 
the substitution, believing that it directly led to Raskin’s indictment as a 
co-conspirator in the Boston 5 case (ibid.). 
The brief meeting inside the Justice Department unfolded in a 
bizarre manner. The eleven protesters were escorted to the office of 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John McDonough. The draft-age 
resisters present at the meeting had not been screened in advance and 
included Dickie Harris, an afro-sporting U.C. Berkeley student active in 
the black power movement. Harris’s mannerisms unnerved McDonough. 
In an interview with Jessica Mitford, Coffin recalled that 
He rounded on McDonough. “Man, you gonna hear me?” he 
demanded. “Yes, I’m listening to you,” said McDonough nervously. 
“I didn’t say listen, man, I said he-e-e-ar me!” McDonough was 
looking most uncomfortable. Then Harris, with measured, 
contemptuous emphasis: “Man… you . . . don’t . . . exist.” 
McDonough literally started checking himself out—patting himself 
up and down—and I thought, Watch out, McDonough! Here comes 
the West wind! (Mitford 1970, 42, 43) 
A moment later, McDonough read a brief statement warning the group 
that they could be violating the law (ibid., 43). Coffin then attempted to 
hand McDonough a briefcase full of draft cards (ibid., 43). Coffin later 





I picked up the briefcase and handed it to him. But he pulled back, 
putting his hands on his lap. Puzzled I said, “Shall we try it again, 
Mr. McDonough?” and once more offered him the briefcase. But 
again he recoiled. This is getting to be silly, I thought. “Shall we try 
the table, Mr. McDonough?” I said. This time I put the briefcase 
down squarely in front of him. McDonough started back as though 
it contained hot coals. (Coffin 1977, 250) 
A moment later, the group thanked McDonough and exited the building 
(ibid., 251). 
The Resistance Aftermath 
The October Resistance activities met a firestorm of controversy. 
Interlocutors argued that Coffin’s ‘sanctuary’ plan was incoherent, that 
his advocacy was insincere, and that he failed to grasp the possible 
consequences of draft resistance. 
Coffin’s advocacy for making churches sanctuaries for draft 
resisters proved particularly controversial. In an October 24 letter to the 
Yale Daily News, Yale Divinity School faculty member David Little 
condemned the proposal in sharp terms. Calling the proposal 
“mystifying,” Little asserted that “the notion that the church is a place of 
immunity from the burdens or responsibilities of the law is highly 
questionable indeed” (Little 1967, n.p.). Instead, Little argued that the 
church should encourage conscientious objectors to take full 





precisely what distinguishes civil disobedience from other kinds of 
disobedience. By suffering the legal consequences one acknowledges, 
even in protest, the right of the state to exact a penalty” (ibid.).  
Interlocutors second claimed that Coffin’s anti-draft advocacy was 
insincere. In an October 7 letter, Yale President Kingman Brewster 
warned Coffin that “anyone who is not himself subject to the draft suffers 
a moral handicap when it comes to urging others to take a course which 
not only involves a serious legal penalty but bears the suspicion that it 
may not be motivated by conscience and involves putting the burden on 
someone else to serve in his place” (Brewster 1967a, 1). Brewster 
criticized Coffin in even stronger terms in a speech at the Parents Day 
Assembly on October 28, 1967. He first argued that Coffin’s advocacy 
was insincere. Brewster claimed, “the Chaplain’s effort to devise 
‘confrontations’ and ‘sanctuaries’ in order to gain spot news coverage 
seems to me unworthy of and to detract from the true trial of conscience 
which touches most of your sons and preoccupies so many” (Brewster 
1967b, 3).  Brewster further implied that draft-age men should not heed 
Coffin’s advice, stating that “I do not think your sons are well-served by 
strident voices which urge draft resistance as a political tactic. This is 
especially distasteful when those who urge the resistance are too old to 
be able to share fully the personal and moral consequences of refusing to 





else” (ibid., 2). Despite his personal disapproval of anti-draft advocacy, 
Brewster tolerated Coffin’s right to speak on civil libertarian grounds.36 
 Critics third alleged that Coffin failed to grasp the significance of 
the disobedience he advocated. In a scathing editorial, the October 5 
Manchester Union-Leader called Coffin’s claims incoherent, arguing that 
“The standard ‘line’ of advocates of civil disobedience is that those who 
oppose the law ‘for reasons of conscience’ should be willing, even eager, 
to go to jail for their convictions. But the outspoken New Haven 
clergyman will have none of that; he believes that such people should be 
above the law – a new class of ‘untouchables.’ Coffin also boasts that the 
government would back down rather than face a ‘moral’ confrontation 
with the church protected law violaters [sic]” (“Rev. Mr. Coffin’s 
‘Untouchables’” 1967, 19). Similarly, Kingman Brewster advised Coffin 
that he needed to be willing to accept any consequences his activities 
created. He advised Coffin that “the entire [Yale] Corporation would not 
only permit but would honor and respect those who would, not for 
political effect but for personal, private reasons, witness their conscience 
by a willingness to pay the price which society exacts in order to assure 
                                                 
     36 In the Parents Day Address, Brewster asserted: “Would Yale be a 
better place if the Chaplain were not free to pursue his own convictions, 
including the preaching and practice of non-violent disobedience of a law 
he feels he could not in conscience obey? I think not . . . I have great 
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would have no confidence in them at all if they [word missing here?] 
protected from exposure to all argument and sheltered from the risk of 






itself that the motivation is truly conscientious rather than self-serving” 
(Brewster 1967a, 2). Echoing Brewster’s warning, an unnamed Yale 
senior told the New York Times on October 13 that “I don’t think Bill 
Coffin has quite squared with the fact that a student, in turning in his 
draft card, might be closing off all avenues for later life. Coffin acts as 
though he were just as vulnerable, but he’s not, because his life is  
already set” (“Yale Chaplain Urges Students to Ponder Spurning the 
Draft” 15, 1967). 
After the conclusion of the Department of Justice protest, Coffin 
continued to advocate for draft resistance. On October 23, he attended a 
CALCAV strategy meeting in Detroit. In an October 27 memorandum to 
CALCAV members summarizing the meeting, Richard Fernandez stated, 
“Mr. Coffin outlined, in some detail, the historical significance of 
churches and synagogues being used as sanctuaries for conscience. 
There followed several questions with respect to both the draft and 
churches and synagogues being used as sanctuaries” (1967d, 2). 
Fernandez further noted that the arguments appeared to be having some 
resonance. He explained, “one of the more interesting developments that 
has occured [sic], as some of you know about, is the use of actual 
churches for sanctuary in both Detroit and San Francisco” (ibid., 2).  
Fernandez then summarized three main points that emerged from 
the draft discussion. First, the idea of draft resistance remained 





metropolitan areas the populace is sufficiently fragmented that taking a 
stand on the draft is not by some of the ‘moderate’ peace people, 
considered an abnormal activity” (ibid.). However, such sentiments were 
not widespread: On the other hand, it was also clear, as the discussion 
developed, that identification with draft resistance—no matter the 
particular rightness of that activity—placed many people in a totally 
uncompromising position even among the ‘peace people’ in ones [sic] own 
community” (ibid.). Second, CALCAV members overwhelmingly agreed 
that their main focus should be to support draft resisters. Fernandez 
speculated that this was the case because “[y]oung men of draft age of 
course are the ones that are being told to go and kill Vietnamese and are 
in the position of being placed in a very personal confrontation as to 
what they will and will not do with respect to this war” (ibid., 2). Third, a 
detailed discussion emerged about ways to best support conscientious 
objectors. Possible ideas discussed included “draft counseling, going to 
court with young men who need adult support, preparations to help 
support persons financially who must pay legal fees and/or go to jail for 
their commitment[,] making the draft issue a more public one via the 
press . . . were among many ideas with respect to the ways in which 
people can support men of draft age” (ibid., 2). 
“On Martin Luther” 
 Coffin’s next New Haven sermon on Sunday, November 5, “On 





punctuated the sermon: the existential angst of religious dissidents from 
the Hebrew Bible to the present, the need for purification, and the need 
to experience grace in order to achieve salvation. 
 The first theme reflected in the sermon is the existential angst 
experienced by religious dissidents. In the opening paragraph of the 
sermon, Coffin observed the tendency of ordinary persons who seek “a 
good excuse to do nothing” by criticizing the motives of those who raise 
controversial issues (1967g, 1). Here, Coffin cited the example of “the 
Buddhist monks who turn themselves into burning signposts pointing at 
the war, and the typical reaction is not ‘look at the horrors of the war’ 
but ‘Look at the crazy monk’” (ibid., 1). From the example of the self-
immolating monks, Coffin next proceeded to the case of Martin Luther. 
Despite Luther’s prominent role in church history, Coffin claimed that 
Luther “did things with motives as mixed as our own” and was called a 
“wild boar” by the Pope for his radical actions (ibid.). But as Coffin noted, 
Luther’s ungenteel style put him in good company with prophets from 
the Hebrew Bible. “The prophet Isaiah can be imagined as a dinner guest 
at a gentile party. But what about that dirty bearded sandled shepherd 
Amos who [was] given to complimenting the ladies by calling them ‘cows 
of Bashan?’ There is no telling what Ezekiel would have done at anyone’s 
dinner party, and had Hosiah [sic] been invited, he would have insisted 
upon bringing along his harlot wife” (ibid., 1). The point, Coffin noted, 





what they said. Rather, “they were unpopular to begin with, and then 
simply made the best of it” (ibid.). 
 From the example of Martin Luther and the Hebrew prophets, 
Coffin underscored the fundamentally dangerous roles played by 
religious dissidents. He argued, “truth is always in danger of being 
sacrificed on the altars of good taste and social stability” (ibid., 2). This 
led Coffin to a major line of reasoning in the sermon, “It is a lesson worth 
time and attention, for what the Church was to Luther American society 
may be to the American today” (ibid., 2). 
 Analogically, Coffin warned that the United States was veering 
down the same path as Martin Luther’s Europe. He warned, “it is asking 
human beings to adjust to the social order rather than asking human 
beings to adjust to human needs” (ibid.). As evidence of this point, he 
offers the example of civil rights. “Martin Luther King raised his voice but 
it was not heard” (ibid., 4). Consequently, he reasoned, “the voices are 
more strident, the actions more violent, and the spectre [sic] of a country 
unraveling is real” (ibid.). More ominously, he stated, “even more terrible 
is the spectre [sic] of a new coalition forming not behind justice, not 
behind truth, but behind an order that will be achieved at the expense of 
justice, behind a stability that will demand that truth be sacrificed on its 
altars” (ibid, 4.). 
Coffin concluded the sermon by calling for listeners to follow the 





above all else,” he said, “is to raise up men of thought and of conscience, 
adventuresome imaginative men capable like Luther of both joy and 
suffering” (ibid., 4). Acknowledging that following one’s conscience would 
be difficult, Coffin insisted, “most of all[,] they must be men of courage so 
that when the day goes hard [sic] and cowards steal from the field, like 
Luther they will be able to say, ‘My conscience is captive to the word of 
God . . . to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. Here I stand. I 
can do no other. God help me.’” 
Conclusion 
 By the end of 1967, Coffin had committed to civil disobedience in 
earnest. Motivated by a desire to end the war, he laid the groundwork for 
draft resistance by arguing that draft-age men should put their sense of 
conscience ahead of the state and, if necessary, accept the consequences 
for that choice. This rhetorical move was a logical outgrowth of the 
existential discourse already circulating within Coffin’s social milieu, 
including the civil rights movement, the student New Left, and the 
discourse of the Peacemakers. Given Coffin’s longstanding involvement 
with the civil rights movement, it should hardly be surprising that Coffin 
invoked existentially-driven race protests as a representative case of 
social change in “On Civil Disobedience.” 
The October Resistance activities in Boston and Washington, D.C. 
showed that Coffin was serious about carrying those activities through to 





consequence of the existential mode, one that would become the biggest 
crisis yet of Coffin’s career.  Eventually, it would force a new mode of 








THE TRIAL AND THE RECONCILING MODE, 1968-1975 
  
Despite Coffin’s triumphant participation in the October 
Resistance activities, the backlash against draft resisters began almost 
immediately after the October 20 draft card turn-in at the Department of 
Justice. On October 24, Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of 
the Selective Service, signaled his intention to speed up the induction of 
draft resisters (Ayres 1967, 1). He further called for the prosecution of 
individuals without draft obligations who interfered with operations of 
the Selective Service system (ibid.). On November 8, 1967, the New York 
Times published the full text of an October 24 memorandum and letter 
from Hershey to local draft boards that outlined procedures for inducting 
draft resisters.37 Hershey’s plan was not well-received and appeared 
headed toward a legal challenge. In November, Justice Department 
officials indicated that they believed Hershey’s plan to be 
unconstitutional (Sheehan 1967, 1, 12). Yale President Kingman 
                                                 
     37 Hershey’s memorandum specified that: “Whenever a local draft 
board received an abandoned or mutilated registration certificate or 
current notice of classification which had been issued to one of its own 
registrants, the following action is recommended: (A) Declare the 
registrant to be eloquent for his failure to have the card in his 
possession. (B) Reclassify the registrant into a class available for service 
as a delinquent. (C) At the expiration of the time for taking an appeal, if 
not appeal has been taken, and the delinquency has not been removed, 
order the registrant to report for induction or for civil work in lieu of 
induction if in Class I-O, as a delinquent, or in the board’s discretion in a 






Brewster criticized Hershey’s proposed policy in a December 3 
appearance on the CBS program Face the Nation (“Brewster Accuses 
Hershey of Usurping Power” 1967, 26). 
The conflict between the Selective Service and the Department of 
Justice appeared over on December 9, when Hershey and Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark issued a joint statement pledging to prosecute 
draft resisters who refused to cooperate with draft boards after being 
classified as delinquent (New York Times 1967e, 5). However, Hershey 
stated in an interview two days later that his October memorandum and 
letter were still valid, and that he and Clark still disagreed about how to 
handle draft resisters (Sheehan 1967, 16). The about-face led the New 
York Times to declare in a staff editorial on December 14 that “this threat 
to use the draft as a means of punishment exceeded Mr. Hershey’s 
authority and violated constitutional processes” (1967d, 46). The Nation 
went so far as to argue that Hershey’s policy had galvanized political 
opposition to conscription (1967, 642- 643).  Unrepentant, Hershey 
stated on December 29 that 618 men in 46 states had turned in or 
burned draft cards, and that approximately half of the men in those 
cases were “vulnerable to the draft” as a result of their activities (New 
York Times 1967b, 2). 
Despite the heated argument, few local draft boards changed their 
policy on deferments as a result of Hershey’s directive (Blair 1967, 1, 15). 





letter stating that the Selective Service system was not intended to 
punish dissent (New York Times 1967h, 5).38 Nevertheless, the 
Department of Justice soon took legal action against draft resisters as a 
way of appeasing General Hershey.39 
On January 5, 1968 a Federal grand jury in Boston indicted Coffin, 
Benjamin Spock, Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, and Marcus Raskin 
for conspiracy to aid and abet draft resisters (Graham 1968a, 1, 2).40 The 
indictment held in part that the men had conspired “to unlawfully, 
knowingly and wilfully counsel, aid and abet diverse Selective Service 
registrants to unlawfully, knowingly, and wilfully neglect, fail, refuse and 
                                                 
     38 Josph A. Califano, Jr., a special assistant to President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, wrote the White House document. His letter was a response to 
a letter drafted by presidents of Yale, Brown, Dartmouth, Harvard, 
Cornell, Princeton, and the University of Pennsylvania expressing 
concern regarding Hershey’s policy on draft resisters (New York Times 
1967h, 2). 
 
     39 Department of Justice official John Van de Kamp later admitted to 
Jessica Mitford that the indictments had been meant to appease General 
Hershey: “The prosecution of these five was thought to be a good way 
out—it was done to provide a graceful way out for General Hershey” 
(quoted in Mitford 1969, 56). 
 
     40 Each of the indicted men had followed their own paths to 
involvement with the draft resistance movement. Spock, an 
internationally renowned pediatrician, entered the antiwar movement 
through his involvement with the anti-nuclear group SANE earlier in the 
decade (Mitford 1969, 15). Ferber, a doctoral candidate at Harvard 
University and the only one of the five defendants who was draft age, 
joined The Resistance after his local draft board refused to reclassify him 
as a conscientious objector (ibid., 20). Goodman, a novelist and college 
instructor, was inspired by politically active students at Stanford 
University to draft “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” in summer 
1967 (ibid., 32). Raskin, a former Kennedy administration advisor and 
co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies, participated in the 





evade service in the armed forces of the United States and all other 
duties required of registrants under the Universal Training and Service 
Act (50 U.S.C. App. 451-471) and the rules, regulations, and directions 
duly made pursuant to said Act, in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 462(a).” The 
indictment further identified eleven overt acts committed by the 
defendants between August and October 1967 as part of the conspiracy. 
Coffin’s name was mentioned in seven of the eleven overt acts: (1) for 
circulating a draft of “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” in August 
1967, (2) for chairing the press conference announcing “A Call to Resist 
Illegitimate Authority” on October 2, (3) for speaking at the Arlington 
Street Church service on October 16, (4) for accepting draft cards during 
the Arlington Street service, (5) for speaking at the draft resistance rally 
outside the Justice Department on October 20, (6) for entering the 
Department of Justice Building, and (7) for abandoning a briefcase inside 
the Justice Department which contained returned draft cards. 
The charges came as a surprise to the five men, who learned of the 
indictment from the news media. Most of the men did not know each 
other prior to the indictment (Goldstein 2004, 208). Coffin met Goodman 
once during the summer of 1967 and had exchanged only a dozen words 
with Spock prior to the “Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” press 
conference on October 2 (Bannan and Bannan 1974, 97). Coffin had 





(ibid.).41 The other defendants did not know each other at all (ibid.). 
Almost immediately, the indictment became a cause célèbre among the 
antiwar movement. The charges garnered media coverage on the front 
page of the New York Times. The Nation correspondent Jean Carper 
suggested the government had indicted the five because of their social 
prominence, speculating that “the government cannot tolerate the kind of 
rebellion Dr. Spock represents: a revolt in the ranks of the older 
generation, especially those with some status an influence. It cannot fill 
its prisons with doctors, and clergy and politicians and writers, without 
losing credibility as a free nation” (1968, 329). But despite the antiwar 
movement’s high hopes for the trial, the realities of the U.S. legal system 
would limit the rhetorical opportunities open to Coffin and his co-
defendants.  
 Although Coffin briefly considered pleading guilty to the Federal 
charges, he agreed with the other four defendants to plead “not guilty.” 
The plea devastated Coffin’s credibility. The existential mode of argument 
that he used throughout 1967 had insisted that individuals accept 
responsibility for their own actions. Yet Coffin and his attorney 
subsequently argued at trial that he did not seek to recruit draft resisters 
and that his actions did not fulfill the legal definition of conspiracy. Such 
arguments appeared to be an evasion of responsibility that directly 
                                                 
     41 Ferber delivered a speech at the Arlington Street Church service on 
October 16, 1967 (Bannan and Bannan 1974, 92). Raskin was part of 
the delegation that entered the Justice Department with Coffin and 





contradicted the existential mode, even while Coffin continued to make 
existential arguments outside of judicial settings in early 1968. I argue 
that after the trial, Coffin’s discourse moved away from the existential 
mode. Chastened by his prosecution and recognizing that the war was 
coming to an end, he employed a reconciling mode of rhetoric that 
attempted to rehabilitate war opponents. Coffin used the reconciling 
mode first, to argue for national confession, and later, to advocate for 
legal amnesty for draft resisters and deserters. 
After the Indictment 
 After their indictment came down, Coffin and his four co-
defendants faced three legal options: plead guilty and accept the court’s 
punishment, act as their own attorneys in court to draw attention to the 
conduct of the war, or mount a full legal defense by arguing their actions 
did not amount to a conspiracy (Mitford 1969, 74-75; Foley 2003, 82-
83).42 As Coffin later recalled in his memoirs, he initially favored pleading 
guilty: 
Before the indictment in the rare moment in which I thought about 
being arrested, I generally imagined I’d go straight to jail. To plead 
not guilty and stand trial meant challenging the legality of the war. 
At CALCAV we had always stressed the moral aspects. 
                                                 
     42 Because Coffin’s antiwar activities in Boston and Washington D.C. 
and Boston were well-documented in the news media, disputing the 






Furthermore a good courtroom battle would tend to distract public 
attention from the unpleasantness in Vietnam. After the 
indictment, I still felt much the same way. I pictured the five of us 
behind bars, our silence more effective than our words, a prospect 
which seemed all the more likely as literally hundreds of people all 
over the country arose to proclaim that their guilt was as great as 
ours and to prove thereby that the government had not cowed the 
movement. (1977, 260)  
For Coffin, pleading guilty appeared attractive for both philosophical and 
practical reasons. Foley (2003) writes, “Not only did taking one’s 
punishment follow more consistently the examples of Socrates, Thoreau, 
Gahndi, and King, but they believed that the sight of Dr. Spock entering 
prison—handcuffed and in overalls—would prove extremely 
embarrassing to the administration” (82). But pleading ‘guilty’ and 
heading to prison would prove easier said than done. 
Coffin’s legal advisors and the other co-defendants expressed 
strong reservations about pleading guilty. Yale Law School professor 
Alexander Bickel, an informal legal advisor to Coffin, warned him that 
the conspiracy charges were “a legal vacuum cleaner. It’s a worn-out 
piece of tyranny that has to be resisted if the government is not to 
become repressive” (quoted in Coffin 1977, 261). Of the four other 
defendants, only Michael Ferber shared his desire to not contest the 





James St. Clair as his attorney to mount a defense against the 
government’s case.43 The five defendants pleaded ‘not guilty’ at their 
arraignment in Boston on January 29, 1968. 
Coffin later expressed regret about agreeing to mount a defense in 
the case. He recalled personal responsibilities as a husband and father 
softened his stance on a ‘guilty’ plea, writing that “when going to jail 
seemed very imminent—and inevitable if I pleaded guilty—I was suddenly 
assailed by feelings of guilt vis-à-vis my family” (1977, 262). Goldstein 
offers another plausible explanation for pleading not guilty, stating that 
“Coffin knew enough about jail to know that he would have had a very 
difficult time with the regimen, the inactivity, and the lack of an 
audience” (2004, 208). It is also possible that Coffin naively believed 
public support would turn the trial outcome in his favor. On January 25, 
Yale faculty released a petition in support of Coffin signed by 358 of the 
university’s 1,169 faculty members, including 16 deans and department 
chairs (New York Times 1968, 2).   
During this time, Coffin struggled to defend his actions. As will 
soon be clear, he awkwardly claimed that his participation in draft 
resistance activities was not meant to persuade anyone to join the draft 
movement, yet simultaneously made arguments outside of legal settings 
implying that individuals had an existential duty to resist the war. The 
                                                 
     43 St. Clair gained national prominence for representing Joseph Welch 
during the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1953 (Mitford 1969, 76). He later 






tensions between these two stances are most evident in Coffin’s 
appearance on the NBC talk show Meet the Press on January 28, 1968 
his Sunday sermon at Battell Chapel delivered exactly one week later, 
and his comments at the National Resistance Day rally in New Haven on 
April 3, 1968. 
Meet the Press 
 Coffin and Spock both appeared on the Sunday January 28, 1968 
edition of the NBC talk show Meet the Press. Under questioning from the 
program’s four panelists, Coffin defended his anti-draft activities with 
two ill-conceived lines of argument. First, he claimed that his activities 
represented a ‘test case’ that called the legality of the draft into question, 
along with the broader legality of the war. Second, Coffin asserted that he 
merely counseled young men who had already decided on their own to 
resist the draft and did not seek actively to recruit new participants into 
the draft resistance movement. The two lines of argument contradicted 
the existential mode, because Coffin appeared to be evading 
responsibility for his personal actions instead of accepting the results of 
his choices. 
Coffin first argued that the Boston 5 indictment represented a test 
case against the United States government’s Vietnam policy. He openly 
acknowledged that his activities in Boston violated the Selective Service 
Act, claiming, “The law that we violated has yet to be tested for its 





There are lots of questions about the draft law” (Meet the Press 1968, 4). 
Coffin admitted that if the war was found legal, he would be obligated to 
accept whatever punishment the courts chose to impose. He conceded, 
“It may turn out that the draft law is totally legal according to our courts, 
in which case then it’s up to me to accept the legal punishment; and this 
again it seems to me is quite proper. I’m not against the whole legal 
order; I’m willing to accept the legal consequences” (ibid., 6).44 
Coffin second argued that a distinction existed between counseling 
draft resisters and actively encouraging resistance. Early in the 
interview, Coffin claimed that he spoke to men who had already decided 
on their own to resist the draft.  
I think to make it crystal clear it’s important for me to say that I 
have never told anybody to violate any law . . .  I have not tried to 
Pied Piper any into jail. But I have said that I would stand with 
those who in conscience felt they could not serve in the war, in the 
army, as long as the war in Vietnam continued. And I think that’s 
an important distinction because I wouldn’t be playing a proper 
pastoral role if I were telling people to violate the laws. I am playing 
a proper role when I say to obey the dictates of conscience. (ibid., 
6) 
                                                 
     44 Because Coffin had been indicted for conspiracy to aid and abet 
draft resisters, rather than for resisting the war itself, his argument 





However, the distinction between counseling draft resisters and 
persuading them proved difficult to maintain in the subsequent exchange 
with the Meet the Press panelists. When panelist Douglas Kiker asked 
Coffin if there was a distinction between ‘advocating’ and ‘advising’, 
Coffin conceded there was not. 
KIKER: You described yourself earlier—I hope I’m accurate in 
this—as a sort of advisor on conscience to young men who might 
need it. But it seems that you’re more than that, that you’re 
advocating what a young man of conscience should do[,] so really 
aren’t you an advocate rather than an advisor? 
COFFIN: Well, I’m advocating in the sense that I am presenting my 
own views, yes. But if you came to me as a student at Yale and 
said should I turn in my draft card? The last thing in the world I 
would ever tell you to do is to turn in your draft card. (ibid., 13) 
Coffin’s admission in the first part of his answer that he did advocate 
undermined his larger claim that he only counseled young men who had 
already decided to oppose the draft on their own. As John Bannan and 
Rosemary Bannan wryly observe, “Coffin disavowed lawyers’ 
understanding of the terms ‘counsel, aid, and abet’” (1974, 98). His 
repeated insistence that he did not seek to recruit new draft resisters 





The Battell Chapel Sermon of February 4, 1968 
 Although Coffin’s appearance on Meet the Press made clear that he 
intended to mount a vigorous challenge to the government’s conspiracy 
charges, his other public statements at the time continued to use 
existential argument. In his February 4, 1968 sermon at Battell Chapel, 
Coffin argued that the present time represented the correct moment for 
social change. The sermon can be seen as continuation of the existential 
mode, although shrouded in language more metaphorical than his public 
discourse prior to the indictment. Kairos served as the central theme of 
the sermon. In the rhetorical tradition of the ancient Greeks, Kairos 
referred to the ideal moment for persuasion. In the early twentieth 
century, Paul Tillich reappropriated Kairos as a term with deep religious 
significance, most notably in his Systematic Theology.45 
 Coffin began the sermon with a series of temporal metaphors 
designed to elevate the significance of current time. In the first 
                                                 
     45 Tillich’s definition of kairos focuses on the death and resurrection 
of Jesus as the central moment of human history (1963, 369). He argues 
in volume three of Systematic Theology that the term holds eschatological 
implications. He notes that, “In the New Testament it is the translation of 
a word used by Jesus when he speaks of his time which has not yet 
come. It is used by both John the Baptist and Jesus when they 
announce the fulfillment of time with respect to the Kingdom of God, 
which is ‘at hand’” (ibid., 369). In addition to this “great kairos,” Tillich 
acknowledges that other kairoi exist in history, representing a 
breakthrough of the Holy Spirit into a particular milieu: “The fact that 
kairos-experiences belong to the history of the churches and that the 
‘great kairos,’ the appearance of the center of history, is again and again 
re-experienced through relative ‘kairoi,’ in which the Kingdom of God 
manifests itself in a particular breakthrough, is decisive for our 





paragraph, Coffin described the experience of parachuting at night, an 
event marked by a particularly unique sense of time: 
There is in the experience of parachuting at night one glorious 
moment. It follows a distinctly inglorious one when the jumper 
leaps from the plane into a gale roaring past the open door at 
about a hundred and thirty-five miles an hour. For a few seconds 
he is at the mercy of the wind—bashed, buffeted. But then of a 
sudden comes the shock of the opening chute. For a few seconds 
there is no sense of falling. The drone of the plane is distant. The 
stars on the horizon are lower than the jumper. So for one glorious 
moment he hangs in silence among the stars. But the vision 
quickly recedes, and presently with a rude jolt he is returned to 
earth, to business as usual. That strikes me as a pretty accurate 
picture of life, with time offering an occasional high or perhaps 
very low moment, but for the most part being low-voltaged. (1968c, 
1) 
Coffin immediately followed the parachuting anecdote with three 
additional examples of the momentary elevation of time. First, he 
contrasted Shakespeare’s 53rd sonnet with the Bible, claiming that “Yes, 
to those who have ears to hear, minds to think, and hearts to feel 
business as usual is really business as never before, for in each moment 
there is something new, meaningful, painful, joyous” (ibid., 1). Second, 





colleague’s deathbed. “[H]e started the visit with ‘The number of my 
taxicab was 1729. It seemed to me a rather dull number.’ ‘No, Hardy, no,’ 
replied the dying man, raising himself up in his bed with excitement, ‘It 
is a very interesting number. It is the smallest number expressible as the 
sum of two cubes in two different ways’” (ibid.). Third, Coffin offered Eric 
Hoffer as an example of someone easily excited by the mundane, 
observing that “everything going on in this world seems to pull him in . . . 
In this sense, surely, Eric Hoffer is a religious man. He is there, present, 
in every moment looking for its meaning, mystery, significance” (ibid., 2). 
Each of the three examples elevated the significance of seemingly 
ordinary events in a particular moment, calling attention to the 
possibilities for action or new understanding.  
These examples served as metaphors for the central claim of the 
sermon: the present time was ripe with the possibility for Kairos-driven 
change. To advance this claim, Coffin offered his own definition of Kairos. 
His account drew heavily from Tillich’s The Protestant Era.46 Coffin 
explained, “In human history there are crucial times, turning points. 
Tillich talks of these moments as Kairos—special time—as opposed to 
chronos—formal time. A Kairos is a moment in history when the power of 
                                                 
     46 In The Protestant Era, Tillich differentiates between two types of 
Kairos: “Kairos in its unique and universal sense is, for Christian faith, 
the appearing of Jesus as the Christ. Kairos in its general and special 
sense for the philosopher of history is every turning-point in history in 
which the eternal judges and transforms the temporal. Kairos in its 
special sense, as decisive for our present situation, is the coming of a 
new theonomy on the social of a secularized and emptied autonomous 





life has a peculiar power to move life along. Kairos is a moment in history 
when the eternal judges and transforms the temporal. And in the Bible a 
Kairos is a moment of highest drama because in part it is one of highest 
tragedy” (ibid., 2). Coffin next elaborated an example of Kairos in Biblical 
terms: 
For instance, we read of Christ that “his time (Kairos) had not yet 
come.” But then it did come. He entered Jerusalem. This was the 
moment--and Jerusalem missed it. The tragedy of a Kairos is 
always this failure of vision on the part of those to whom it comes. 
“And because Jerusalem did not know the time of its visitation,” 
Christ says of Jerusalem, “they will not leave one stone upon 
another within you.”47 In other words, according to the Biblical 
view of history there comes a time when men and groups of men 
must choose between “blessings and curse, life and death:” and 
they reach a point of no return if they hesitate too long in choosing 
life. (ibid., 2). 
 In the subsequent paragraph, Coffin enumerated three 
characteristics of Kairos. The first such characteristic was conflict. “In 
nations conflict is inevitable,” Coffin stated, “for in a Kairos the power, 
                                                 
     47 This line appears similar to Luke 19:44, which reads, “They will 
crush you to the ground, you and your children within you, and they will 
not leave within you one stone upon another; because you did not 
recognize the time of your visitation from God” (NSRV, 855). The line also 
has similarity to Luke 21:6, which reads, “As for these things that you 
see, the days will come when not one stone will be left upon another; all 





pride, prestige of the government or ruling groups is being challenged by 
new forces” (ibid., 2). Second, Coffin argued that ruling groups resisted 
the Kairos. He stated, “If conflict is the first obvious characteristic, the 
second characteristic of a Kairos is hardly less obvious, and that is the 
extraordinary difficulty ruling groups have in recognizing that the time 
for change has come” (ibid., 4). As a result, Coffin argued that the third 
characteristic of Kairos was that only a small minority of people would 
recognize it, because “those who apprehend it before the point of no 
return are always few in number. They are a saving remnant. They 
cannot always save, but if anyone can save, they can” (ibid., 3).  
Coffin next applied Kairos as a means for explaining the political 
situation of early 1968.  He asserted that Kairos had arrived for the 
United States, as evidenced by mounting social unrest. Coffin explained, 
“Conflict, blindness on the part of ruling groups, a saving remnant--all 
three of these characteristics are present in the Kairos which beyond the 
shadow of a doubt has now come to this nation. The conflict was sensed 
by President Johnson when in his State of the Union Message he referred 
to ‘a certain restlessness in the land.’ But while he sensed the conflict, 
the President did not understand it, for he implied it should not be there 
given the benefits of his administration” (ibid., 3). Yet the moment was 
not simply a response to political crises. To Coffin, much deeper spiritual 
crisis existed, and meant that “the conflict is not only economic and 





so seriously. The nation seems to have exhausted its spiritual substance” 
(ibid., 3). 
In the conclusion of the sermon, Coffin suggested ways the 
audience could respond to the Kairos. He argued that students 
represented one group particularly well-suited to taking action, observing 
that “St. Benedict once wrote ‘God often reveals what is better to the 
younger. I think God is doing just that” (ibid., 4). He closed the sermon 
by encouraging his audience to act for positive social change. “Perhaps,” 
Coffin stated, “the beginning of a new term is a good time to remember 
that despite all that is wrong with our universities, churches, and nation, 
we must not ‘Lie down in darkness. Rather, we must walk a ‘not as 
unwise men but as wise, asking the most of the time,’ so that this 
twilight which seems to herald an oncoming night may yet prove the 
early morning light of a new and better day” (ibid., 4). 
 The Battell Chapel sermon of February 4 is noteworthy for two 
reasons. First, Coffin’s repeated nod to social and religious unrest 
suggests that the existential mode remained present in his discourse 
during the period between the indictment and the trial. Although 
Vietnam is never specifically referenced in the sermon, statements such 
as “God often reveals what is better to the younger” and “this twilight 
which seems to herald an oncoming night” must be interpreted in the 
context of the antiwar movement and the deepening crisis in race 





tone of the sermon stood in sharp contrast to his equivocation on Meet 
the Press a week earlier. This uncompromising attitude would remain 
evident in his next significant public statement regarding Vietnam, 
delivered two months later. 
The National Resistance Day Rally 
 Coffin’s boldest speech in the pretrial months of 1968 came on 
April 3, at the National Resistance Day Rally in New Haven. His brief 
remarks reflect continued use of the existential mode. 
Acknowledging President Johnson’s March 31 announcement that 
he would not seek re-election Coffin began the speech by asking, “Is it 
right to turn in draft cards less than seventy-two hours after the 
President’s historic speech? And should we not now close ranks behind 
his peace offensive and give to our unhappy and disheveled country a 
much needed respite?” (1968a, 1). Rather than answer the questions 
immediately, the next five hundred words of the speech enumerated 
Coffin’s criticisms of the Johnson administration’s conduct of the war. 
In the eighth paragraph, Coffin argued against patriotic calls to 
rally around the government. Coffin stated, “Last night I read the words 
of a war hero echoing Eisenhower’s call to close ranks: ‘The time,’ he 
said, ‘for arguing whether we should be there or not has passed. We 
should get behind our country’” (ibid., 2). Coffin argued that such a 
pronouncement was illogical because it failed to grasp the existential 





These sentences should be framed for their purity of 
incomprehension. They are the epitome of that cheap patriotic 
piety that lacks both candor and courage. They are the epitome of 
that false resignation than induces men to abdicate when they 
should be revolting. As of today the plea to close ranks still means 
to close minds and eyes to the incredible suffering of the 
Vietnamese people, not to mention our own boys. It is a plea for 
spiritual death. (ibid., 2) 
 In paragraph ten, Coffin offered a theological defense for his 
continuing protest activities. Here, Coffin invoked the example of Martin 
Luther to support his position, arguing that “Over four hundred years 
ago many good men pleaded with Luther to exercise some tact and 
restraint. But Luther understood that it was too early, that what they 
wanted was for truth and justice to be offered up on the table of social 
stability. His words are still explicable and pertinent to Christians at 
least in this season” (ibid., 2). Coffin then quoted Luther at length: 
This is not a time to cringe, but to cry aloud, when our Lord Jesus 
Christ is damned, reviled, and blasphemed. If you exhort me to 
humility, I exhort you to pride . . . we see Christ suffer. If hitherto 
we ought to have been silent and humble, I ask you whether now, 
when the blessed Saviour is mocked, we should not fight for Him . 





The Luther quotation then became the basis for Coffin’s exhortation to 
the audience, given in the last three paragraphs of the speech.  
 In paragraph twelve, Coffin argued that draft resistance 
represented a logical outgrowth of individual belief. He extolled the 
audience to respect the conscience of draft resisters. “My fellow citizens 
of New Haven,” he implored, “if you cannot follow, permit at least these 
young men to go where their consciences lead them” (ibid., 2). He 
contrasted the draft resisters with other dissidents protesting during this 
time, stating “remember they are not trying to disturb the peace. They 
are only trying to disturb the war. They are not rioting in fact, they are 
not infringing on the civil liberties of any other citizen” (ibid., 2). In 
paragraph fourteen, Coffin acknowledged that “for me, once again, I am 
pleased to be with them. They have elected to risk something big for 
something good. I admire them and believe theirs is the true voice of 
America, the vision that will prevail beyond the distortions of the 
moment” (ibid., 2). 
 The speech offered a clear indication that despite his looming trial, 
Coffin continued to use existential argument. But confrontation with the 
legal system would soon test the extent to which Coffin was willing to 
stand by his beliefs. 
The Trial of the Boston 5 
In early 1968, the five defendants and their supporters hoped their 





legal realities of conspiracy charges, the political turbulence of mid-1968, 
and the disposition of the trial judge would work against them. 
Journalistic commentators recognized shortly after the indictment 
that the odds were stacked against the defendants. Fred P. Graham 
wrote in the New York Times on January 14, 1968 that “the upcoming 
trial in Boston will undoubtedly be a moral confrontation, because these 
men are not criminals in the accepted sense, yet they chose to violate the 
law as a means of opposing the war. But as a legal confrontation, the 
Spock case appears at this stage to be exceedingly one-sided” (1968b, 
E8). Similar cases against individuals encouraging draft resistance 
during WWI, WWII, and the Korean War had resulted in convictions 
(ibid.). In addition, the increasing social turmoil of early 1968 
overshadowed news coverage of the Boston 5 case. The Tet Offensive in 
Vietnam, President Johnson’s announcement on March 31 that he would 
not seek re-election, Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination on April 4, 
and subsequent urban rioting dominated news coverage in the weeks 
preceding the trial (Foley 2003a, 81-82). Although a crowd of nearly 
1,000 antiwar activists rallied outside the courthouse during the 
January arraignment, few protesters attended the trial itself (Bigart 
1968, E15). 
The case’s presiding judge, Francis J.W. Ford, also limited the 
options available to the defense in the case. The longest-serving district 





personal distaste for the defendants. In April, Ford ruled that questions 
regarding the legality of the war were irrelevant to the conspiracy charges 
and were therefore inadmissible as evidence (Foley 2003a, 88). The ruling 
proved particularly devastating to Spock’s defense team, who had sought 
depositions from 25 witnesses about the legality of the war (Graham 
1968c, 10). Ignoring the objections of defense attorneys, Ford also ruled 
that each defendant would present their case one at a time, determined 
by the first initial of each defendant’s last name (Bannan and Bannan 
1974, 95).  
Additionally, each of the defendants hired separate attorneys, who 
subsequently discouraged their clients from discussing the case with 
each other. St. Clair filed unsuccessful pre-trial motions seeking to sever 
Coffin’s trial from the other defendants (Mitford 1969, 81-84). As co-
defendant Marcus Raskin later recalled, “the lawyers prevented us from 
taking our case to the people, into the streets, holding demonstrations 
and picket lines, or from any sort of public collaboration with the Resist 
[sic] groups” (quoted in Mitford 1969, 82).  
The all-male jury seated to hear the case also gave the prosecution 
another strategic advantage. As New York Times reporter Homer Bigart 
wrote, “The Government, apparently suspecting that women in general 
might be biased in favor of Dr. Spock, a world-famous pediatrician, 





(1968, E15). All but one of the twelve jurors eventually seated in the case 
lacked a college degree (ibid.).48 
Coffin’s Testimony 
During the trial, Coffin took the witness stand to testify in his own 
defense. In direct examination, St. Clair led Coffin through the 
chronology of events leading up to Coffin’s participation in the October 
Resistance protests. Coffin claimed that he learned of the group known 
as The Resistance from students sometime in the summer of 1967, but 
could not recall precise dates (United States vs. Coffin 1969, 8-113). 
Coffin further testified that he had met Dr. Spock in-person only twice, 
once when he received an honorary doctorate from Yale in 1963 and the 
second time at a SANE rally in 1963, and that he had exchanged no 
more than half a dozen words with him during both encounters, and that 
he had not met Ferber and Raskin prior to September 1967 (ibid., 8-
122). He testified that he had been invited to speak at the Arlington 
Street Church service by Rick Bogel, a Yale graduate student who 
participated in the group planning the anti-draft protests in Boston 
(ibid., 8-145). 
In a crucial segment near the end of his direct examination, Coffin 
made a series of claims that would seal his fate at the trial. Coffin 
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testified that he had three reasons for participating in the Department of 
Justice meeting with Deputy Attorney General John McDonough: to 
support draft resisters, to force a legal confrontation over the Selective 
Service Act, and to raise public awareness of conscientious objection to 
the war (ibid., 9-30 and 9-31). Oddly, Coffin testified that he did not 
believe the draft card turn-in would be an impediment to the war. 
ST. CLAIR: Now sir, did you at that time believe that the delivery of 
the draft cards to the Attorney General would hinder or impede the 
function of the draft? 
COFFIN: Certainly not. 
ST. CLAIR: Why not? 
COFFIN:  Because turning in a draft card speeded up a man’s 
induction and in no way impeded his induction. (ibid., 9-37) 
Such testimony strained Coffin’s credibility. If taken at face value, the 
statement amounted to an admission that the Resistance protests were 
counterproductive, at least as they concerned the fate of the men who 
turned in their draft cards. 
Coffin also equivocated about why he participated in Resistance 
activities. He testified that he “never counseled anyone to refuse service 
in the Armed Forces” (ibid., 9-37) and insisted that his reference to 
“counseling, aiding, and abetting young men of conscience” in his 
October 20 speech outside the Justice Department had been a reference 





(ibid., 9-37, 9-38). He openly admitted that he hoped such activities 
would result in prosecution, testifying that, “From the point of view of the 
Department of Justice, I hoped that the government would accept the 
invitation to prosecute us for violation of Section 12 of the National 
Selective Service Act in order to find out, through us, as a test case, to 
test the legality of the war and the provisions of the draft law regarding 
conscientious objection” (ibid., 9-41). Coffin’s testimony amounted to an 
odd admission: he hoped it would bring him into conflict with the legal 
system, yet he simultaneously denied that he had engaged in any 
conspiracy to encourage draft resistance. One could reasonably conclude 
from this admission that Coffin was either unsure of his own reasons for 
participating in the protest, or that he was deliberately misrepresenting 
his intentions under oath as a means of evading the conspiracy 
charges.49 
 During cross-examination, prosecutor John Wall focused on 
Coffin’s claim that he did not intend to recruit new conscientious 
objectors. In particular, Wall narrowed in on the rhetorical nature of the 
events in Boston. 
WALL: And did it occur to you that in those circumstances and 
that house of worship, at least in clerical garb, you and others 
                                                 
     49 As one newspaper columnist wrote after the trial’s conclusion, 
“Except for Dr. Spock and [Michael] Ferber, the defendants seemed to 
waffle and equivocate on the witness stand, humiliating themselves and 
taking the starch out of the peace movement--partly because they felt 
they were being held to account for the wrong conduct. For the most 





particularly you, might move some of those that had less iron in 
their spine than others to act on their convictions and turn in their 
draft cards? 
COFFIN: No, it did not. 
WALL: Did not? 
COFFIN: It did not. 
WALL: It was not your intention to convince anybody at all to turn 
in his draft card there; is that correct? 
COFFIN: That is absolutely correct. (ibid., 9-56) 
Wall’s questioning strained the credibility of Coffin’s claim that he did not 
intend to persuade draft resisters. For example, Coffin acknowledged 
that during the Arlington Street Church service, he asked each resister 
“are you sure you know what you’re doing?,” shook hands with each 
resister, and even returned a card to a Yale law student (ibid., 9-60). 
Wall’s cross-examination second moved to establish factually that 
Coffin’s activities made the legal definition for being a conspiracy. 
WALL: Now, when you say you didn’t know that to accept draft 
cards was a violation of the law, do you mean to tell us that you 
did not consider yourself to be, according to what the law 
purported to be, you did not consider yourself to be an aider and 
abettor if you accepted a draft card from someone who was turning 





COFFIN: That is correct. I was not sure in my own mind what 
aiding or abetting really would constitute. (ibid., 9-79, 9-80) 
After a brief interjection by the defense attorneys, Wall highlighted the 
absurdity of Coffin’s answer. 
WALL: Well, if it wasn’t clear in your own mind what aiding and 
abetting meant, will you please explain this, in Exhibit E, which is 
your speech at Arlington Street Church, as introduced by the 
defense “ . . . And further, as the law regarding aiding and abetting 
is clear--up to five years in jail and a fine of $10,000--church 
members could then say: if you arrest this man for violating a law 
which violates his conscience you must arrest us.” (ibid.) 
The exchange made Coffin look foolish for claiming that he had not 
sought to put himself in legal jeopardy. Besides contradicting available 
evidence, Coffin’s equivocation ran counter to the existential mode’s 
insistence on accepting personal responsibility for the consequences of 
one’s own actions. 
Coffin’s cross-examination was also noteworthy because of a 
comment made by Judge Ford. When several courtroom spectators 
laughed at a tense exchange between Coffin and Wall, Ford angrily 
threatened to have the courtroom cleared of observers (ibid., 9-82). A 
moment later, after St. Clair and Wall exchanged arguments about a 
legal technicality, Ford told the jury, “if I make a mistake in the law, 





Spock’s defense attorney, strenuously objected to the propriety of Ford’s 
statement. An exasperated Ford told the jury, “I am not at the present 
moment indicating this case will go to a higher court, not at all . . . I 
meant to say that if it did and I made an error in the law a higher court 
would correct me” (ibid., 9-86, 9-87). Still, Ford’s comments left little 
doubt that he believed the defendants were guilty. 
The Verdict 
Ford’s conduct at the end of the trial further illustrated his 
personal distaste for the defendants. After closing arguments ended, he 
presented the jury with unusual deliberation instructions. As Foley 
explains: 
Now, in charging the jury, Ford, on his own, submitted a 
questionnaire to the jurors to help them reach their verdicts. The 
10 questions (or, as lawyers call them, “interrogatories”) broke 
down the different segments of the alleged conspiracy and asked 
the jury to decide if the defendants were guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of each charge. If they were guilty of any one of 
the 10 charges, they would be guilty overall. (2003a, 95)  
It took the jury just a few hours to return “guilty” verdicts against Coffin, 
Ferber, Goodman, and Spock on June 14; Raskin was acquitted. At the 
sentencing hearing on July 10, Ford sentenced each defendant to two 
years in prison, fined Ferber $1,000, and Coffin, Spock, and Goodman 





accept the government’s recommendation that the defendants be given 
suspended prison sentences (United States vs. Coffin 1969, 107 n. 66). 
After the Trial 
After sentencing, Coffin and his three convicted co-defendants were 
released on their own recognizance pending appeal. Coffin put on a brave 
public face, but it was evident that the trial had taken a toll on him 
personally. He had amassed over $39,000 in legal fees (Horton 1968).50 
The threat of incarceration loomed large enough that Coffin’s predecessor 
at Yale, Sidney Lovett, wrote to Coffin about ideas for covering Yale 
Chaplaincy. “Suppose we gathered eighteen Yale graduates, clergy of 
wide ecumenical distribution,” Lovett suggested, “who would indicate 
that, without expense to the University, we would each come for a month 
in residence to fulfill, as best we could, the pastoral and administrative 
functions of the Chaplain” (Lovett 1968, 1). Coffin responded favorably to 
the plan, which he urged Lovett to take up with Yale President Kingman 
Brewster (1968b, 1). 
A year later, a 3-judge panel from the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals set aside the convictions (Fenton 1969, 1, 12). Writing for the 
majority, Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich and Judge Edward M. McEntee 
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to convict Spock and Ferber 
and ordered them acquitted, but ruled that Coffin and Goodman should 
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face a new trial. Dissenting judge Frank Coffin (no relation to the 
defendant) went even further, opining that all defendants should have 
been acquitted on first amendment grounds.  
On August 7, 1969, the Justice Department announced that 
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold would not appeal the ruling about 
Spock or Ferber to the Supreme Court, but sought extension of 
timeframe required to file an appeal of the court’s ruling on Coffin and 
Goodman (Smith 1969, 1). The reason for the extension was that “Mr. 
Coffin and Mr. Goodman had already been granted an extension until 
Sept. 9 of the time during which they could appeal to the Supreme 
Court” and “The Government’s decision ‘whether to file an appeal may be 
affected’ by what Mr. Coffin and Mr. Goodman do” (ibid., 5). Through 
private channels, the Department of Justice signaled to Coffin’s attorneys 
that they would not seek retrial. The department issued a formal notice 
of intent not to prosecute in 1970. 
Implications of the Trial 
The significance of the Boston 5 case for the antiwar movement 
remains disputed. Commentators generally concluded that the trial had 
been unsuccessful in allowing the defendants to make their case against 
the war. New York Times commentator Sidney E. Zion argued that Judge 
Ford had “virtually foreclosed the defendants from the confrontation that 
some of them, notably Dr. Spock, so actively desired” (1968, E10). The 





wrote, “Obviously, the peace flock expected more from men who had been 
among the first to raise the moral flag against the war. They wanted a 
front-page trial and they didn’t get it” (ibid.). Similarly, the June 29, 1968 
New Republic editorialized, “In the peace movement, there is opinion that 
once it proved impossible to turn the Boston affair into a propaganda 
trial on the legality of the Vietnam war, there was no further defense that 
could be made worthily, and hence none should have been made” 
(1968b, 11). John C. Bennett argued in Christianity and Crisis that the 
trial’s outcome highlighted the moral bankruptcy of the American 
government, asserting that “For these men [Coffin and Spock] and their 
codefendants to be in prison would be an absurdity that would reflect on 
our legal processes themselves” (1968, 149-150). 
 Mitford, the earliest historiographer of the trial, pessimistically 
wrote that the trial failed to mobilize opponents of the war to meaningful 
action, speculating that “it is likely that if enough people were moved to 
concern themselves with political trials everywhere, in their own 
communities or on a national level—and by learning about these trials 
were stung into action to demand a stop to them—prosecutors, who are 
after all only cogs in the political system, would be forced to call a halt” 
(1969, 246). Foley likewise concurred that the trial failed to accomplish 
its intended aims, arguing that situational constraints almost completely 
overwhelmed the trial. He explained, “A combination of facts, including a 





legalistic, defensive defense), a judge who summarily ruled out any 
discussion of the illegality or morality of the war in Vietnam, an all-male 
jury, and the judge’s use of special interrogatories in his charge to the 
jury, guaranteed an anticlimactic trial—almost completely useless to a 
movement attempting to stop a war” (2003a, 97-98). 
But not all accounts view the Boston 5 case as a failure. In the 
immediate aftermath of the conviction, John C. Bennett argued that 
prosecution represented an unsustainable strategy for dealing with draft 
resisters. Bennett asked rhetorically, “Does the Government plan to seek 
confrontation with these young men? How many persons sent to prison 
because of their conscientious conviction can our society absorb without 
morally destroying itself? Are ‘the Boston four’ only the beginning?” 
(1968, 150). Bannan and Bannan claim that the trial “turned the 
community against the prevailing selective service practices” (1974, 212).  
However, they concede that legal actions did not unfold in the way that 
antiwar activists anticipated:  
Legal confrontation was the policy of the peace militants who were 
not radical pacifists and who hoped to enlist the coercion of law in 
their cause. In this they failed. They did succeed in helping to 
arouse consciences and to generate the eventual anti-war political 
current. But their success in this was of the sort envisioned by 





witness. The policy of legal encounter, in short, proved to be a 
fairly acceptable strategy of sensitization. (ibid., 212) 
This finding is consistent with Goldstein’s claim that despite the legal 
shortcomings of the case, the trial ensured Coffin’s status as a celebrity 
within the antiwar movement, because “Even though the trial absorbed 
energy and money, the ultimately unsuccessful prosecution added to the 
defendants’ standing as peace movement celebrities and consequential 
moral figures for supporters—and notorious subversives for opponents” 
(2004, 222). 
Remnants of the Existential Mode 
Although Coffin abandoned the existential mode during the trial, 
traces of existential mode remained present in Coffin’s personal 
correspondence. Coffin seemed particularly pleased to have shaped the 
thinking of Yale alumni serving in the military. George Hume wrote to 
Coffin on December 6, 1970 that “the life of a college student seems so 
far away, yet so much more meaningful than my current existence. I 
cannot wait to get out of the military and get back to graduate school, 
and hopefully serve my country in a more contemplative manner” (Hume 
1970, 1). Replying on December 18, Coffin suggested to Hume that his 
discontent with the military represented a great moment of personal 
authenticity. “I am delighted you are not enjoying your life in the 
military,” Coffin wrote. “‘Thanks a lot,’ you say. But wouldn’t it be worse 





again I return to the thought that alienation represents an act of 
understanding. How much better, at least, to understand than to be a 
fool, even though the pain obviously is far greater” (1970, 1). Here, 
Coffin’s words echoed Tillich, who suggested that anxiety represented a 
breakthrough to new life. 
The Emergence of the Reconciling Mode 
Although Coffin remained active in the antiwar movement after the 
trial, Republican Richard Nixon’s victory in the presidential election of 
1968 would change the shape of the antiwar movement. Although Nixon 
made vague promises to end the war during the 1968 campaign, he was 
slow to act on those policies.51  
 Coffin’s public discourse underwent a subtle but notable change 
during this time. Chastened by the outcome of the Boston 5 trial, he no 
longer encouraged direct civil disobedience against the war. In its place, 
Coffin employed a reconciling mode of rhetoric. The mode’s earliest traces 
can be seen as early as October 1969 in Coffin’s speech in New York 
City’s Bryant Park. As the war drew to a close, Coffin’s concerns 
gradually shifted toward advocating legal amnesty for draft resisters. 
The Bryant Park Speech 
 By late 1969, growing public support for a negotiated settlement to 
the war crystallized into plans for a National Moratorium Day on October 
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15. In New York, Mayor John Lindsay directed the city government to 
lower flags to half-staff as a way of mourning the war dead (Bigart 1969, 
16). Extensive Moratorium Day activities in New York included a noon 
rally at Washington Square Park, a noon march from Wall Street to 
Trinity Church, a 12:30 PM rally near the United Nations, and a 4:30 PM 
rally at Bryant Park (New York Times 1969, 16). Speakers at Bryant Park 
included Coffin, Mayor Lindsay, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm of 
Brooklyn, Senators Charles E. Goodell and Jacob Javitz of New York, and 
Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota (Bigart 1969, 16). After the rally, 
demonstrators marched from Bryant Park to Rockefeller Plaza for a 
candlelight vigil and then to Fifth Avenue, for a closing service outside of 
St. Patrick’s Cathedral (ibid.). The day’s events attracted considerable 
media attention. NBC and CBS pre-empted their late night talk shows 
with 90-minute specials about the moratorium (Ferretti 1969, 12). Radio 
and television stations in the metropolitan New York area aired several 
hours of uninterrupted programming about the moratorium, including 
WBAI-FM radio, WVOX-AM radio, and WOR television (ibid.). 
Coffin’s brief speech at Bryant Park repeatedly urged national 
confession for sins committed in Vietnam. The first three paragraphs of 
the speech contained a brief exposition of American failings in the war. In 
the fourth paragraph, Coffin made his first call for confession, arguing 
that “Mayor Lindsay’s day of mourning should also be a day of 





militarily, and unilaterally in the civil affairs of another country” (1969a, 
1). Immediately after this sentence, in the speech’s fifth paragraph, 
Coffin claimed that the United States needed to confess that the South 
Vietnamese government was incompetent, stating, “Then we need to 
confess that, despite the blood of some forty thousand American dead, 
despite the billions of dollars in aid and despite the heroic labor of 
thousands of dedicated Americans, the government in Saigon which we 
support is incapable of winning the support of its own people” (ibid, 1). 
As evidence, Coffin cited the South Vietnamese government’s various 
failures. He asserted, “It is a government of militarists, war profiteers and 
fanatic anti-communists who imprison tens of thousands for the crime of 
simply being against the war” (ibid., 2).  
In the speech’s sixth paragraph, Coffin claimed U.S. conduct 
during the war was immoral, arguing that “we need to confess—and this 
is hard—that we have waged this war in a fashion so out of keeping with 
American instincts for decency as to seriously undermine them” (ibid., 2). 
Coffin supported this point by insisting that “We have forcibly displaced 
millions of civilians. We have reigned [sic] terror from the skies” (ibid, 2). 
He further argued the U.S. military enabled the South Vietnamese 
government’s brutality against its own people, stating that “In Kuan Tin 
province alone, between January and April 1969, American-trained 
agents executed 239 South Vietnamese without trial and 153 who can 





 In the speech’s eighth paragraph, Coffin made clear that he 
believed fault for the war belonged to the United States as a whole, not 
the U.S. military. “Let us be clear,” Coffin said, “the fault does not lie 
with the infantrymen, the bomber pilots, the Green Berets--our boys in 
Vietnam. Rather, the fault lies with our men in Washington, and with us 
for giving them our silent consent” (ibid., 2). As a result, Coffin asserted  
all of the United States needed to confess that “What all [of] America 
needs to recognize, and most needs to confess, is that violence in its 
worst form today is not individual and haphazard, but bureaucratic and 
efficient, antiseptic and profitable” (ibid., 2). He added, “For while all are 
not guilty, in a democracy all are responsible” (ibid., 2).  
In the speech’s eleventh and final paragraph, Coffin pledged to 
participate in further antiwar protests, including the November 15 
Moratorium Day demonstration in Washington, “to continue 
constructive, clear dissent that seeks only to grant [the] Vietnamese a 
genuine chance for peace, to recall our sons from Vietnam and, thereby, 
to recall our citizens to their senses” (ibid., 3).  
Although Coffin’s use of the term confession did not appear to be 
religious in nature, it is nevertheless consistent with definitions of 
confession in recent rhetorical scholarship. For instance, Dave Tell 
argues that confession can have political implications, because “The 
confession, then, is not simply a religious form of speech in which 





speech whose decisive characteristic is its power to render transgression 
in speech and thus bring it into the realm of politics proper—that is, the 
realm of human affairs in which it can be discussed, debated, and 
thereby disarmed” (2008, 163). Thus, the Bryant Park speech can be 
read as Coffin’s attempt to bring American transgressions in Vietnam 
into the open, where they could be rectified. 
1970-1971 
 Archival documents provide limited details about Coffin’s speaking 
activities during 1970 and 1971. Available secondary materials indicate 
that Coffin remained active in the antiwar movement during this time, 
especially as a supporter of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. He 
endorsed the Committee’s peace fast of April 13-15 1970 (Vietnam 
Moratorium Committee 1970), as well as the October 13, 1971 
Moratorium Day (ibid. 1971). He also joined activists in filing an 
unsuccessful lawsuit against Dow Chemical Company, alleging that Dow 
had violated international law by supplying chemicals for the United 
States (New York Times 1970, 28). When the possibility of race riots in 
New Haven arose in April 1970 because of the nearby criminal trial of 
Black Panther Bobby Seale, Coffin played an instrumental role in 





Amnesty: Reintegrating the Antiwar Movement 
 By late 1972, it became apparent that American involvement in the 
Vietnamese conflict was coming to an end. Ongoing peace negotiations in 
Paris led by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger resulted in a negotiated settlement in January 
1973. In a televised speech to the nation on January 23, Richard Nixon 
called the accords “peace with honor” and portrayed the agreement as a 
victory for the United States (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990, 357). The 
actual terms of the accords were far less generous to the United States. 
The agreement stipulated that the United States would withdraw combat 
troops from South Vietnam within 60 days and that all prisoners of war 
would be released (Gwertzman 1973, 1). However, the accords did not 
mandate the withdrawal of North Vietnamese soldiers from the South, 
making the agreement difficult to enforce in practice.52 
 With the war winding down, amnesty for draft resisters became a 
priority for antiwar activists. A coalition of antiwar groups, including 
Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the 
American Friends Service Committee, and the War Resister’s League 
called for amnesty in the spring of 1973 (DeBenedetti and Chatfield 
1990, 354). But the antiwar groups faced an uphill fight. Public opinion 
polls throughout 1972 and 1973 showed strong opposition to granting 
                                                 
     52 North Vietnam subsequently ignored provisions of the Paris 
Accords, and eventually recaptured the territory held by South Vietnam 





amnesty to war resisters (Baskir and Strauss 1978, 209, 210). The Nixon 
administration opposed amnesty, even as other Republican officials 
began to advocate in favor of it (ibid., 210).53 Baskir and Strauss (1978) 
argue that supporting amnesty had four negative consequences for the 
antiwar movement: it focused attention on the most radical fringes of the 
movement, it alienated centrist participants, it provoked strong 
emotional responses from conservatives, and it created tensions between 
the moderate and radical antiwar protesters (ibid., 206-08). 
 Keenly aware of the dilemma faced by draft resisters, Coffin 
increasingly turned toward advocating amnesty in the early 1970s. In 
two of his public statements about amnesty—his Sunday sermon of April 
16, 1972 and his May 5, 1973 speech at the National Conference on 
Amnesty—Coffin presented amnesty as a means for achieving national 
reconciliation and reintegrating war resisters into mainstream American 
culture. 
The Battell Chapel Sermon of April 16, 1972 
 Coffin first offered a detailed argument for amnesty in his April 16, 
1972 sermon. The speech advocated for amnesty—as a means of 
encouraging forgiveness—by invoking arguments from history and ironic 
tropes that highlighted the social contradictions created by the war. In 
the first paragraph of the sermon, Coffin asserted that the end of wars 
                                                 
     53 Republicans who called for amnesty programs included Robert Taft, 
U.S. Senator from Ohio, and former Pentagon officials Melvin Laird and 





often resulted in an ironic sense of justice. He claimed that by the end of 
WWII, “it was a commonplace necessity to destroy the innocents through 
mass bombing. So that ironically, when the war was over, we Americans 
and other victors could judge the German leaders for war crimes, the 
death of the innocent, without a single mention of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 
or Dresden” (Coffin 1972, 1). In the paragraph immediately following, 
Coffin claimed that the United States would soon face a similar choice 
regarding the end of the war in Vietnam, asking rhetorically, “Well, how 
are we going to handle our affairs as a nation once this terrible war is 
over? Are we going to be vindicative [sic], vengeful? Are we going to be 
sentimental, forgetting all kinds of moral distinctions? How are we going 
to handle our affairs? What about amnesty?” (ibid., 1). 
 After a brief digression about the need to care for veterans who did 
serve in Vietnam, Coffin offered a lengthy argument about the historical 
precedent for granting amnesty to war resisters. He asserted that George 
Washington offered amnesty to participants in the Whisky Rebellion, 
Jefferson pardoned deserters in 1807, and Andrew Jackson pardoned 
deserters in 1830 (ibid., 3). But most of all, Coffin found historical 
support for amnesty from the example of the Civil War. He asserted, 
“Once again we have proof that Abraham Lincoln is the spiritual center of 
our country. Lincoln refused to think of any prosecution or of any 





insisted that they return in peace” (ibid., 3-4). Only during the twentieth 
century did amnesty to war opponents become politically unfashionable. 
Coffin next argued that amnesty would purge the nation of moral 
guilt caused by the ironies of the war. The first such irony was the class 
and race-based inequalities that had been perpetuated by the war. 
Beginning in paragraph nine, he argued that amnesty needed to be 
granted to both draft resisters and those who had deserted the military 
while on active duty. Coffin offered a socioeconomic rationale, claiming 
that “when you stop to think of it and look at the record and talk to 
people, you realize that the draft evaders for the most part were white, 
middle-class, went to places like Yale where there was a lot of anti-war 
talk, and then took off” (ibid., 5). In contrast, active duty deserters were 
more likely to be racial minorities without a college education. In Coffin’s 
view, to treat the two groups differently was unacceptable. “wouldn’t it be 
ironic, then if amnesty were used as an instrument, another instrument 
of racial and class discrimination. We can’t morally do that; use amnesty 
in that fashion” (ibid., 5). Coffin next asserted that a second irony of the 
war had been created by shifts in public opinion, arguing that “When you 
stop to think about it, why are these people guilty? Most Americans now 
agree with the position that these exiles took, that the war was mistaken 
in its conceptions, immoral in its conduct, futile in its objectives” (ibid., 
5). Draft resisters and deserters were therefore guilty of only being ahead 





In the final two paragraphs of the sermon, Coffin drew an extended 
metaphor that compared amnesty to Biblical precedents. He argued that 
amnesty was analogous to the jubilee:  
The Jews looked at themselves and said, you know, if all things 
were normal we would be slaves in Egypt. But by God’s grace, 
we’re out. Now, seeing that everything belongs to God we had 
better stop every now and then and take a look at the land and see 
what it would look like if we could look through God’s eyes. What 
would we see? We’d see some people homeless. Yes, but I paid him 
good money for his home. Yes, but God doesn’t want anybody 
homeless. So every fifty years you all go back to your homes. Every 
fifty years everybody gets his land back. Every fifty years, all debts 
are wiped out. All iniquities pardoned. We’ll start it all over again, 
we’ll proclaim a jubilee year. (ibid., 7-8) 
In Coffin’s view, amnesty would follow the same precedent. This would 
ultimately help to restore the reputation of the United States. He 
asserted, “If we abstain from all punitive acts, against those who 
prosecuted this war and against those who refused to participate in it, I 
think we shall be in the spirit of the year of jubilee, affirm a spirit of 
humanity that will stand this nation in good stead as it makes peace 





Remarks to the National Conference on Amnesty, May 5, 1973 
Coffin again argued in favor of amnesty at the National Conference 
on Amnesty in Washington D.C. on May 3, 1973. As he had a year 
earlier, Coffin again invoked the examples of Abraham Lincoln and the 
year of the jubilee to argue for the historical precedence of amnesty. But 
the argument ultimately turned to healing psychological divisions that 
had divided the country. 
 Coffin began the speech by quoting from Lincoln’s second 
inaugural the words, “With malice toward none, with charity for all, with 
firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to 
finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him 
who shall have borne the battle[,] and for his widow and for his orphan, 
to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among 
ourselves and among all nations” (Coffin 1973, 1). He then contrasted 
Lincoln with Nixon, stating that “the very fact that that the American 
president now, who has two strikes against him, still could knock the 
amnesty pitch clean out of the ballpark, is an indication of how far this 
nation is from its own spiritual center” (ibid.). He reminded the audience 
that the majority of Americans did not favor amnesty and that recent 
attempts by Ohio Senator Robert Taft to advocate for amnesty had been 
unsuccessful. In Coffin’s view, “It is not politically expedient to introduce 
this because the nation doesn’t know that generosity is expedient to the 





Rather than dwell on the historical precedent of Lincoln or the 
jubilee, Coffin instead argued for psychological reconciliation. To 
accomplish this, he first claimed that both opponents and advocates of 
the war needed to accept responsibility for their failures, noting that 
“when we are talking in ultimate terms, it doesn’t matter who broke the 
law, who kept the law, human relations are finally not contractual, they 
are human” (ibid., 3). Coffin criticized the antiwar movement for failing to 
embrace this principle, chastising them for being too strident in their 
demands:  
We often hear that America has to confess her faults. For whose 
sake? I agree that America has to confess her faults. Confession is 
good for the soul, I’m committed to that. But when I hear people 
say that America must confess her faults, I hear people say that for 
my sake just as much for her sake. In other words, its [sic] an old 
psychological understanding that the need for reform can be as 
insistent a need for the reformer as the need not to reform is for 
the recalcitrant. And when the need for reform is laid on the 
recalcitrant by the reformer, in order to satisfy his need, what 
happens? He only increases the insecurity of the person that made 
him go for ‘America, love it or leave it’ in the first place. (ibid., 4-5) 
 Achieving amnesty as a political objective required understanding the 
mentality of war resisters. Coffin argued, “We cannot educate because 





to engage in an educational campaign, we have to know how to get at the 
underlying anxieties” (ibid., 5). He then offered a list of common 
counterarguments to amnesty and ways to respond to them. 
Conclusion 
Only after Nixon’s August 1974 resignation and Gerald Ford’s 
subsequent ascent to the presidency did amnesty for draft resisters 
become a real political possibility. Encouraged by his son, Jack, Ford 
announced a clemency program during his first days in office. Under the 
Ford program, fugitive draft resisters would perform up to two years’ of 
alternative service, after which time, the charges would be dismissed 
(Baskir and Strauss 1978, 212). Supporting a limited form of amnesty 
also proved politically attractive to President Ford, as way of quelling 
public anger over his controversial pardon of President Nixon 
(DeBenedetti and Chatfield 1990, 369). The Ford program required draft 
resisters “to take a loyalty oath, undertake two years of alternate service, 
and submit to periodic review by a clemency board” (ibid., 370). The 
program proved to be unpopular with draft resisters, because, “those 
who refused clemency and pursued their cases in court had about a 90 
percent chance of getting charges dismissed without having to do 
alternative service, and about a 99% chance of avoiding prison” (Baskir 
and Strauss 1978, 212). Of the 263,250 draft fugitives and non-
registrants eligible under the terms of the Ford program, only 2,600 





(ibid., 217).54 On January 21, 1977, President Carter issued pardons for 
7,150 convicted draft resisters and ordered the government not to 
prosecute the remaining non-registrants (ibid., 231). 
As the last Americans fled Saigon in April 1975, ahead of the 
rapidly-descending North Vietnamese military, the long Vietnam era had 
finally ended for the United States. By late 1974, Coffin had become 
restless at Yale. Vietnam no longer registered as a major public concern 
and the skirmishes of the civil rights movements had receded into the 
past (Goldstein 2004, 272). The prophetic mode no longer resonated with 
Yale students, the existential mode seemed unnecessary with military 
forces no longer in Vietnam, and the reconciling mode had been rendered 
obsolete by the Ford clemency program. In January 1975, Coffin 
announced that he would retire from Yale at the end of the academic 
year (ibid., 273). He returned to the pulpit two years later as the senior 
minister at Riverside Church in New York City. For the time being, a 
major chapter had closed for the former CIA agent-turned minister-
turned Freedom Rider-turned draft resistance leader. 
 
  
                                                 
     54 Baskir and Strauss categorize civilian resisters into four categories: 
draft fugitives who remained at large within the United States, 
nonregistrants who refused to comply with the Selective Service Act, 
convicted offenders who went to prison, and expatriates who fled the 








This project examined Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr.’s public 
discourse during the Vietnam War era. As the chaplain at Yale University 
and a founding member of the organization Clergy and Laymen 
Concerned about Vietnam, Coffin became a prominent spokesperson for 
the religious branch of the antiwar movement. I argued that as the war 
continued, Coffin employed prophetic, existential, and reconciling modes 
of rhetoric to express his opposition. Coffin’s use of these three modes 
reflected his evolving views about how to best oppose the war; as political 
circumstances changed, so did Coffin’s antiwar activities, and in turn, 
his rhetoric. My analysis drew on primary sources produced between 
1961 and 1973, including sermons, speeches, interview transcripts, 
essays, personal correspondence, and courtroom testimony. 
Coffin’s earliest antiwar discourse used a prophetic mode of 
rhetoric. The prophetic mode relied on appeals from the Hebrew Bible to 
warn of God’s impending judgment, and reflected the theological 
influences of Personalism and Neo-Orthodoxy. Prior to the antiwar 
movement, Coffin employed prophetic arguments to justify his 
participation in the civil rights movement and the May 1961 Freedom 
Rides. Notably, in “The Church and Civil Rights” (1962), Coffin defended 
his pro-civil rights activities by invoking prophetic arguments about the 





the American bombing campaign in Vietnam, he instinctively employed 
the prophetic mode in his first antiwar sermon, “The Spirit of Lamech,” 
delivered in January 1966. He likewise employed the prophetic mode in 
“Plea to the President” (1966) and in “Why Are the Clergy Concerned 
About Vietnam?” (1966/1967). At this stage in the war, Coffin called for a 
negotiated settlement to the war, rather than unilateral American 
withdrawal. However, as the war continued, Coffin grew increasingly 
frustrated with U.S. policymakers.  
 Disappointed with the continuing carnage in Vietnam, Coffin 
abandoned his call for a negotiated settlement in 1967. Instead, he began 
to argue that individuals had a duty to oppose the war by any means 
possible, including civil disobedience through draft resistance. He 
publicly endorsed this view for the first time in his lecture “On Civil 
Disobedience” (1967). The basic thrust of his argument was that 
individuals had an existential duty to follow their own conscience, even if 
those actions put them in conflict with the state, and to accept 
responsibility for any consequences that occurred as a result. This new, 
existential mode of rhetoric was consonant with contemporary views on 
the human condition in philosophy, theology, and popular discourse 
opposing the war in Vietnam. Coffin spent several months in the spring 
and summer of 1967 engaged in behind-the-scenes organizing with other 
antiwar activists. In October 1967, he participated in a flurry of antiwar 





Washington, D.C. that openly urged draft resistance and facilitated 
conduct by resisters that was forbidden by the Federal Selective Service 
Act. 
 As a result of the October 1967 anti-draft activities, a Federal 
grand jury indicted Coffin and four other antiwar movement leaders in 
January 1968 for conspiracy to aid and abet draft resisters. During the 
subsequent trial, Coffin repeatedly testified that he did not seek to 
persuade anyone to resist the draft. This testimony contradicted what 
Coffin had said during the October 1967 protests in Boston and 
Washington, D.C. It also ran counter to the existential mode that Coffin 
had preached for most of 1967, which emphasized accepting personal 
responsibility for one’s own actions--including any negative 
consequences. By refusing to accept personal responsibility for 
encouraging draft resistance, Coffin appeared hypocritical and evasive.  A 
jury convicted Coffin and three of his co-defendants in June 1968.  
Although a Federal appeals court later overturned the verdict, 
Coffin was shaken by his conviction and abandoned the existential mode. 
In its place, he employed a reconciling mode of rhetoric that sought to 
heal societal divisions created by the war. At first, Coffin emphasized 
collective national responsibility for the war and its effects, as evidenced 
in his “Speech at Bryant Park,” delivered during the October 1969 
Moratorium Day protests. Later, as the war drew to a close, Coffin 





discourse during this period conspicuously avoided assigning blame for 
the war, reframed draft resistance as a patriotic act, and argued that 
amnesty had historical precedent in the United States. 
The main contribution of my study is a new and more complex 
interpretation of William Coffin’s rhetoric on the war in Vietnam during 
1961–1973. My interpretation is new, because it brings into 
consideration a broad range of rhetorical materials that have previously 
been ignored. Among these materials are five sermons, seven speeches, 
two essays, nine letters, one interview, and one trial court record that 
have never been examined in relation to Coffin’s antiwar discourse. My 
interpretation is necessarily complex, because an inclusive review of 
Coffin’s discourse makes clear that he employed at least three distinct 
modes of rhetorical discourse in adaptation to shifting circumstances in 
the war and religious responses to it. 
In addition to providing a more nuanced historical interpretation of 
Coffin’s activities, my analysis points toward a possible new approach to 
a common methodological problem in rhetorical studies of social 
movements. As J. Robert Cox and Christina Foust argue, it is remarkably 
difficult for scholars of social movement rhetoric to theorize effect:  
The question of efficacy remains the white elephant in the room as 
scholars often ignore the conceptual ambiguities in the vocabulary 
and categories for assessing the consequential nature of 





number of questions remain: In what ways are the linguistic and 
extralinguistic acts of activists related to changes (if any) in law, 
policy, prevailing discourses, activists’ identities, or interests? If 
historical events are overdetermined or the result of multiple and 
complex causes, can SMR scholars speak intelligibly about 
“effects” at all? What are the conceptual or theoretical challenges 
in specifying rhetorical effects, instead of external policy or 
historical effects? (2009, 621). 
Rather than claim that Coffin’s antiwar rhetoric influenced target 
audiences to take specific actions regarding the war, I believe Coffin’s 
significance to the Vietnam antiwar movement might be more fruitfully 
discussed from the standpoint of intertextuality. Because Coffin’s 
antiwar arguments instantiated three modes of rhetoric that circulated 
within his intellectual milieu, it seems possible to use the categories of 
prophetic, existential, and reconciling rhetoric as categories for the 
investigation of discourse by other antiwar speakers. 
 Intertextuality provides a plausible framework for analyzing 
similarities between texts produced by many authors and writers in the 
Vietnam antiwar movement. First coined by literary theorist Julia 
Kristeva, “intertextuality” initially referred to the way that literary texts 
incorporated elements of other literary texts.55 Early studies of 
                                                 
     55 Kristeva defines intertextuality as the complex production of 
meaning in literary text, in which “[t]he text is defined as a trans-





intertextuality restricted the concept to the direct quotation of one text 
within another (Plett 1991, v.) However, more recent theorists argue that 
intertextuality may be implicit. For example, Gerard Genette describes a 
variation of intertextuality that he terms metatextuality; this “unites a 
given text to another, of which it speaks without necessarily citing it 
(without summoning it), in fact sometimes without even naming it” 
(1997, 3).56 Norman Fairclough articulates this relationship more 
explicitly, arguing that “a text may 'incorporate' another text without the 
latter being explicitly cued: one can respond to another text in the way 
one words one’s own text, for example. The constitutive intertextuality of 
a text, however, is the configuration of discourse conventions that go into 
                                                                                                                                                 
communicative speech, which aims to inform directly, to different kinds 
of anterior or synchronic utterances. The text is therefore a productivity, 
and this means: first, that its relationship to the language in which it is 
situated is distributive (destructive-constructive) and hence can be better 
approached through logical categories rather than linguistic ones; and 
second, that it is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space 
of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and 
neutralize one another” (1980, 36) 
 
     56 Genette identifies five types transtextual relationships: first, 
intertextuality, or the direct quotation one text within a second text; 
second paratexts, which are devices as titles, prefaces, or illustrations 
that situate a single text within a larger field of meaning; third, 
metatextuality, explained above; fourth, architextuality, large-scale 
semiotic patterns such as prose or verse; and fifth, hypertextuality, or 






its production” (1992, 104).57 Thus, it is possible to analyze 
intertextuality even when texts to not directly refer to one another. 
Scholars of Vietnam antiwar movement rhetoric might profitably 
analyze antiwar discourses from the intertextual standpoint by 
examining the types of relationships between such discourses. For 
example, scholars interested in the prophetic mode might compare 
Coffin’s prophetic discourses with Martin Luther King Jr.’s anti-Vietnam 
War sermon “A Time to Break Silence” delivered on April 4, 1967. King’s 
speech bears striking similarities to Coffin’s “The Spirit of Lamech” 
(1966). Most notably, King ended his sermon by quoting the James L. 
Lowell poem “Once to Every Man,” the same poem that Coffin used in the 
opening lines of “Lamech.” Protesters sang the hymn during the 
Arlington Street Church service during the October 1967 draft resistance 
protests, and the phrase “Once to Every Man” subsequently became the 
title of Coffin’s 1977 autobiography.58 Other instances of prophetic 
rhetoric may exist in the speeches of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, a 
CALCAV member and friend of Coffin, whose collected papers remain 
unprocessed.59 
                                                 
     57 Fairclough prefers the term ‘interdiscursivity’ rather than 
‘constitutive intertextuality,’ to call attention to the social forces involved 
in the production of texts (1992, 104). 
 
      58 “Once to Every Man” was first written by James L. Lowell in 1845. 
It subsequently became a hymn later in the nineteenth century. 
  
     59 Duke University acquired Heschel’s collected personal papers in 





Scholars interested in the existential mode might profitably analyze 
the antiwar speeches of Robert McAfee Brown anthologized in his 1972 
book The Pseudonyms of God. A professor of religious studies at Stanford 
University, Brown participated in CALCAV-sponsored protests in the 
western United States and expressed support for draft resisters in late 
1967. Brown’s speech “From a Mandate for Murder to a Placard for 
Peace,” delivered at an anti-draft protest in San Francisco on December 
4, 1967, represents a particularly clear case of the existential mode. In 
the speech, Brown extolled the virtues of individual conscience and 
urged young men to resist the draft if they felt compelled to do so, and to 
accept any consequences their actions might produce. 
Finally, scholars interested in the reconciling mode of antiwar 
rhetoric might analyze the March 1974 amnesty hearings held by the 
U.S. House of Representative’s Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration of Justice. Fifty-four witnesses testified for the 
subcommittee and hundreds of additional persons offered written 
statements, resulting in over 900 pages of hearing transcripts. W. 
Sterling Cary, president of the National Council of Churches, testified for 
the committee on March 11, 1974. In his testimony, Cary expressed 
themes similar to Coffin’s use of the reconciling mode. He emphasized 
that the Vietnam War had created national divisions and that a need for 
reconciliation existed, but conspicuously avoided assigning blame for the 
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war. On the same day, Rev. J. Bryan Hehir testified to the committee on 
behalf of the United States Catholic Conference, and likewise emphasized 
the need for reconciliation.  
 On analogy with the foregoing, intertextuality, might provide a 
possible means for explaining the significance of social movement 
rhetoric which avoids the conundrum described by Cox and Foust. 
Rather than asserting a speech produced a particular effect in an 
audience, the rhetorical critic could use intertextuality to point to 
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